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PREFACE 
Keith Hitchins/ Orthodoxy an.Q !'J..?._!iona_lj_:ty~ Angrej~ 
saguna and _:the Buma_!!iaDE_ 9i 1E~nsylv~ni~.L 1§46.:11311 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977) described the 
personality and achievements of a remarkable national leader 
who was also a bishop. The work includes a discussion of 
Saguna/s relations with Greek Catholic Metropolitan 
Alexandru Sterca-$ulutiu, a no less remarkable leader who 
has received little attention from historians. American 
historiography has been even less aware of the contemporary 
prelates Janos Scitovszky, Lajos Haynald, roan Alexi and 
Iosif Papp-Szilagyi and their role in the political battles 
Hitchins described. This dissertation places the nations 
and religions of Transylvania in a context 1n which the 
relationship of religion and politics, and of bishops and 
clergymen of the various religions and ethnic groups, may be 
better understood. 
The completion of this study owes a debt to scholars 
and institutions too numerous to list. The short list 
includes Professor Hitchins of the University of Illinois, 
whose works inspired my interest in Transylvania and set an 
imposing standard of scholarship, and various members of the 
Indiana University Department of History for their teaching. 
Among the latter, I must recognize a special debt to 
Professor Gyorgy Ranki, who provided insightful but tolerant 
guidance, and Professor Denis Sinor, who added my name to 
v 
his long list of doctoral students and patiently supervised 
this dissertation to its conclusion. The International 
Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) made possible a research 
stay of nearly one year each in Hungary and Romania. I 
especially appreciate the astute diplomacy of those who 
helped to secure my access to archives in Romania: Regina 
Kay as IREX desk officer for Romania, and the Romanian 
Academy of Social and Political Sciences. It was my privi-
lege to enjoy the sponsorship and hospitality of the 
Historical Institute of the Hungarian Academy in Budapest 
and the Institute of History and Archaeology in Cluj-Napoca. 
My official advisors in these places, Professors Peter Hanak 
and $tefan Pascu, generously offered their time and influence. 
Ambrus Miskolczy and Simian Retegan were my expert and 
enthusiastic consultants on the nuts and bolts of research. 
Numerous archivists provided invaluable assistance. Down 
the final stretch of writing I received the assistance of a 
Mellon Dissertation Write-Up Fellowship from the Russian and 
East European Institute of Indiana University and a semester 
in Debrecen through the Indiana University-Lajos Kossuth 
University exchange. The services of the university 
libraries in Debrecen, at the University of Illinois 1n 
Champaign-Urbana and Indiana University, and especially 
extraordinary help by the Interlibrary Loan staff at the 
latter institution, are gratefully acknowledged. I must 
recognize a special debt to Simian Retegan for providing 
vi 
detailed comments and Ruth Weening for stylistic editing of 
the final text. Peter Jorgensen of the Academic Computer 
Center, Colgate University, provided invaluable assistance 
in the preparation of the two maps. Finally, every graduate 
student should have a financial aid office as understanding 
as my parents have been. None of these people, nor the 
friends and colleagues in Hungary, Romania and elsewhere who 
also helped, are responsible for the interpretations, errors 
and (mis)translations I stubbornly retained through the 
various drafts of this work. 
There is no completely satisfactory solution to the 
problem of the linguistic form of names to be used when 
writing about Transylvania in English. The consistent 
translation of all terms is only logical when writing in one 
of the indigenous languages. During the 1860s official 
correspondence in Transylvania was carried out in four 
languages (those of the three most numerous nationalities 
and Latin), using as many as four different names for 
Transylvanian localities. People of those times pragmatic-
ally translated the names of places and persons into the 
language they were using at the moment, and did not assume 
that the language one uses identifies the nationality of the 
subject. In view of the dominant conception of our day and 
as a shorthand which reflects the ethnic makeup of locali-
ties in the 1860s in most cases, I will use the following 
procedure. All districts and localities of the Szekler 
vii 
region [§zekelyfold] will bear their Hungarian names, as 
will all counties, royal free cities, privileged noble 
towns, and market towns [ v<hmegyek, .§~ab9:d ~i!:~l.Yi­
varosok, kivaltsago_.§ neEleS ~ar_gso~, and ki~al!:sa_gos 
mezovarosok] of the second major administrative category, 
the Hungarian or noble counties. Districts and district 
seats [Stuhle and Vororte, _§ze~e~ and 
szekhelyek] of the third region, the Fundus Regius 
[Saxon region, ~iralyfold] bear their German names. 
Finally, the two Romanian districts and all other localities 
will be identified by the Romanian names which correspond to 
modern usage. Geographic features bear their Romanian 
names. Cities in Hungary bear their Hungarian names 
regardless of their population. An exception to the last 
rule is Karlowitz/Karlocza/Sremci Karlovci, which is known 
in the English-language literature by its German name. 
Alternative forms of names are given in a table on pages 
xiii-xv. For personal names, I will use the form which 
historians of that person's nationality most commonly 
employ. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Scholars generally accept the view of Oscar Jaszi and 
Robert A. Kann that religious affiliation was one of the 
integrating forces in the Habsburg monarchy and nationalism 
l 
one of the disintegrating ones. The Habsburg dynasty 
and bureaucracy naturally sought to employ the centripetal 
forces at their disposal, among which the churches and a 
religiously inspired social conservatism were prominent. A 
major paradox of the monarchy in the nineteenth century is 
that nationalism arose in national groups whose churches and 
clergy retained an enormous intellectual and social influence 
and were themselves enmeshed in the national movements. Not 
only did the Habsburg court continue to rely on religious 
institutions for support, but it also sought to encourage 
and harness national movements for imperial ends. The lat-
ter policy would have fateful consequences for the monarchy 
itself. This complex interaction is at the center of this 
study. 
Friedrich Engel-Janosi wrote with reference to the 
1860s: 
l. Oscar J~szi, The Dissolution of the Habsburq 
Monarchy (Chicago: universityofchlcago Press, 1929), pp. 
155-62, 248-67; Robert A. Kann, Th~ ~absp~~g Empire: ~Study 
jn ]:ntegra_:tio_!! ang Dt§ integration (New York: Praeger, 19 57) , 
pp. 7-15, reprinted in: The Austrian Empire: Abortive 
Federation?, Nancy M. ancCHarolcf-:J·~-Gordon, eds. (Lexington, 
Mass: Heath, 1974), pp. 129-36. 
l 
In later times it was primarily the parish clergy 
which was susceptible to political activity in the 
service of the oppositional, mostly Slavic nation-
alities. At the time of the Hungarian crisis, the 
bishops placed themselves at the disposal of the 
leaders of the national movements ... A thorough 
portrayal of the national opposition of the bishops 
of the Transleithanian half of the empire would be 
very welcome. 2 
One object of this study is to help fill the lacuna that 
Engel-Janosi points out. Although the focus is on 
Transylvania, its intense relations with other Habsburg ter-
ritories and even with the Danubian Principalities require 
that these lands also be drawn into the picture. 
Between 1860 and 1865 the decisive struggle was fought 
in the monarchy between the advocates of centralized court 
control and rule by the two most powerful national groups. 
The Austrian Germans and the Hungarians, seeking to estab-
lish and control parliamentary government in their halves of 
the monarchy, emerged victorious in the Austro-Hungarian 
Ausgleich [Compromise] of 1867 after the fall of the liberal 
centralist regime two years earlier. Emperor Franz Joseph 
had reluctantly agreed in 1861 to grant a constitution with 
a central parliament (Reichsrat) composed of representatives 
of all provinces of the monarchy. The dominant Hungarian 
aristocracy in both Hungary and Transylvania refused to 
allow their diets to send deputies to the Reichsrat, thereby 
threatening the success of the new system. As in its ear-
lier contests with Hungarian particularism, the court was 
2. Osterreich und der Vatikan 1846-1918 (Graz: Styria, 1958 )-, 131~---- --- -- -----
2 
able to enlist a powerful weapon in the struggle to preserve 
centralized rule: the appeal to the sentiments of the non-
Hungarian nationalities in Hungary and Transylvania. 
A study of this period in the Habsburg province of 
Transylvania, with its Romanian, Hungarian and Saxon 
3 
(German) populations , is instructive with respect to the 
new Habsburg strategy. This time the court went beyond the 
mere manipulation of national differences. To secure a 
Transylvanian diet that would send deputies to the 
Reichsrat, it awarded social benefits and political oppor-
tunities to the other nationalities that had lasting signi-
ficance for the vitality of the national movements. It 
facilitated major improvements in minority language educa-
tion, guaranteed the autonomy of the minorities' churches, 
and permanently broadened the political arena. To break the 
resistance of the Hungarian nobility, it replaced the cor-
porative electoral law with a more liberal economic one. 
These benefits granted to the nationalities were in part an 
extension of the achievements of the revolution of 1848, but 
they went much further. Romanian gains in Hungary and 
Transylvania eventually undermined the national hegemony 
that Hungarian leaders demanded in 1848 and thought they had 
assured in 1867. 
Recent studies have pointed out the importance of the 
3. According to a calculation based on offical statis-
tics, the population of Transylvania in 1869 was 57% 
Romanian, 32% Hungarian and 10.5% German. Karoly Keleti, 
Hazank es ne~ .9: ko_zg_a_zda_E~ ~_§_ _!:~rs_?da_lmi Et~_tis~_!:jka §~_~!_ll= 
pontjabOl (Pest: Athenaeum, 1871), 72. 
3 
clergy in the national movements of East European minorities 
4 
which lacked a powerful aristocracy or middle class. 
Nationalism required ideology and propaganda, functions 
dependent on the intelligentsia. The clergy often was the 
dominant element of the intelligentsia in premodern socie-
ties. Only as the economic transformation progressed during 
the nineteenth century was society able to offer intellec-
tual employment outside the church, as education, journalism 
and the professions expanded. Thus while clerical leader-
ship was strongest among the socially disadvantaged nation-
alities-- such as the Romanians, Slovaks, Slovenes, 
Estonians and Lithuanians-- the clergy also played a major 
cultural and political role among Transylvania's Hungarians 
and Saxons. While the Hungarians and Saxons had their own 
aristocracy or middle class, the expansion of politics into 
the village inevitably involved the clergy. The latter were 
the most numerous element of the rural intelligentsia in 
each ethnic group. It was primarily the clergy who received 
higher education at distant foreign or domestic institu-
tions. The cleric was often an adherent of nationalist 
ideology and corresponded regularly with church and civil 
authorities. In an era of restricted social and geographic 
4. Hugh Seton-Watson, "'Intelligentsia' und Nationalis-
mus in Osteuropa 1848-1918," Historische ~eitsc_brij't 195 
(1962), 331-45; Gale Stokes, "Church and Class in Early 
Balkan Nationalism," Ea_s! ~_yropeafl_ Quarterly, 13,3 (1979), 
259-70; Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National 
!"{§viya l 1:.!2 ~Y.!:2Pe: "8- f9!f!Pii.!:a t_iv~ AnE~J.i?J~ 2l the Social 
~9!!!P9.§i!-io!l of Pa_tTio_!.ic §roy£? ~mo!lg_ !-be _?ma_ller European 
Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
4 
mobility, he provided a picture of the outside world through 
his sermons and less formal contacts with the villagers. 
clerical leadership was strongest and survived the longest 
in relatively isolated or impoverished villages where the 
nation lacked a wealthier or better-educated aristocracy or 
middle class. 
This study has profited from the recent renaissance of 
research and publication of Hungarian and Romanian church 
history. Church historiography was a dominant branch of the 
historical discipline among Romanians and Saxons during much 
of the nineteenth century, as typified by the works of Georg 
Daniel and Friedrich Teutsch and the many works about 
5 
$aguna. Hungarian church historiography reached a high 
level of sophistication during the period between the two 
6 
world wars. Conditions for church history were unfavor-
able for most of the period after 1945, but have improved in 
the last fifteen years as both the Orthodox Church in 
Romania and the Roman Catholic Church in Hungary have estab-
7 
lished a modus vivendi with the state. The renaissance of 
5. On the most important Romanian church historian of 
the interwar period, see Niessen, "Ioan Lupa~ and the Cluj 
School of History Between the World Wars," Balkanistica 7 
(1981-2), pp. 78-91. 
6. Still interesting today from a theoretical standpoint 
are the articles in the church history yearbook Regnum by 
Tihamer Vanyo: "Hogyan irjuk meg egy egyhazmegye 
tortEmetet?" (1937), "A plebaniatortenetiras m6dszertana" 
(1941), and "Az egyhazt6rt€mesz szemhatara" (1943). 
7. Most of the Romanian Orthodox bishoprics now publish 
journals that include historical articles, which tend to be 
apologetic and biographic. Romania hosted a meeting of the 
International Commission for Comparative Church History at 
the International Congress of Historical Sciences in 
Bucharest in 1980 and presented more than a third of the 
5 
catholic church history in this century received specific 
encouragement from the Second Vatican Council and from the 
decision of Pope Paul VI in 1966 to open the archives of 
8 
Pope Pius IX (1846-1878) to historical research. Two 
products of the improved atmosphere which have proven most 
useful for this study are the source publications of the 
Hungarian and Romanian citizens Lajos Lukacs and Ion 
9 
Dumitriu-Snagov. 
papers (Comite international des sciences historiques. XVe 
Congres international des sciences historiques. Bucarest, 
10-17 aout 1980, Actes IV,2 (Bucarest: Academie, 1982), pp. 
1133-40), but it is unclear whether this will stimulate 
church historiography in Romania. I have used Mircea 
Pacurariu's recent survey of Romanian Orthodox church 
history: Istoria bisericii ortodoxe rom§ne III, Bucure$ti: 
Editura Institutului biblic- ;;{-de-misiune-a Bisericii 
Ortodoxe Romane, 1981). 
8. Part of the Vatican Archives for these years had been 
open previously, however. Most of the works on Hungarian 
Catholic church history surveyed by Jend Gergely in "Disser-
tationes Hungaricae ex Historia Ecclesiae (A magyar 
katolikus egyhaztortenetiras ujabb eredmenyeirol)," Szazadok 
117,3 (1983), 647-66) appeared in Germany since 1966, and 
only a few in Hungary. During most of the period after 1945 
church history was suppressed in Hungary even more 
thoroughly than in Romania, and political conditions still 
discourage the preoccupation of professional historians with 
church topics. Unlike the minority Reformed Church, the 
Catholic Church in Hungary offers no journals or profes-
sional training in the field of church history. The publi-
cation of Konrad Szanto's 12. ka_toliku.§ ~_yhaz tortenete 
and the holding of a church history symposium in Hungary 
recently indicate the situation may be changing; see Konrad 
Szanto, "A katolikus egyhaztortenetirasr61," Hist6ria 7,4 
( 1985), 3 0-31; Zsuzsanna Demeter and Jimos Po to, "Egyhaztor-
teneti szimpozion," Szazadok 119 (1985), 1346-8; and most 
recently Tihamer Vanyo, "Nemzeti egyhaztortE~netirasunk. 
Teljesitmenyek es feladatok," Szazadok 120 (1986), 678-705. 
9. Lukacs, Th~ Vaticag a:r1d HUQ9§-_EY 1846-1878 (Budapest: 
Akademiai, 1981) and Dumitru-Snagov, 1~ §_9-in~= Siege et la 
Roumanie Moderne (Roma: Universita Gregoriana Editrice, 
1982). There are several Hungarian Protestant journals in 
Hungary that publish historical articles, and two in 
Romania. Concerning recent Hungarian Reformed church 
historiography, see Laszlo Makkai, "Reformatus tortenet-
6 
Scholars in recent years have called for a departure 
from traditional church history that concentrated on the 
laudable activities of individual bishops and holy persons 
and underestimated the social dimension. The church as an 
institution necessarily had to consider material and politi-
cal interests that can only be understood independent of 
theology. Furthermore, historical evidence is silent about 
10 
the role of churches as an instrument of salvation. The 
believers' relationship to religion was a complex cultural 
and social phenomenon. Modern church historians have ex-
tended their interest to anthropology, sociology, and social 
ll 
movements. 
Gabriel Adrianyi has cited the churches' role as ex-
pressions of national identity, their original contributions 
to canon law, distinctive religious ethnography and mission-
12 
ary activity as special East European characteristics. 
1ras," Historia 7,4 (1985), 34. 
10. This point was emphasized by the President of the 
American Society of Church History in a recent address: 
Henry Warner Bowden, "Ends and Means in Church History," 
Church Risto~ 54 (1985), 85. 
11. Edith Saurer, "Kirchengeschichte als historische 
Disziplin," in Denken uber Gesc_bic_b_!.~~ Au_fsa,tze zur _beu.!_:igen 
Situation des ~Echich_tli~heQ Bewusstseins und dei Ge§.chjchts~ 
wissenschaft(Munchen: 1974), pp. 157-69; Richard von Dulmen, 
"Religionsgeschichte in der historischen Sozialforschung," 
Geschichte und Gesellschaft 6 (1980), 36-59. 
12. Gabriel Adrianyi,---oiJ5ie osteuropaische Kirchen-
geschichte und ihre Integrierung in die Westeuropaische," ln 
Fes!_g_?be .fur _:§ernhars:!_ §.!_:asl:ew~ki ~urn 1~ Geburtstag 
(Leverkusen: Verlagshaus Borengasser, 1980), pp. 45-47. 
Adrianyi is referring here chiefly to the Catholic Church, 
but his observations apply equally to other churches in the 
region. See also Bernhard Stasiewski, "Zum Begriff der 
osteurop~ischen Geschichte und Kirchengeschichte," Munchner 
The_2logis_ghe Eeitschrift 4 (1953), 324-340. 
7 
These traits evolved 1n an environment of many nationalities 
and religions, where the variety of contacts reinforced 
separate identities. Both the ethnic and ecclesiastic 
dimension of the religious communities extended people's 
awareness beyond the village, the province and even the 
state borders. For politically conscious Hungarians in 
Transylvania in the 1860s, the decisive contest with 
Austrian absolutism was being fought in Hungary proper. 
The Saxon view of politics was influenced by the contem-
porary struggle for supremacy in Germany. The most signif-
icant political events for the Romanians during these same 
years were the unification of the Danubian Principalities in 
1859 and the reforms of Prince Cuza in the following years. 
It is thus possible to speak of ethnic Transylvania as the 
center of three overlaid rings, three very different 
13 
national contexts. Each church also represented a 
religious community that crossed political boundaries, and 
hence played its part in cultivating awareness of broader 
ethnic solidarities. International religious solidarities--
Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant-- were even more complex, 
but to some degree they undermined national exclusiveness. 
Most of the historiography concerning Transylvania is 
nationalist in spirit or at least informed by a specific 
13. The historian of the Transylvanian Saxon press noted 
this phenomenon in the preoccupations of the Saxon, 
Hungarian and Romanian press in our period: Weisenfeld, 4. 
Katherine Verdery observes a similar socioecomic matrix: 
German merchants, Hungarian landowners, and Romanian 
peasants: Verdery, 195-229. 
8 
national perspective. Stefan Malfer has noted the absence 
of a detailed investigation of Austrian policy toward 
Transylvania during the 1860s, and lamented the lack of a 
political history of Transylvania not written from the per-
14 
spective of one of the three nationalities. The national 
historical traditions are limited by particularist concerns 
and lines of inquiry. A comparative approach is needed to 
15 
overcome these limits. This study addresses the general 
phenomenon of clerical and religious influence in 
Transylvania, weighing the relative importance of secular 
and religious institutions, culture and social structure for 
this influence, and strives for a better understanding of 
Transylvanian Hungarian, Saxon and Romanian society and 
their churches. 
The possibilities of statistical comparison of the type 
practiced by Hroch are limited in the case of Transylvania 
by the dearth of preliminary studies concerning the number, 
material support, and numerical significance within national 
intelligentsias of each nation's clergy. The national move-
ments of Transylvanian Hungarians, Saxons and Romanians were 
of different types with respect to their dominant social 
classes. Hungarian nationalism was of the aristocratic 
type, Saxon nationalism bourgeois or middle class, and 
Romanian nationalism plebeian or clerical. Transylvanian 
14. Introductory study to POM, V,3, xlvi. 
15. See Gyorgy Rimki, "Az osszehasonl.i.to tortenetiras 
problemai," in Rimki, Mo~gastef"ekL kenys zerpalyak (Budapest: 
Magvet6, 1983), 173-204. 
9 
Romanian society was comparatively "incomplete," lacking an 
16 
upper class like those of the other two nations. 
Urban intellectuals increasingly challenged clerical 
leadership. In general the laicization of politics and cul-
ture-- what sociologists call "secularization"-- proceeded 
throughout the century. Not only were the state and lay 
institutions taking over many normative and educational 
functions as well as the control of the property of the 
church, which is the conventional legal sense of the term 
secularization. Officials and laymen also contested the 
influence and leadership of the church and clergy in social 
movements. 
Various factors, however, partially offset this trend 
and restricted anticlericalism in Transylvania. Clergymen 
and church schools had long been the center of ethnic 
identity, as elsewhere in the monarchy. In addition, the 
Transylvanian constitution which existed up to 1848 had in-
vested special authority in the churches, and their autonomy 
was largely respected even after 1867. The corporative 
constitution assured special status to the churches and 
clergy. It was revised during the 1860s to give greater 
weight to property, but the religiosity and preference for 
traditional institutions of Franz Joseph prolonged the 
16. Peter Sugar, "External and Domestic Roots of East 
European Nationalism," in Sugar and Ivo Lederer, eds., 
~atJ:onali§!Jl .i!?- Ea~tern Europe (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1969), 43-54, and Emil Niederhauser, A 
IJ.~mz~i !Jl~~~J;as_i rno_~.9:9:Jrna~ keJ et-:eur6paban (Budapest: 
Akaderniai kiado, 1977), 42-5. 
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importance of the "clerical estate." In time not only was 
society secularized, but to a degree the churches were 
declericalized. The social and cultural influence of the 
clergy declined, and so did the public practice of 
religiosity among the educated population. Still, the 
churches retained considerable prestige as national 
institutions which were increasingly democratized and preoc-
cupied with politics. 
Not only the national traditions, but also the vast 
regional differences within Transylvania have made the study 
of of Transylvanian history difficult. Three major regions 
existed: The Hungarian (or Noble) Counties, the Szekler 
region (Szekelyfold) and the Saxon region (Fundus Regius). 
In each the economy, constitutional structure, strength of 
the nobility and urban population, status of the peasantry, 
and the religious and nationality relations were different. 
These local factors were all the more important for social 
and political movements in an age of limited mobility and 
communication. Railways had yet to reach Transylvania, and 
the cost of a fifty-mile coach ride exceeded most subjects' 
annual income. Other regional differences arose from the 
location of geographic features and church centers. Just as 
the individual national movements should not be viewed in 
isolation from each other, so also the differences within 
nations deserve more attention than they have usually 
received. The atmosphere of the nationality conflict led 
politicians, and later historians, to emphasize national 
11 
unity, and understate divisions. The national idea was 
supposed to supercede regional and social interests. 
The study of religious communities is well-suited to 
the understanding of ethnic politics in their concrete 
temporal, cultural and geographical settings. When politics 
is viewed from the unitary perspective of national ideal-
ogists, the complexity of society and also of interethnic 
relationships is obscured. Church history, with its 
diocesan and parish structure, can illuminate the cultural 
17 
geography of the national movements. The study of 
clergymen as national leaders makes it possible to ascertain 
the extent and location of their "constituency'' with greater 
accuracy than that of secular politicians. 
The relationship of religion, liberalism, and nation-
alism in rural and ethnic politics is one question raised by 
Kann and Jaszi. Another concerns the relationship of 
Catholicism and the Habsburg state. Their long symbiosis 
was based on a substantial commonality of conservative 
goals. At first glance the years after the Austrian 
Concordat of 1855 present an instance of extraordinary col-
laboration. In fact, Austria's tortuous path from ultra-
montane absolutism to liberal monarchy in the decade of the 
1860s led to significant innovations in church-state rela-
tions. The second half of this dissertation gives special 
17. See the use of this term in Emanuel Turczynski, ''Zur 
Kulturgeographie der Nationalbewegung im Sudosten," Beitrage 
~ Sudoste~ropa-Forschung bnl~§§lich des 1~- Int~rn~tionaleQ 
Balkanologenko~~es§es jn §2fia (Munchen: Rudolf Trofenik, 
1966), 403-28. 
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attention to the complex involvement of the Catholic Church 
in these events as both a domestic and an international 
factor. 
To understand the role of the churches one must inves-
tigate the institutional and social elites on which they 
exercised the greatest influence in the Habsburg political 
system. Histories of Hungary and Transylvania in the 1860s 
have given inadequate attention to the precise nature of 
this system, and consequently have conveyed misleading con-
cepts of Austrian absolutism and the liberal Hungarian 
opposition. This is especially the case for Transylvania, 
with its system of social and ecclesiastic checks and 
balances that favored local conservative elites. These 
constitutional restrictions on absolute power bound the 
hands of Vienna's erstwhile centralists, and paved the way 
for the conservative restoration known as the Ausgleich or 
Austro-Hungarian Compromise. 
The nine chapters of this study proceed from an 
overview of secular politics, to a comparative examination 
of administrative regions and social and religious groups, 
to a detailed discussion of the politics of the Hungarian 
and Romanian Catholics, and finally a portrayal of various 
religious leaders' attempts to strengthen their national 
leadership by securing the administrative separation of 
their ethnoreligious community from coreligionists of 
foreign ethnicity. 
The first chapter traces certain aspects of the history 
13 
of the Habsburg monarchy in the twelve years after the 
revolution of 1848 that are relevant for an understanding of 
the importance of the clergy, Hungarian and Austrian 
liberalism, the Kossuth emigration and the Danubian Princi-
palities for the policies of the Austrian government in 
Transylvania during the 1860s. The second chapter examines 
Transylvanian society and administration in terms of the 
traditional institutions that were reestablished in 1861. 
The third chapter builds on a knowledge of these structures 
to present the course of secular politics in the province 
from 1861 to 1863. 
Chapter four is a comparative study of the major reli-
gious communities of Transylvania in terms of the training 
and material support of the parishes and schools, the nature 
of official and popular religious culture, and the relation-
ship of education, liberalism and secularization. The large 
issues encountered in this chapter find more specific 
expression in the later chapters. 
Chapters five and six are devoted to the Catholic 
Church. Chapter five examines the issues of ultramontanism 
and liberalism in the universal church, the nature of the 
Greek Catholic Church as a component of the Catholic Church, 
and the character of Catholic Church politics in Hungary 
during the 1850s and 1860s. Chapter six narrows the focus 
to the Transylvanian diocese, and in particular the activity 
of Bishop Lajos Haynald and various members of his diocesan 
clergy in the opposition to Austrian policy 1n the 1860s. 
14 
Chapters seven and eight focus on the religious and 
geographical divisions in Romanian politics and, specifical-
ly, within the Greek Catholic Church. Earlier chapters on 
social structure, secular and religious politics provide a 
basis for an understanding of a Romanian national movement 
that was far less united in purpose than is conventionally 
assumed. 
The final chapter addresses one of the most character-
istic strivings of ecclesiastic politics in the mid-nine-
teenth century, the organizational separation of ethnoreli-
gious corrmunities from perceived foreign rule. The Romanian 
Orthodox, Hungarian Catholics, Hungarian Reformed, and 
Armenian Catholics are at the center of the chapter. The 
expression of their concept of churches as alternative poli-
ties fittingly concludes the study. 
15 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE DECLINE OF ABSOLUTISM AND THE PATH TO DUALISM 
The Revolution of 1848 brought improvements in the 
status of the peasantry in Transylvania. It also brought 
the union of Hungary and Transylvania, which provoked a 
civil war that was both social and ethnic in character. All 
three Transylvanian nationalities were dissatisfied with the 
absolutist regime that ensued after the end of the civil war 
l 
in 1849. Hungarians suffered especially. Transylvanians 
made up a disproportionately high number of the Hungarian 
revolutionaries condemned to death by the Austrians: 199 of 
666, or nearly twice Transylvania's percentage of the popu-
2 
lation of Hungary. Social and national animosities had 
undoubtedly increased the dedication of the Transylvanian 
3 
Hungarian nobility to the revolutionary government. The 
liquidation of the county administration after 1849 deprived 
them of their leading role, and most declined any positions 
in the absolutist administration. Romanians had suffered 
l. Historians use the terms Revolution, War of 
Independence (Szabadsagharc) and Civil War for the events 
of 1848-9 in the Hungarian lands. I consider the last of 
these the most accurate description of the year beginning 
in September, 1848 in Transylvania. 
2. Istvan Deak, The Lawful Revolution. Louis Kossuth 
and the Hungarians ]-_?4 8.:1.JlJ2. ( NewYork :Col umbia-Universi-
ty Press, 1979), 335. Many of those condemned were later 
reprieved. 
3. The bitterness of the struggle and the memories it 
left were symbolized by the destruction by Romanian peasants 
and guerillas of the Hungarian town of Nagyenyed and the 
murder of many townspeople of Zlatna. Vilmos Matyas, 
Uta~asok Erdelyben (Budapest: Panorama, 1977), 55, 62, re-
fers to mass graves of 700 persons in these two cases. 
16 
considerable human and material losses while fighting in the 
4 
civil war on the side of the Austrians, but their hopes 
for national autonomy were frustrated. Saxons had also 
fought for the Habsburgs and suffered correspondingly, but 
witnessed the dissolution of the Fundus Regius during the 
5 
decade of absolutism. The frequently repeated phrase ''We 
received as reward what the Hungarians received as pun-
ishment" reflected the virtually equal suppression of auto-
nomous political activity under absolutism. 
The peasant emancipation legislation, administrative 
reform and Concordat enacted under absolutism were all cal-
culated to strengthen the authority of the central gov-
ernment against internal adversaries in the empire. The 
4. The estimates of casualties are contradictory. Ac-
cording to Romanian accounts 40,000 Romanians died in 1848-
49, 300 Orthodox churches, 100 villages were destroyed com-
pletely and 230 partially; Keith Hitchins, The Rumanian 
National Movement in TransylvaQia, 1]80-1849 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1969), 274 and ibid., Orthodoxy 
and Nationality. bnd£eiu Saguna ang the Rumanians 2i 
Transylvania, 1846-1811 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1977), 78. Iosif Sterca-$ulutiu accepted the 40,000 
figure and estimated the corresponding Hungarian fatalities 
at 100,000 (a figure that seems extraordinarily high)-- "Din 
istoria muntilor apuseni," Gazeta Transilvaniei (1891), p. 
18, cited by Ambrus Miskolczy, bibliographic annex to Erdely 
t6rtenete III (Budapest: Akademiai, 1986), 1805. An offi-
cial Austrian estimate of civilian "victims of the Hungarian 
rebels" gave a total of 5405 Romanians out of 6112; Eduard 
Albert Bielz, Handbuch der Landeskunde Siebenburgens 
(Hermannstadt: S. Filtsch, 1857), 149. With the much 
greater casualties from typhus and among the military, Bielz 
estimated 18,000 Transylvanians died during the civil war. 
5. Two Saxon towns were burned by Szekler guard units 
during the civil war. While Saxon municipal life suffered 
the same limitations as those in other parts of 
Transylvania, it is also true that Saxons received dispro-
portionately more positions in the absolutist administration 
than either the Hungarians or the Romanians. 
17 
adversaries of the regime were most numerous in Hungary and 
Transylvania. The prosecution of the Hungarian participants 
in the Revolution-- about 120 were executed and 1500 sen-
6 
tenced to multiple years of imprisonment -- achieved the 
short-term goal of pacification, but also the alienation of 
most politically conscious Hungarians. Most of the former 
leaders of Hungarian society, aristocrats, noblemen and 
urban intellectuals, withdrew from the administration into 
7 
hostile passivity, or used the limited possibilities of 
the censored press to keep the memory of the revolution 
alive. Kossuth and the other revolutionary leaders in exile 
sought to discredit the Austrian regime, collaborate with 
other democratic emigres, and maintain their tenuous connec-
tion with the underground opposition in Hungary. The assas-
sination attempt against the emperor Franz Joseph by a young 
Hungarian in February, 1853, it is true, had no connection 
8 
with the emigration. But the abortive revolutionary 
conspiracy of Jozsef Makk in the previous year had ties to 
Kossuth and acted in his name. 
The conspiracy was betrayed and a series of arrests 
6. Deak, 333-5. Deak notes that those executed in-
cluded "an astonishing number of Catholic priests.'' Of a 
list of 666 condemned Hungarian revolutionaries, two-thirds 
were soldiers, but 21 were Catholic priests or monks and 
eleven were Reformed ministers and preachers; ibid., 334-6. 
7. As late as 1859, only 37 of the 83 highest posts in 
Hungary were occupied by natives of that country; Eva 
Somogyi, Az abszolutizmus ~~ kiegyezes 1849~1867 (Budapest: 
Gondolat, 1981), 67. 
8. Gyorgy Szabad, Hungarian Political Trends between 
the Revolution and the Compromise (1849-1867) (Budapest: 
Akademiai kiado~-197TI, 64-5. 
18 
9 
followed, with twenty-five persons executed. The cen-
ter of the movement was the Szekler region of Transylvania, 
and the conspirators hoped to coordinate the insurrection 
with an armed incursion from the Danubian Principalities. 
10 
some 600 were arrested in the Szekler region alone, 
including a surprisingly large number of clergymen and 
school teachers. The Roman Catholic Canon Mazes Keseru was 
11 
implicated in Kolozsvar, but exhonerated. Of 48 persons 
condemned to death, whose sentences were later commuted to 
five years or more, there were seventeen landowners, five 
lawyers, six Reformed [Calvinist] ministers, four students, 
two principals of Protestant secondary schools, two Catholic 
12 
priests and one Unitarian minister. Correspondence 
concerning the conspiracy was discovered in the residence of 
a Reformed preacher and professor at the Reformed College 1n 
Marosvasarhely, the college was searched by the police and 
13 
several students arrested. The Franciscan abbot-profes-
sors in Marosvasarhely and Csiksomlyo were also arrested. 
The abbot in Csiksomlyo was exhonerated and released in 
9 . Ibid. , 51. 
10. Somogyi, 84. 
11. Ladislau Gy~mant, Pompiliu Teodor, "Clujul !n timpul 
revolutiei de la 1848-1849 si a regimului neoabsolutist 9i 
liberal," in Stefan Pascu, ed., Istoria Clujului ([Cluj-
Napoca]: Consiliul popular al municipiului Cluj, 1974), 271. 
12. Balazs Orban, A szekelyfold leirasa IV (Pest: Rath 
M6r, 1870), 159; facsimile rpt., Budapest: Helikon, 1982, 
I), reprinted in D~nes Karolyi, Szek~ vertanuk 1854 
(Bukarest: Kriterion, 1975), 217-18. 
13. Orban, loc. cit. The professor, Janos Torok, was 
among those executed. On his theological and philosophical 
writings, see Karolyi, "A Habsburg-ellenes mozgalom multja-
b61," Korunk N.S. 42 (1983), 66-7. 
19 
1854, but the abbot in Marosvasarhely and a village priest 
of Udvarhely district were condemned to death, later com-
14 
muted to fifteen and eight years in prison, respectively. 
The participation or implication of so many church or 
school leaders in the conspiracy suggests that sympathy for 
the emigre leaders or at least strong alienation were consi-
derable even among those groups of society which one would 
expect to be the most conservative. The rapid liquidation 
of the conspiracy, however, demonstrated the formidable 
obstacle that Austrian police surveillance presented to such 
a movement. It became evident that a prospective insurrec-
tion would have a better chance of success if coordinated 
with foreign military action. Thus, as a result of the 
conspiracy's failure the emigre leaders devoted more of 
their attention to the search for allies among the existing 
states. 
*** 
Foreign Policy in the Decade of Absolutism 
Diplomatic developments in the decade favored the 
Hungarian search for allies. Austria had been able to 
defeat the Hungarian War of Independence in 1849 largely 
14. Karolyi, Szekely vertanuk 1854, 46; Egyed Hermann, A 
magyar katolikus Qapsag az osztrak katonai diktatura es az-
abszolutizmus idejeben (Godoll6: n.n., 1932), 71, 74-5. The 
abbot in Marosvasarhely, Rafael Andrassy, and the village 
priest, Mazes Palffy, are not included in Orban's list. All 
those imprisioned were set free as the result of the im-
perial amnesty of May, 1857-- Orban, loc.cit. According to 
Ferenc Ko6s, the abbot in Csiksomlyo, Ignac Veress, was 
executed; introduction by Gyorgy Beke, in Koos, Eletem es 
emlekeim (Bukarest: Kriterion, 1971), 22. 
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thanks to the Russian military intervention resulting from 
the two powers' conservative solidarity in the Holy 
Alliance. As the result of the Crimean War (1853-56), the 
alliance came to an end. The new French policy of support 
for the expansionist designs of Piedmont-Sardinia put 
Austria on the defensive. This pressure as well as fears 
of Russian expansion in the Balkans caused Austria to side 
with Russia's enemies in the war and thereby force Russia to 
sue for peace. The experience embittered Russia, particular-
ly its Foreign Minister Gorchakov, so that in succeeding 
years Russia alligned with Austria's adversary in northern 
Italy, France. Weakened by its military and diplomatic 
embarassment in the war, Russia became a diplomatic auxil-
15 
iary for French designs in succeeding years. 
The first consequence of Austria's isolation was its 
defeat in the Danubian Principalities. In 1854 it had 
obliged Russia to end its occupation of these provinces, and 
subsequently occupied them herself for more than two years. 
Various Austrian actions seemed to indicate it desired to 
permanently annex the Principalities, like the article in an 
Austro-Prussian convention in 1854 which provided for the 
extension of the German federal defense system to include 
the Principalities. The Western press and diplomats discus-
sed the possibility of Austrian annexation of the 
Principalities in exchange for compensation to France or 
15. Barbara Jelavich, The Habsburg Empire in European 
Affairs, 1814-1918 (Hamden, Conn: Archon, 1975), 69-79. 
21 
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sardinia in Italy. The international congress after the 
crimean War in 1856 approved the Austrian demand for the end 
of the Russian protectorate over the Principalities, but 
also required the end of the Austrian occupation and the 
establishment of an all-European protectorate. Nervous 
about Romanian nationalism in the Principalities, Austria 
now worked for the restoration of Ottoman control and fa-
vored the conservative party. Officials in Transylvania 
17 
feared the potential impact on the Romanians there. 
For the Romanians in the Principalities, as for the 
Transylvanian Hungarians in 1848, the pervasive slogan was 
"Union'': in this case, that of the Principalities. The 
circumstances under which the first stage of the union was 
achieved were even reminiscent of the Kolozsvar diet in 
1848. Having been elected prince of Moldavia in January, 
1859, Alexandru loan Cuza was then nominated by the liberals 
in the election in Wallachia two weeks later. It is likely 
16. Dan Berindei, Epoca unir11 (Bucure$ti: Editura 
Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1979), 35-6; for 
the contemporary Hungarian perspective see Domokos Kosary, 
Szechenyi Doblingben (Budapest: Magveto, 1981), 67-72. 
During their stay the Austrian troops also cracked down on 
the Hungarian emigre activists in the Principalities--
Zoltan Szasz, "Az abszolutizmus kora Erdelyben (1849-1867)," 
in Erdely tortenete III (Budapest: Akademiai, 1986), 1463. 
17. Numerous reports of District Chief Thiemann and 
police officers Semetkowsky, Jankowsky and Siebert, 1857-9, 
~n Documente i_ne2J:!:§ priyit_9are la istoria Transilvaniei 
1ntre 1848-1859. Din arhivele de stat a ministerului de 
inte~ne §i justit~dela Viena~-E~~ihail Popescu 
(Bucure$ti: "Cartea romaneasca," 1929). But Thiemann 
declared flatly in a letter of August 18, 1859: "Was lasst 
sich wahrnehmen uber Verbindungen der Rumanen Siebenburgens 
mit jenen in der Moldau und Wallachei? Im Volke gar 
nichts."-- Ibid., 300. 
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that this union was more popular than that of Transylvania 
and Hungary had been in 1848, but the conserv-
ative electoral assembly appeared likely to defeat Cuza. 
The liberals brought crowd pressure to bear on the assembly 
to elect him, just as the Hungarians of Kolozsvar had al-
18 
legedly terrorized the Saxon deputies in 1848. 
The double election of Cuza took place without, or in 
defiance of, foreign interference. It was a defeat for 
Austria because it was achieved by a popular movement and 
because the union could be expected to stimulate Romanian 
nationalism in Transylvania. France favored the union, and 
Russia was willing to tolerate it, in order to weaken 
Austria. This was also the decisive consideration for the 
Hungarian emigres and their emissary, the veteran of 1848-9 
General Klapka. Becoming aware of the approaching war of 
France and Sardinia against Austria at the beginning of 
1859, he raised the possibility of Hungarian participation 
in the action. Kossuth was reluctant, due in part to his 
well-founded skepticism concerning French intentions. 
Klapka won his approval for the idea only after concluding 
18. Berindei, 87-91; Gerald Bobango, The Emergence of 
the Romanian National State (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1979), 33-7; Barbara Jelavich, Russian and Formation 
of the Romanian National State 1821-1878 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Pres~984), 96-7. By an interesting 
coincidence, Laszlo Berzenczei, the agitator at the 1848 
diet, was an emissary of the Hungarian emigration in the 
Principalities during these years. On the role of 
Berzenczei in 1848, see Miklos Asztalos, Kossuth Lajos kora 
es az erdelyi kerdes (Budapest: Collegium Transilvanicwn;--
1928), 121, and Carl Gellner, Di~ S~ebenburger Sachsen in 
den Revolutionsjahren 1848-1849 (Bukarest: Akademie, 1967), 
139. 
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an agreement, 1n March, 1859, on collaboration between 
19 
France and Prince Cuza. Local politics were to greatly 
complicate the application of the agreement. For the moment 
it was an impressive demonstration of the geopolitical pos-
sibilities of the French alliance. The perspective of the 
Transylvanian Hungarians was contradictory. Rumors of an 
invasion from Russia or the Principalities inspired insubor-
dination among some Transylvanian Romanian peasants and 
miners. Fearing a recurrence of the events of 1849, many 
Hungarian landowners moved to the cities or even to 
20 
Hungary. 
The first central institution of the emigres, the 
Hungarian National Directory, was established in Paris on 
May 6, 1859, one week after the commencement of Franco-
Austrian hostilities. The Directory-- composed of Kossuth, 
Klapka and Laszlo Teleki-- began the organization of a 
Hungarian Legion of 3500-4000 men within the Sardinian army, 
chiefly from Hungarian deserters and captives from the 
21 
Austrian army. From the standpoint of the emigres, the 
19. Lajos Lukacs, Magyar politikai em_igraci6 1849-1867 
(Budapest: Kossuth, 1984), 134-42. Klapka negotiated the 
agreement as the emissary of the French emperor. Contrary 
to Lukacs, Vasile Curticapeanu states that Cuza never signed 
the protocol of the agreement because he was dissatisfied 
with its vagueness on the question of Transylvania; 
"Alexandru roan Cuza $i Transilvania," in Cuza Voda in 
memoriam (Ia$i: Junimea, 1973), 418-19. ----------
20. Reports of Colonels Jankowsky and Siebert, May 22-
3, 1859, in Documente inedite privitoare istoria 
Transilvaniei, 264, 281-2. 
21. Lukacs, Magyar £2litikai emigraci6, 147. The 
Franco-Sardinian troops facing Austria in Italy numbered 
about 320000; Joseph Redlich, Das osterreichische Staats-
~ Reichsproblem, I, pt. 2 (Leipzig: Der neue Geist-
24 
minor part played by the Hungarian troops and the rapid 
conclusion of the armistice by France were a disappointment. 
The alliance of Hungarian troops with France and the deser-
tion of two Hungarian infantry divisions under Franz 
Joseph's personal command were propaganda victories for the 
emigres, and helped to explain the rapid Austrian capitula-
tion after the French victory at Solferino. The new 
Austrian Foreign Minister wrote later that fear of domestic 
unrest and a Hungarian uprising caused Franz Joseph to make 
22 
peace when he did. The prospect of an armed insurrection 
was minimal, but the perception of the fragility of the 
political regime was accurate. 
The Franco-Austrian war marked the high point of the 
emigration's military power. With the conclusion of peace, 
the Directory quickly realized that the Legion in northern 
Italy no longer had a purpose and dissolved it. The recent 
recruits from the Austrian army were allowed to return home 
23 
where they could make a political impact. The renewal of 
hostilities against Austria that the Directory hoped for 
became increasingly unlikely, and the focus of Hungarian 
politics shifted again to the domestic front. 
*** 
Verlag, 1920), 175. 
22. Szabad, .B~.D.9"9-.Ii:..?!1 _!Jg_litjcal_ Trends, 75; Redlich, 
I , pt. 1 , 7 53 . 
23. Elek Csetri, introductory study to the memoirs of 
the emigre Sandor Teleki, Emlekezzun~ ~jgie~~§l (Bukarest: 
Kriterion, 1973), 30. 
25 
The Thaw 
Austria conceded its military defeat and the loss of 
Lombardy and embarked on a course of internal retrenchment. 
The threat of a Hungarian uprising may account for the 
timing of the armistice, but the sources of the Austrian 
defeat were deeper. The unsuccessful foreign and domestic 
policies of the emperor since the revolution had led to the 
empire s progressive isolation and financial crisis. Franz 
Joseph made the dismissed Foreign Minister, Count Buol, 
responsible for his own disastrous poli~ies, but was be-
coming aware of the exasperation in society at his own 
24 
military despotism. A week after the armistice, the 
emperor issued his Laxenburg Manifesto pledging to 
dedicate my complete and uninterrupted attention 
and care to the successful solution of my task: 
to permanently establish Austria's internal 
welfare and external power through the purposeful 
development of its rich intellectual and material 
energies as well as through timely improvements 
in legislation and administration. 25 
The terse manifesto, revealing the nervous caution of 
an autocrat whose own policies were under attack, initiated 
a series of experiments with new policies. In August, the 
two ministers most responsible for administering the failed 
internal regime, Interior Minister Bach and Police Minister 
26 
Kempen, were replaced. Bankers met the attempts of 
24. Buol left his successor, Count Rechberg, an exten-
sive memorandum describing the state of opinion and a pro-
posal for reform; Redlich, I, pt. 1, 462; the memorandum is 
in I, pt. 2, 234-40. 
25. Ibid., I, pt. 2, 173-74. 
26. The Austrian Foreign Minister was simultaneously 
Minister des kaiserlichen Hauses with special access to the 
26 
Finance Minister Bruck to float new loans by calling for 
representative institutions to supervise public finances. 
The revelations about the desperate financial situation and 
unjust accusations of malfeasance drove Bruck to suicide in 
April, 1860. The emperor reluctantly surrendered to the 
calls for fiscal responsibility, announcing in March, 1860 
the convocation of an assembly of imperial notables to 
discuss the matter, the expanded Reichsrat, in June, 1860. 
While high officials in Vienna discussed the financial 
dilemma, the revival of political life in Hungary focussed 
on other issues. Office holders Of Hungarian nationality 
were few and lacking in prestige, and freedom of the press 
severely limited. Therefore popular discontent found ex-
pression, already before the Laxenburg Manifesto, in the 
actions of Catholic prelates and a few wealthy landowners. 
Cardinal Archbishop Scitovszky led the opposition of the 
27 
Hungarian episcopate to the Concordat of 1855, which he 
viewed as an intrusion by the Archbishop of Vienna on 
Hungarian rights. Scitovszky's stance added to his pres-
tige, but was in essence a narrowly ecclesiastical matter. 
More significant in a secular sense was the address of 131 
emperor and traditionally the leading minister in status. 
Rechberg also became the first Prime Minister since 1852, 
meaning that unlike Buol he would take a leading role in 
internal policy and in discussions in the Council of 
Ministers. Decisions of the Council would be by majority 
vote and binding on all the members. See Helmut Rumpler, 
"Minsterrat und Ministerratsprotokolle 1848 bis 1867. 
Behordengeschichtliche und aktenkundliche Analyse," in POM, 
Einleitungsband (Wien: bsterreichischer Bundesverlag fur 
Unterricht, Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1970), 56-7. 
27. See Chapter v. 
27 
Hungarian notables during his visit to Hungary in May, 1857, 
calling in moderate terms for a change of policy. 
Scitovszky was the leading signatory to the document, and 
displeased the court even further by his organization of a 
mass pilgrimage to Mariazell in Austria in September of the 
same year. The long procession of 25000 persons, including 
36 magnates, was the largest public assembly since the rev-
olution. Ostensibly religious in nature, it impressed many 
contemporaries as an anti-Austrian patriotic demonstration 
because of Scitovszky's published and oral declarations, its 
size and the national costumes and number of the participants. 
The other leading domestic figure of the early 
Hungarian political revival was Count Istvan Szechenyi. The 
founder of the national revival in the 1820s enjoyed tremen-
dous prestige despite his conflicts with Kossuth and emo-
tional breakdown in 1848. Living in an asylum near Vienna, 
Szechenyi had recovered sufficiently by the end of 1856 to 
29 
begin to write again. At the end of 1857 he began to 
28. Istvan Nemeskurty, Parazs a hamu alatt. Vilagostol 
Solferinoig (Budapest: Magveto, 198~210-17. Kempen wrote 
in his memoir that he unsuccessfully advocated Scitovszky's 
removal from his see as a result of this event. The most 
extensive published description is Janos T6r6k, "Az 
evszazados Mariaczelli bucsu," Torok Janos publicistikai es 
nemzetgazdasagi nemely dolgozatai (Pest: Rath M6r bizomanya, 
1858), 503-18; the same author also published two pastoral 
letters of Scitovszky concerning the pilgrimage, in 
Magyarorsza_g 12..!:lmasa. _!Sozjogi es torteneti vazola_t, II 
(Pest: Laufer es Stolp, 1859), 265-81. 
29. Kosary, 60-1, implies that the new diplomatic 
situation after the Crimean War helped to inspire 
Szechenyi's recovery and renewed interest in politics, but 
he fails to demonstrate the connection. His clerical con-
tacts may have been more significant. Szechenyi only began 
to write about foreign policy questions in May, 1857; 83 ff. 
28 
28 
write what became the most important Hungarian polemical 
work of the decade in response to an apologia for Austrian 
absolutism. Szechenyi's bitterly satirical Blick auf den 
anonymen Ruckblick appeared anonymously in London in July, 
30 
1859. The date of publication greatly increased the 
international impression it made. In Hungary the response 
to the work was overwhelmingly positive and contributed to 
the growth of the opposition, even though it is an exaggera-
tion to state that it was responsible for the fall of Bach. 
Szechenyi maintained contact with a large number of opposi-
tion politicians during the crisis of 1859-60, including 
31 
most of the conservative aristocrats, the retired Arch-
bishop Lonovics, and even the future Austrian minister 
32 
Schmerling, who visited him in December, 1859. 
The Protestant Patent enacted for Hungary in September, 
1859 served as a convenient pretext for open political 
action by the opposition. The newly permitted Reformed 
district synods were the first such public assemblies in 
Hungary since the revolution. Reformed bishops and aristo-
30. It was a response to [Bernhard von Meyer], Ruckblick 
auf die jungste Entwicklungsperiode Ungarns (Wien, 1857). 
Jacint R6nay served as Szechenyi's intermediary with the 
publisher in London. The Benedictine monk was recommended 
to Szechenyi by Jozsef Lonovics, the former archbishop 
during the Revolution. Kosary, 177-8. 
31. The Austrian police mistakenly considered Szechenyi 
the leader of the Old Conservatives (See below). His gen-
eral views and sympathies were close to the Old Conserva-
tives, but his situation as a virtual prisoner in his asylum 
precluded his active leadership, and he did not consider it 
politically opportune to formulate a specific program of 
demands as did the Old Conservatives. Ibid., 218ff. 
32. Ibid., 304. 
29 
crats protested against the Patent as contrary to church 
law, and were supported by many Catholics, including Car-
33 
dinal Scitovszky. Public opinion may well have rejected 
any sort of legislation coming from Vienna. The court 
backed down, and the Patent was repealed in May, 1860. 
Redlich writes: 
From week to week the discontent and public 
unrest increased ... The impression increasingly 
made on the emperor and his closest advisors by 
Hungarian conditions would henceforth be the real 
driving force of internal policy in the empire. 34 
The influence of the group of Hungarian magnates known as 
the Old Conservatives, led by Count Antal Szecsen, rose 
rapidly at this time. They convinced Franz Joseph, in March 
and April, 1860, to name a Hungarian as Governor of Hungary 
and to announce plans to restore the former county adminis-
tration and diet, despite the opposition of two archdukes 
35 
and of the majority of the Council of Ministers. 
A series of Hungarian national celebrations in the 
winter of 1859-60 provided further opportunities for 
36 
meetings, patriotic rhetoric and parades. One typical 
event was the founding of the Erdelyi Muzeum-~let 
[Transylvanian Museum Society], a cultural association of 
the Transylvanian Hungarians, in Kolozsvar in November, 
1859. Dismissing allegations of disunity among the citizens 
of the country, the president of the society, Count Imre 
33. Nemeskurty, 281. 
34. Redlich, I. pt. 1, 490. 
35. Redlich, I, pt. 1, 491-9. 
36. See Somogyi, 113. 
30 
Miko, announced that Hungarian national feeling had never 
been stronger, and the new society would help to cultivate a 
37 
unified sense of patriotism in all. 
Kossuth's National Directory was beginning to establish 
38 
ties with Hungarian radicals. Conservative aristocrats, 
however, quickly reasserted their leadership of the country, 
supplanting the absolutist officials. Several factors ac-
count for this. First, many of the Old Conservatives, while 
rejecting participation 1n the Habsburg administration, had 
maintained their contacts, sources of information and poten-
tial influence at the court. Second, from religious faith 
and family tradition they had strong ties to the hoffahig, 
socially influential church leadership. Third, aristocrats 
continued to dominate the leading bodies of such cultural 
organizations as the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The 
uncontested leader of the Transylvanian moderates, Imre 
39 
Miko, in 1860 formulated six basic principles which can 
serve as a summary of the group's attitudes: the cultivation 
of native Hungarian literature; national unity and a rejec-
3 7. Laj OS Urmos sy, Ji z~nhi!_ ~~ Erde]y .!:.§I_tenetebol, I 
(Temesvar:Nyomtatott a Csanad-egyhazmegyei konyvsajton, 
1894), 202-3. 
38. Gyorgy Szabad, "Az onkenyuralom kora (1849-1867)," 
in Magyarorsza3 t6~tenet~ l8j8-l890 (Budapest: Akademiai 
kiad6, 1979), I, 648-9; Lukacs, 167. 
39. Mik6, "Iranyeszmek," ~uda~ti szemle No. 8, 257-68; 
No. 9, 3-16, 257-71; No. 10, 5-20, 261-73; No. ll, 3-12 
(1860). Zoltan Szasz ("Az abszolutizmus kora Erdelyben 
(1848-1849)," in ~rdely tor_!:en~te _1830-t.Ql napjainkig 
(Budapest: Akademiai, 1986), 1448 and elsewhere) refers to 
Miko as a "moderate liberal," but in the Transylvanian 
politics of 1860-63 his politics were closer to those of the 
conservatives than the liberals. 
31 
tion of "party spirit''; careful, traditional education; 
family values; the protection of landed property, national 
institutions and traditions, and historical consciousness; 
and the rejection of emigration as a form of disloyalty. 
Miko~s program was undeniably elitist and conservative, but 
in the context of 1860 it appeared a suitable blend of 
patriotism and prudence. 
The widespread mourning of the tragic suicide of 
40 
szechenyi in April and the death of the Transylvanian Old 
Conservative leader Baron Samuel Josika provoked new demon-
strations of national unity that seemed to confirm the 
leadership of the conservatives. Nearly 10000 attend-
ed the funeral of Szechenyi in Hungary; smaller ceremonies 
commemorated him all over Transylvania, including in 
Romanian communities that remembered his tolerant views on 
41 
nationality problems. The meeting of the Saxon Verein 
fur Siebenburgische Landeskunde in Bistritz in August, 1860 
featured a series of speeches on Saxon national culture and 
patriotisrrt. Baron Jozsef E6tv6s attended the meeting, as he 
had that of the Erdelyi Muzeum-~ylet in November, on behalf 
of the Hungarian Academy. His dramatic speech, describing 
40. Police harassment apparently caused Szechenyi~s 
mind to come unhinged again. Public opinion was quick to 
accuse the police, unjustly, of murder; at any rate, his 
status as a martyr was assured. Szabad, "Onkenyuralom," 
651-2; Kosary, 248-75. 
41. Urmossy, I 224-5. A similar episode was the Hungarian-
Romanian fraternization at a celebration in Kolozsvar at the 
end of July (Ibid., I 229-30). But the refusal of Romanian 
Greek Catholic dean Ioan Fekete-Negrutiu (see Chapter VII) 
to attend was a foretaste of future conflicts; see Fekete-
Negrutiu to Bari~iu, May 19, GBCS III, 161. 
32 
scholarship as a mountain on which all nations would join 
hands upon reaching the peak, appeared in newspapers 
42 
throughout the country. It was, unfortunately, one of 
the last speeches of the "era of good feelings," of anti-
absolutist solidarity. 
The seeming unity of the opponents of absolutism arose 
in part from a virtual absence of public debate. 
szechenyi's Blick was exclusively negative and presented no 
program. On the other hand, Eotvos published a study in the 
same year, Die Garantien der Macht und Einheit bsterreichs, 
which sought to reconcile dynastic and national interests by 
a federal system and a weak central parliament. The 
Hungarian press and most leaders rejected the work as con-
43 
trary to Hungarian constitutional independence. The 
framework of an underground insurrectionary organization of 
44 
the emigration was being laid in Hungary and Transylvania. 
Participants in the ceremonies welcoming Eotvos to the Szekler 
town of Szekelyudvarhely in August, 1860 reported, among cheers 
for friendship between the peoples, isolated cheers for 
45 
Kossuth and Garibaldi as well. 
*** 
42. Gyorgy Kristof, Bar6 Eotvos Jozsef utazasai 
Erdelyben (Cluj-Kolozsvar: Minerva, 1932), 20-4. 
43. Istvan Schlett, Eotvos Jozsef (Budapest: Gondolat, 
1987)' 177-81. 
44. Urmossy, I, 219-22. 
45. Kristof, 27. 
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The Expanded Reichsrat 
The opening of the expanded Reichsrat caused local 
politics in Hungary and Transylvania to fade temporarily 
into the background. Eotvos had by now revised his views 
and his new book, Die Sonderstellung Ungarn~ vom Standpunkte 
der Einheit Deutscbla~ds, was closer to the views of Ferenc 
Deak, the architect of the eventual compromise. For this 
reason, Eotvos declined his invitation to the Reichsrat. 
Ironically, Eotvos' views of the previous year helped in-
spire the program of the aristocratic conservative majority 
in the assembly. The expanded Reichsrat (verstarkter 
46 
Reichsrat) consisted of sixty members, eight from the 
original body plus officials, landowners, clergy and Chamber 
of Commerce members appointed by the emperor on the recom-
47 
mendation of the provincial governors. The emperor cal-
led upon the members to offer their advice on ''important 
questions of general legislation and the normalization of 
48 
the state budget." 
Discussion in the body quickly turned from budgetary 
questions to the political reorganization of the empire. 
The majority position was presented by Count Clam of Bohemia 
and Count Szecsen and other aristocrats of Hungary. They 
proposed a federation of the "historical-political indivi-
46. The original Reichsrat (Imperial Council) was an 
advisory body with six Austrian and two Hungarian members 
established in 1851. Robert A. Kann, ~ History of the 
Habsbur~ Empire 1526-1918 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1974), 326. 
47. Redlich, I, pt. l, 489. 
48. Ibid., I, pt. l, 501. 
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dualities" (the previously existing crown lands or provinces), 
equal with respect to each other and each with its autonomous 
corporative constitution and diet. The minority, led by the 
viennese bureaucrats Count Nadasdy and Baron Lichtenfels, 
insisted that the granting of autonomy to the provinces 
would dangerously weaken central state power and Austria/s 
international position. Furthermore, they argued, the 
federalists/ insistence on the restoration of the old feudal 
constitution in the Austrian hereditary provinces (the 
future Cisleithania) was ahistorical and unrealistic because 
the estates there had enjoyed little power or autonomy for 
the better part of two centuries. 
The constitutional demands of the federalists corres-
ponded in large part to the minimum programs of their re-
spective national movements opposing German bureaucratic 
centralism. These two camps would continue to face each 
other, in public debate and in that in the Council of 
Ministers, for the next several years. The divisions over 
the Austrian-Hungarian problem also continued. But the 
emperor/s preference for aristocratic and bureaucratic mem-
bers had artificially colored the deliberations from the 
outset, obscuring the ascendancy of liberal ideas in public 
opinion in all parts of the monarchy as the controls on the 
press began to be relaxed. 
The federalists/ program became the basis for a reor-
ganization of the empire in October. The majority enjoyed 
by this party in the Reichsrat was not decisive in itself, 
35 
but rather Franz Joseph's personal decision, in spite of the 
views of his ministers, to accept the proposals of the 
federalists. The thoroughly surprised Council of Ministers 
had no choice but to accept the federalist October Diploma, 
49 
which was promulgated on October 20. The Diploma was a 
sort of centralist constitution in the sense that the Reichsrat, 
expanded to 100 members, and the provincial diets were 
guaranteed participation (Mitwirkung) in legislation. 
Matters concerning the entire empire, primarily financial, 
50 
must go before the Reichsrat, while all others were 
reserved for the diets. In a simultaneous letter to 
Rechberg as Prime Minister, Franz Joseph authorized the 
reestablishment of the Hungarian, Transylvanian and Croatian 
51 
Court Chancelleries for all civil administration of these 
lands and the replacement of the former Ministries of 
Interior, Justice, and Culture by a Ministry of State, thus 
unifying under one ministry the administration of all the 
49. Redlich, I, pt. l, 612-22. He refers to the 
Diploma as a "coup d'etat of the aristocracy against the 
bureaucracy." (623) The project of Count Emil Dessewffy of 
mid-September, which closely resembled the Diploma and ac-
companying measures, literally refers to the promulgation as 
a "coup d'etat.'' (De~k Ferencz beszedei, Ed. Man6 K6nyi, II 
(Budapest: Frankli~886), 244-69. The text of the Diploma 
is in Redlich II, pt. 2, 228-9 and ~~~~ Ferencz beszedei, 
II, 273-5. 
50. The imperial edict of July 17, 1860 had stipulated 
that all new taxes and expenditures, the increase of tax 
rates and duties, and all state loans and duties must be 
approved by the Reichsrat; Friedrich Walter, bsterreichische 
Verfassungs- und Verwaltungs~chichte von 1500-1955 (Koln: 
Bohlau, 1972), 187. 
51. Until November 20, 1861 the official name of the 
Croatian body was provisorisches ~~oati~ch-slawonisches 
Hofdikasterium. 
36 
52 
lands not subject to the restored chancelleries. The 
Minister of the Interior, Count Goluchowski, became the 
first Minister of State. 
The public Hungarian response to the Diploma was nega-
tive almost from the beginning. As in the rejection of 
Eotvos~ book of 1859, Deak and the most influential 
Hungarian newspapers rejected the authority, however lim-
ited, of the Reichsrat over Hungarian affairs and demanded 
53 
the restoration of the laws of 1848. The application of 
the Diploma in the hereditary provinces required the issuance 
of new statutes for the operation of the diets and the 
election by them of deputies to the Reichsrat. The conserv-
ative aristocratic nature of the new statutes and the limited 
legislative powers granted to the Reichsrat aroused the 
dissatisfation of the liberal Austrian press. Consequently 
Goluchowski became discredited and isolated in the Council 
of Ministers. On December 13, 1860 he resigned. 
The Reichsrat had helped to create a misleading im-
pression of the degree of moderation of the Hungarian poli-
ticians concerning the restoration of Hungarian constitution-
alism, since the views of the Old Conservatives were actual-
ly unpopular. But the Reichsrat also gave voice to calls 
for the modification of the Hungarian constitution by non-
52. Szasz, "Erdely az abszolutizmus koraban" (1474) 
incorrectly states the chancelleries were subordinate to the 
Ministry of State as central government. As will become 
clear, the Ministry of State and the chancelleries were 
parallel and independent institutions. 
53. Deak Ferencz beszedei, II, 287-8. 
37 
Hungarians from the Hungarian lands. Three of these were 
Romanians: Baron Nicolae Petrino from Austrian Bukovina, 
Andrei Mocioni [Mocsonyi] from the Banat, and Orthodox 
Bishop $aguna from Transylvania. In $aguna's view, which 
was supported by his two Romanian colleagues, the program of 
the federalists was inadequate because the old order they 
favored benefitted only the Hungarian aristocracy and middle 
class. Rather, all provincial constitutions should be modi-
fied to guarantee the equality of nationalities and churches, 
their representation in the provincial and central govern-
ments, a free press, and the necessary strength of the 
54 
central government. 
The three Transylvanian members of the Reichsrat were 
$aguna, Bogdan Jakabb, the Hungarian Mayor of 
55 
Szamosujvar , and Karl Maager, a Saxon and president of 
the Chamber of Commerce in Kronstadt. Each presented what 
would become the dominant viewpoint of his nationality in 
54. Hitchins, Orthodoxy and Nationality, 98-100; 
Verhandlungen de~ osterreichischen Verstarkten Reichsrates 
1860 (Wien: Friedrich Manz, 1860; facsimile rpt., Wien: 
Verlag des Wissenschaftlichen Antiquariats H. Geyer, 1972) 
II, 284-7. Hitchins' statement (98) that Saguna rejected 
the positions of both the federalists and centralists is 
only partially correct. Autonomy should be recognized, but 
not in the way the federalists visualized. The very first 
of Saguna's ten stated principles for the reorganzation of 
the monarchy was its unity; he stated explicitly that he 
supported the centralists' basic position, adding iron-
ically, "Ich glaube, die Einheit der Monarchie ist schon in 
der That zur historisch-politischen Individualitat 
gelangt."-- Verhandlungen, II 286. He abstained from the 
final voting on the federalist and centralist proposals, 
however. (Hitchins, op.cit., 101). 
55. Like most citizens of Szamosujvar Jakabb was of 
Armenian origin, but his political views were essentially 
those of a conservative Hungarian. 
38 
succeeding years. Jakabb rejected the Romanians' call for 
national equality, as such a measure would effectively re-
duce the rights of a nation that had been enjoying them for 
centuries and undermine a constitution which had many 
56 
praiseworthy aspects. Maager denounced the consti-
tutional conservatism of Jakabb, and went even further than 
the centralists in the opposite direction. The Saxons had 
benefitted from their autonomous constitution in the past, 
but the financial situation and the requirements of the new 
age had made this constitution obsolete: Austria required 
a single constitution, representing all groups of the popu-
lation, including urban citizens and peasants. He added 
rhetorically that he had stated his principles "although the 
stifled press is not even allowed to pronounce the word 
57 
"constitution." 
Maager's pronouncements made him an instant hero of the 
58 
liberal press and bourgeoisie of Vienna. He was the only 
member of the Reichsrat to speak in favor of a liberal 
constitution, but Bruck and his successor in the Ministry of 
Finance, Ignaz von Plener, expressed similar ideas in the 
Council of Ministers in 1859-61. From personal conviction 
and their familiarity with financial circles, they concluded 
that Austria could only stabilize its credit situation if 
the German middle classes played a regular role in the 
56. Verhandlungen_ II, 301-2. 
57. Ibid., I, 715-16, II, 295-97. 
58. Carl Gollner, "Betrachtungen zum fortschrittlichen 
Denken der Siebenblirger Sachsen im 19. Jahrhundert," 
Forschun_~n ~~~yolks= und Landeskunde l (1959), 43-4. 
39 
direction of imperial expeditures through a parliament. The 
implications of such liberal and financial motives and those 
of German nationalists and bureaucrats coincided to a large 
degree. For the German nationalists, alleged German cul-
tural superiority and the contest for leadership in Germany 
were arguments for a liberal constitutional regime. The 
centralist bureaucrats believed in the progressive, civil-
izing role of the Austrian civil service and the dangers to 
the dynasty and the state posed by the national movements, 
especially that of the Hungarians. 
*** 
The Rise of Schmerling 
The financial and bureaucratic arguments for centralism were 
serious ones for Franz Joseph, but balanced to a large degree by 
his dislike of the liberals. He had also by this time made a 
permanent commitment to constitutional restoration in Hungary, 
indeed toward dualism, by the Diploma, which was designated a 
"permanent and irrevocable fundamental state law.'' He felt 
special confidence in Count Szecsen, who thus became the 
most influential member of the Council of Ministers at the 
end of 1860. Szecsen's collaboration in the decision to 
dismiss Goluchowski and in the choice of his successor was 
therefore of great importance. Szecsen was a dynastic con-
servative and Hungarian patriot who believed that sufficient 
concessions must be made to the liberals to break the momen-
tum of the more radical elements who really endangered the 
throne. One such concession to Hungary achieved through 
40 
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sz~csen's influence was the cession of the Banat and the 
partium to Hungary on December 27, an action opposed by both 
59 
the centralists and the Romanians. 
Sz~csen contributed to the choice of the German Schmerling 
as Goluchowski's successor. The choice did not indicate 
that the Emperor had abandoned the Hungarians, but was a 
desperate response to a contradictory situation that Szecsen 
also recognized. Sz~csen realized that Austrian public 
opinion and that of the financiers required the appointment 
of some sort of liberal as Minister of State. Anton von 
Schmerling had elements in his past to satisfy all the 
influential factions in Vienna during the crisis of late 
1860. His oppositional role in the 1840s, leadership in 
1848 and his principled resignation from the office of 
Minister of Justice in 1851 attracted the liberals. German 
nationalists recalled his speeches in favor of German unity 
as speaker of the Frankfurt Assembly in 1848-49. Central-
ists noted that Schmerling was a moderate, law and order 
liberal who used the troops at his disposal 1n Frankfurt to 
quell disorders there in 1848. For Sz~csen and the Old 
Conservatives, Schmerling had a mildly favorable reputation 
because of his denunciation of excessive Austrian brutality 
in the suppression of the Hungarians after 1849. They also 
hoped, quite mistakenly, that Schmerling's liberalism would 
59. Mocioni had called on September 27 for the main-
tenance of the Banat's separateness. Verhandlung~p, II, 110-
3 . 
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dampen the opposition of the liberals in Hungary. 
A single passage in the Diploma provided a wedge for 
Austrian subversion of the new dualism. It stated the 
emperor's commitment to "the equality of our subjects before 
the law ... [and] the independence of officeholding from estate 
61 
and birth." Similarly, the emperor's letter on 
Transylvania to Rechberg of October 20 (the Transylvanian Court 
Chancellor had not yet been appointed) stated the peasant 
emancipation and the establishment of equal civil rights had 
62 
made necessary a revision of the Transylvanian constitution. 
Austrian statesmen who were legally excluded after October 
20 from authority over the lands subject to the Hungarian 
and Transylvanian Court Chancelleries would on occasion 
justify their intervention in Hungarian and Transylvanian 
affairs by these passages. In doing so they would be con-
tinuing the Austrian practice of championing some nation-
alities in order to counter Hungarian influence. This men-
tality was evident in the remark by Plener in the Council of 
Ministers in February, 1861 that if there was a choice 
between further concessions to Hungary and to the nationalities, 
63 
Austria should choose the latter. 
60. Writing from an Austrian perspective, Redlich ar-
gued that the decisive factor in the fall of Goluchowski and 
the appointment of Schmerling was the insistence of Plener 
on the necessity of establishing a government responsible to 
a parliament. Austrian public opinion regarded Schmerling 
as the indispensible minister in such a regime. Redlich, I, 
pt. l' 680-90. 
61. Redlich I, pt. 2, 228. 
62. The text of the letter is in Deak Ferencz beszedei, 
II, 283-4. 
63. Redlich I, pt. l, 757. 
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The Transylvanian Romanian leadership had sent a dele-
gation to Vienna to petition the court for equal political 
rights. They also called for the appointment of a Romanian 
as Transylvanian Court Chancellor, or at least of more 
Romanian high officials. Rechberg and Plener urged consid-
erate treatment of the Romanians' demands because of the 
64 
"annexationist agitation" in the Danubian Principalities. 
There is no evidence that the delegation influenced the 
appointment of Schmerling as Goluchowski's replacement. The 
delegation did achieve two positive results: a small contingent 
of Romanians was appointed to the Court Chancellery and the 
Gubernium, and the court granted the Romanians' request for 
permission to hold a conference in January. The granting of 
permission was controversial. It was apparently granted 
orally by Schmerling. The new Transylvanian Court Chancel-
lor, Baron Ferenc Kemeny, claimed such an action by Schmerling 
was illegal since Transylvania was now subordinate to his own 
65 
authority and not that of Schmerling. 
Contrary to the Old Conservatives' expectation, 
64. In the Council of Ministers session of December 17, 
1860, cited by Lydia Larcher, Die Rumanen Siebenburgens in 
der Fruhzeit Kaiser Fran~ ~oseph..§. ~ j_l8.§Q.=1.§65) (Diss. 
Vienna, 1944), 20-2 and Albert Berzeviczy, Az abszolutizmus 
kora Magyarorszagon 1849-1865, III (Budapes~ Franklin, 
1932), 152. 
65. The Transylvanian Locumtenency [chief absolutist 
administrative body; Statthalterei, helytart6sag] 
had previously been subordinate to the Ministry of Interior, 
which was now a component of the Ministry of State. 
Schmerling implicitly recognized the new relationship on 
February 12 when he forwarded the resolution of the two 
presidents of the Romanian conference, which had been sent 
to himself, to Kemeny. MOL, D228. 1861/90. 
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schmerling quickly established himself as the leading figure 
in the Council of Ministers. Pressed by the financial 
problem, Franz Joseph could not remain indifferent to 
schmerling~s popularity with the Viennese middle class and 
central bureacracy. Developments in Hungary were partly 
responsible for his ascendancy, as the Conservatives~ mis-
judgement of public opinion there became increasingly evi-
dent. The conference of notables in Esztergom under the 
chairmanship of Cardinal Scitovszky on December 17-20 de-
clared in favor of the electoral law of 1848 for the 
Hungarian Diet rather than that of 1608 which had been 
66 
declared on October 20. It became clear that the 
prospective diet would reject the October Diploma after the 
reestablished county assemblies issued declarations in favor 
of the laws of 1848. 
Conditions in Hungary seemed to confirm Schmerling~s 
belief that the Diploma erred in surrendering too much 
67 
central power, yet he insisted that it must be upheld. 
Most frustrating for Schmerling was the Diploma~s adminis-
trative dualism. Was there still a central government for 
the interal affairs of the empire? The credit situation 
continued to demand concessions to the liberal middle class 
in the form of public control over expendiures, ie. a 
68 
parliament. The solution Schmerling proposed was to 
------------~-------
66. Walter, 206. 
67. Ibid., 199-202; Redlich, I, pt. 1, 711. 
68. Plener recalled in 1901: "Man hat lange andere GrGnde fur 
den raschen Ubergang Osterreichs vom Oktoberdiplom zum 
Februarpatent gesucht. Tatsachlich waren dafur nur 
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expand the Reichsrat into a true imperial parliament with 
353 members and much broader powers. Deputies to the Reichsrat 
would be selected by the restored diets of the crown lands. 
such a central parliament was an even stronger limitation of 
Hungarian independence than the Diploma, but the Conservatives 
recognized the need for dramatic action. The size and 
powers of the new parliament, they hoped, would "impress" 
the Hungarian liberals on ideological grounds and cause them 
to moderate their opposition and negotiate with the government. 
Hence the Conservatives acceded to the passage of the new 
Reichsrat statute as part of the new imperial "constitution" or 
69 
February Patent. But in view of Hungarian public opinion 
and the fact that Hungary and Transylvania, with 85 and 26 
seats, would be in a permanent minority in the Reichsrat, 
the Hungarian Chancellor Vay refused to sign the Patent when 
it was promulgated in February 26. 
*** 
The Quasi-Dualist Regime in Vienna 
The Diploma restored most important aspects of the 
historic constitution of Transylvania. The Patent, in addi-
tion, assigned a vital imperial function, the sending of 
staatsfinanzielle Grunde massgebend."-- Malfer, "Einleitung", in 
POM, V,3, xi. Deak's despondent letter to his brother-in-law 
after his unsuccessful meeting with Franz Joseph on December 24 
confirmed the desperateness of the empire's difficulties. 
The financial problem, he wrote, was perhaps the most diffi-
cult: "Az 6ri~si terheket, akar egyutt kezeljuk azokat, akar 
megosztjuk, nem leszunk kepesek elb1rni ... Az adossagokbol 
pedig ki nem fogunk bujhatni, meg akkor sem, ha a birodalom-
tol elszaknank .. " (Deak Ferencz beszedei, II, 305-6). 
69. Redlich I, pt~ 764-7. 
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deputies to the Reichrat, to the provincial diets. The 
political struggle arising from the restoration of the con-
stitution and the preparations for the Transylvanian diet 
must be viewed in the light of the important political 
institutions. These were of three kinds: the central or 
court institutions in Vienna, the provincial government in 
Kolozsvar, and the autonomous administration of the 
Hungarian, Szekler, Saxon and Romanian counties and dis-
tricts. The remainder of this chapter will discuss the 
central government in Vienna. 
The center of the system was, of course, the Emperor. 
Franz Joseph, like other autocrats, was convinced of his 
duty to maintain his personal authority to the maximum 
degree; but he felt even more strongly his dynastic duty to 
maintain the European power and prestige of his monarchy. 
The central meaning of the "Austrian state and imperial 
problem'' lies in the series of reluctant but coldly calcu-
lated concessions of his personal power by the emperor in 
order to preserve his stature in Europe. Beyond these basic 
principles, he was indifferent to political ideas. His 
major concessions-- the reestablishment of the Prime Minis-
tership in August, 1859, the convocation of the expanded 
Reichsrat 1n June, 1860, the October Diploma and the re-
storation of Hungarian autonomy, the appointment of the 
"liberal'' Schmerling and of Prime Minister Archduke Rainer, 
and the "constitution'' of the February Patent in 1861-- all 
impinged upon adamantly expressed requisites of his imperial 
47 
prerogative, and each was accompanied by a declaration that 
no further concessions would be made. Similarly, the 
emperor was able to dismiss his most devoted agents with 
what struck some observers as a shameful lack of senti-
70 
ment, but also stubbornly uphold his own reluctant 
concessions in the conviction of their necessity. Thus 
despite himself he voluntarily became a sort of 
constitutional monarch. 
Franz Joseph sought to respect both his compromise with the 
Hungarian Old Conservatives and with the Austrian moderate 
liberals of Schmerling. These compromises were to a considerable 
extent contradictory, and hence neither side was satisfied with 
the result. The goal of unified leadership through the 
Council of Ministers, expressed in 1859, became elusive. 
The party of Schmerling and his allies was numerically 
dominant in the Council of Ministers, but many important 
measures concerning Hungary and Transylvania were not 
decided there, but only ratified. In difficult questions 
the emperor resorted to smaller consultations or "Ministerial 
Conferences": with the Hungarian ministers to decide on a 
policy opposed by the centralist ministers, or with a core 
of trusted centralist ministers when indiscretions by the 
ministers made a more intimate consultation on diplomatic, 
71 
military or Hungarian matters desirable. 
70. The sudden dismissal of General Gyulay in 1859, 
Schmerling in July, 1865 and the disgrace of General Lajos 
Benedek after the Battle of Koniggratz a year later are prime 
examples. 
71. Rumpler, 70-l. 
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The Emperor's ambivalence meant that, in spite of his 
ultimate authority and chairmanship of most Council of 
Ministers sessions, the party allignments on the Council of 
Ministers were very important. Schmerling's allies were 
centralists by conviction and, in most cases, by virtue of 
the organs they headed which also enjoyed or could claim 
jurisdiction in the Hungarian lands. Only Plener, for 
reasons already noted, advocated ministerial responsibility 
in the liberal sense, but both he and Schmerling took a more 
conciliatory position than the emperor toward the Reichsrat 
concerning the responsibility of the ministers toward that 
72 
body. 
The members of Schmerling's coalition in the Council of 
Ministers were those people to whom Romanian and Saxon 
lobbyists in Vienna appealed for support. The financial and 
military administration of the Hungarian lands were subord-
inated directly to Plener's ministry and to the War Ministry 
of Count Degenfeld, and not to the Chancelleries. Between 
April, 1861 and April, 1862, these two ministries imposed 
the billeting of troops for the collection of delinquent 
73 
taxes in the Hungarian lands. The Hungarian ministers 
agreed to the measure reluctantly, although recognizing its 
fiscal necessity, and strongly favored its termination a 
74 
year later. The army was the most consistently central-
72. Ibid., 66-9. 
73. The procedure was known as military execution. It 
entailed the peaceful quartering of troops on the property of 
a debtor until the debt was paid. 
74. Military execution provoked vehement Hungarian com-
49 
istic body of the Habsburg administration, and hence the 
object of special dislike among the Hungarians of 
Transylvania. The police in Hungary and Transylvania were 
technically subordinate to the Chancelleries, but reported 
to the Minister of Police, Baron Karoly Mecsery. Mecsery 
referred to police reports in his statements in the Council 
75 
of Ministers in support of centralist policies. The 
Emperor's "narrower conference" for sensitive matters con-
sisted of Rechberg, Schmerling, often Degenfeld and Mecsery, 
76 
and occasionally Flener. 
A further ally of Schmerling in the Council of Ministers and 
potential support for the Romanians and Saxons was the 
President of the State Council [Staatsrat], Baron Thaddaus 
Peithner von Lichtenfels. Though not a voting member of the 
Council of Ministers, he was Schmerling's most assertive and 
consistent ally in his centralist course there and in the 
upper house of the Reichsrat. Lichtenfels was also the 
former teacher of the emperor, on whom he exercized a per-
77 
sonal influence for many years. The State Council was 
plaints in the summer of 1861, but was a dramatic success 
during a period of financial crisis. Degenfeld proposed its 
termination because of the harmful effect on military morale 
and because the measure had achieved its goal. Stefan 
Malf~r, "Steuerverweigerung und Milit~rexekution in Ungarn, 
1860-1862," 6sterreichische Osthefte, 24 (1982), 326-7. 
75. Oszkar Sashegyi, Az abszolutizmuskori leveltar 
(Budapest: Akademiai, l9GS), 384, 397; Trocsanyi, 648-55. 
Mecsery supported the call for Mik6's dismissal in the 
discussion of November 17, 1861 citing "einige auf dem 
polizeilichen Gebiete ihm zugekommene Daten." POM, V,3, 31. 
76. Rumpler, 70-l. 
77. Redlich, II (Leipzig: Der neue Geist-Verlang, 
1926), 297, 306; Walter Rogge, II Osterreich von yilagos bis 
zur Gegenwart_ (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1872), 100-l. 
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created on February 17, 1861 as a central advisory council 
neither superior nor subordinate to the Council of Minis-
78 
ters. The intrusive potential of the State Council, 
with its prescribed function of advising the Council of 
Ministers on legislation for the entire empire, disturbed 
79 
the Hungarian ministers. Several councillors of the 
state Council were members from the Hungarian lands, in-
80 
eluding the Transylvanian Baron Karl von Geringer. 
Lichtenfels and the State Council prepared many memoranda 
for Schmerling on Hungarian affairs and presented them in 
81 
the Council of Ministers. 
Most of the other German ministers tended to side with 
Schmerling on the Hungarian issues, but took a less active 
interest and lacked any jurisdictional competence in that 
78. The Vienna Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv uses the 
title jungerer Staatsrat to distinguish the body from the 
more powerful Staatsrat that had existed from 1742 to 1801 
and 1808 to 1848. 
79. The Council of Ministers acceded to a request by 
Szecsen that a passage concerning the nationalities be 
dropped from the Staatsrat Reichsrat statute ''weil man 
darauf den Anspruch wurde stutzen wollen, sampliche Nation-
alitaten im Staatsrate reprasentiert zu sehen." POM, V,l, 
79 (February 17, 1861). 
80. Geringer was born in Hermannstadt and his mother was 
a Saxon; Irmgard Martius, Grossosterreich und die 
Siebenburger §~chsen 1848-1859 (Munchen: Verlag~es 
Slidostdeutschen Kulturwerks, 1957), 31. Szabad, "Az 
onkenyuralom kora," 454, states somewhat imprecisely that he 
was Saxon. After the Revolution he served as royal commis-
sioner in Transylvania and Governor of Hungary in 1851-2. 
For the full membership of the State Council, see POM V, l, 
219 (March 23, 1861). 
81. Redlich, II, 306-7. Rogge exaggerates the influence 
of the State Council, however, when he writes: "Also wieder 
eine Centralbehorde fur das ganze Reich ... Diese Korperschaft 
sollte die letzten Spuren des Dualismus erwischen, die noch 
von der Wiederherstellung der ungarischen Verfassung ubrig-
geblieben waren." (II, 107). 
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part of the empire. Schmerling sought to strengthen his own 
position by insisting that officials forward legislative 
82 
proposals to the emperor only through the Prime Minister. 
The emperor acceded to this demand through his edict of 
83 
February 4. The appointment of Archduke Rainer as the 
new Prime Minister two days later further strengthened 
Schmerling's hand, as the Archduke was a centralist, Presi-
84 
dent of the Reichsrat and known as a moderate liberal. 
Rainer never had the power or independence of a West 
European Prime Minister and could have no real conflict of 
interest with Franz Joseph. But he was a determined cham-
pion of the edict of February 4. By his memorandum of April 
9, he helped convince Franz Joseph to reject Vay's request 
for regular direct access to the emperor. Unless the 
Hungarian Chancellor retained the same status in terms of 
access as the other ministers, Rainer argued, he would in 
effect constitute the head of an independent Hungarian 
85 
government. 
82. Schmerling's appeal, 1n the session of January ll, 
1861, was possibly prompted by the hasty reunification of 
the Banat with Hungary on December 27 after Szecsen's per-
sonal intervention with the emperor; Rumpler, 60-l. 
83. Redlich, II, 22. 
84. Rainer was a 33-year-old cousin of the emperor, son 
of the Viceroy of Lombardy, and a strong opponent of the 
Concordat with varied scientific and commercial interests. 
Helmut Andics, Das osterreichische Jahrhundert. Die Donau-
monarchie 1804-1900 (Wien: Wilhelm Goldmann Verlag~ 1980); 
169; Alois Hudal, Die osterreichische Vatikanbotschaft, 
1806-1918 (Munchen--:--pohi& Co., 1952), 169. 
85. Redlich, II, 21-4; Walter, 206. Helmut Rumpler 
rejects the conventional view of Rainer's appointment as 
strengthening the influence of Schmerling: he argues that 
Franz Joseph sought to undermine his previous liberal con-
cessions and ease the negotiations with Hungary by gaining a 
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The position of Baron Vay and of the Minister without 
portfolio, Count Szecsen, was ambiguous. They owed their 
status to their ability to convince Franz Joseph that the 
restoration of limited Hungarian autonomy would preserve the 
empire from disorder and separatist movements. Soon the 
unpopularity of the Old Conservatives' principles, and their 
inability to confine the opposition in Hungary within the 
desired limits, became evident. Consequently the prestige 
and influence of the Old Conservatives at court eroded. 
They desperately sought to recover it by a series of reluc-
tant concessions to the demands of the opposition in Hungary 
in the hope of reasserting their influence there and stab-
ilizing the system. The dominant noble politicians in 
Hungary demanded a restoration of not only the old constitu-
tion but also of the laws of 1848, and the Old Conservatives 
began to concede even these. After the negative response to 
the Diploma in Hungary, the Old Conservatives in the 
Esztergom conference called for a responsible ministry, 
territorial integrity, and the liberal electoral law of 
86 
1848. At the court, a part of these demands was almost 
immediately put into effect, with the reunion of the Banat 
and Vojvodina to Hungary and the specification of the 1848 
electoral law for the election of county officials. The 
Prime Minister whose familial subordination made him more 
pliable (61-3). But Schmerling's differences with Rechberg 
suggest the retention of the latter as Prime Minister would 
have served these purposes better. A conservative informant 
complained that Rainer was "politisch ganz ergeben" vis a 
vis Schmerling. Redlich, II, 761. 
86. Redlich, II, 39-41, 724-5. 
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demands of the new county assemblies in January, 1861, and 
even more of the Hungarian diet when it convened on April 6, 
demonstrated that these concessions had not achieved their 
goal. The Hungarian ministers' further concessions, namely 
the restoration of Hungarian civil and criminal law and, as 
noted above, of a Hungarian government, were prevented by 
87 
the resistance of the other ministers. 
The Hungarian opposition accepted the leadership of Ferenc 
Deak in the diet; it adopted his address to Franz Joseph 
insisting on the integrity of the 1848 laws, but accepting 
the rights of the monarch as Hungarian king and the possi-
bility of legislative revision of the 1848 laws. The 
Hungarian ministers formally agreed with their German col-
leagues that the address was unacceptable; as the architects 
of the Diploma, they could not do otherwise. Yet they 
sought to prevent the proposed dissolution of the diet and 
the constitution through negotiation. In the tradition of 
the Hungarian estates' horsetrading with the Crown in past 
centuries, called Transaktionspolitik, they hoped to find a 
88 
middle ground for the two sides to agree on. The German 
ministers rejected this tactic; Vay and Szecsen resigned on 
July 18, and the Hungarian diet was dissolved on August 22. 
Military courts took over many of the functions of the 
recently restored Hungarian courts, and Lieutenant-General 
87. Ibid., II, 21-39. 
88. According to Szecsen's later account, Deak was 
ready to accept the reply to the address which the Hungarian 
ministers formulated, but it was rejected by the German 
ministers. 
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Marie Palffy became the Governor of Hungary. 
*** 
The Provisorium in Vienna and Hungary 
The new regime in Hungary, the Provisorium, was a sort 
of victory for Schmerling and his allies, but at the cost of 
a setback for the liberal goals that had kept Schmerling in 
opposition during most of the previous decade. The attempt 
to lure the Hungarians into the Reichsrat had failed at 
least temporarily; the only constitutional basis on which 
the Reichsrat could now debate the imperial budget was by 
89 
the invocation of the February Patent's emergency clause. 
The Hungarian ministers and officials who now took office 
were either bureaucrats of the Bach school or soldiers. 
Austrian liberals feared a restoration of the of the 
intensely Catholic regime of the 1850s. Catholic 
90 
conservatiism enjoyed rising influence. 
Resolutions of the Hungarian counties denounced the 
dissolution of the diet and the collection of taxes by 
military execution, and called for the resignation of all 
Hungarian officials. Cardinal Scitovszky, as prefect of 
89. On December 17 Schmerling declared the acceptance 
by the Council of Ministers (on June 5, 1861) of P.l3 of the 
February Patent as the basis for the Reichsrat's approval of 
the budget. Stefan Malf~r writes: ''Damit war aber der 
Widerspruch nicht beseitigt, der in der Tatsache lag, dass 
der eine Teil des Reiches konstitutionell, der andere ab-
solutistisch regiert wurde." Malf~r, ''Einleitung," in POM 
V,2, XX. 
90. Rogge, II, 155-62. The debate on Austrian religious 
matters in the Council of Ministers on January 3 and March 
6, 1862 revealed the liberal-conservative division there: 
POM V,3, 157-8, 306-8. 
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Esztergom county, took the lead in encouraging such mea-
sures, to the great annoyance of Franz Joseph, who called 
91 
him to Vienna in order to reprimand him. 
The new Hungarian ministers were Count Antal Forgach, former 
Governor of Bohemia, as Hungarian Court Chancellor and Count 
Marie Esterhazy as the Minister without Portfolio. 
Esterhazy was the Austrian ambassador to the Holy See during 
the negotiations leading to the Concordat, and arch-
conservative and fervent Catholic who enjoyed close ties 
withe the Emperor and the Nuncio. They accepted the dis-
solution of the municipalities in Hungary and the restora-
tion of absolutism after November 5, 1861. Yet the unity of 
the newly constituted Council of Ministers was short-lived. 
The decisive reason seems to have been the emperor's con-
tinued conviction of the necessity of compromise with Hungary. 
Count Esterhazy quickly became his closest advisor, and both 
he and Count Forgach spoke regularly in the Council of 
92 
Ministers of "protecting Hungarian sensibilities." 
Forgach sought, in effect, to extend the Conservatives' 
Transaktionspolitik. His differences with Schmerling were 
well-known, being carried out publicly in the newspapers 
93 
sponsored by the two men. The Austrian public was even 
more aware of the heigthening rivalry between Schmerling and 
91. Redlich, II, 183-5; Rogge, II, 151-2. 
92. Redlich, II, 294-305. 
93. Redlich identified these papers as the Botschafter 
of Vienna and the Stirg6ny of Pest. Berzeviczy ("Schmerling 
~s Forg~ch harca," B~csi Magyar Tbrt~neti Int~zet ~vk6nyve 3 
(1933), 379) identifies Donauzeitung as Schmerling's paper. 
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Rechberg, which surfaced in reports about their differences 
in the Council of Ministers and in debates between their 
94 
press organs as well. These differences arose from three 
sources. Rechberg sympathized with the aristocratic opponents 
of Schmerling~s policy in the Reichsrat for social and 
ideological reasons. Second, the Foreign Minister favored a 
more cautious, conciliatory policy than Schmerling on the 
German question. Finally, Rechberg was more moderate than 
Schmerling on the Hungarian question due to his concern for 
Austria~s image in Europe as well as his aristocratic rap-
95 
port with the Old Conservatives. 
The Emperor~s policies in Hungary gave evidence of his 
continued confidence in the Old Conservatives. Forgach 
scored a victory in November, 1862 when Franz Joseph ac-
cepted his proposal to grant a partial amnesty to political 
prisoners in Hungary without Schmerling~s prior know-
96 
ledge. A major crisis arose in the Council of Ministers 
in succeeding months over the compromise proposal formulated 
94. Redlich, II, 760-3. The paper of the Austrian 
conservatives was the Vaterland (Redlich, II, 152). 
95. Ibid., II, 742-3, 766-7; Somogyi, 24-9; Jelavich, 
Habsburg, 93-4. Rechberg was the President of the German 
Federal Diet in Frankfurt from 1855 to 1859. He favored 
collaboration with Prussia, and advocated the Austro-
Prussian alliance on the Schleswig-Holstein question. 
Schmerling was a German nationalist, and persuaded Franz 
Joseph to lead the unsuccessful attempt to defeat Prussia at 
the Frankfurt Congress of Princes in August, 1863, despite 
Rechberg~s objections. In his unpublished memoir, 
Schmerling claimed that disunity among the ministers on 
foreign and internal policy, not his own mistaken concep-
tions, was the chief cause of his regime~s failure.--
Somogyi, 25-6. 
96. Redlich, II, 309. 
57 
by the chief judge of Hungary, the ~~g~x ~~riae (Orszagb{ro) 
count Gyorgy Apponyi. Apponyi was the last Old Conservative 
to retain high office. Schmerling argued in January, 1862 
that Apponyi's "remaining in office is impossible, since his 
presence in Pest is a [source of] continuous agitation 
against the government." Yet the emperor declined to dis-
97 
miss him. Apponyi presented his reform plan, which in 
many respects resembled the eventual settlement of 1867, to 
98 
the emperor at the beginning of 1863. Forgach, Esterhazy 
and Rechberg favored the plan, but it was defeated due to 
99 
the adamant opposition of Schmerling and his allies. 
Franz Joseph vetoed the plan when Schmerling threatened to 
resign. He was unprepared to rule Cisleithania without him. 
The emperor's government had, in a sense, become a constitu-
tional one: however strongly they clashed, the two parties 
must remain in the Council of Ministers because of their 
"legitimate" responsibility for their respective halves of 
the monarchy. Through the decision of Franz Joseph, how-
ever, Schmerling's faction attained a stronger position in 
97. POM, V,3, 236 (January l, 1862); ibid., Malfer, 
"Einleitung,", xliii-xliv. 
98. The complete plan is in Deak Ferencz beszedei, III, 
223-35. 
99. Schmerling wrote in his memoirs that Archduke 
Albrecht convinced the emperor to reject the plan.(Somogyi, 
24) There is no other evidence to support the claim, but it 
is plausible. The Archduke had served as Civil and Military 
Governor of Hungary from 1851 to 1860, and two years later 
played a key role in the compromise negotiations with the 
Hungarians; Laszlo Csorba, "Ujabb adatok a kiegyezes 
el6keszit~s~nek t6rt~netehez," ~magyar Rolgari atalakul~s 
kerdesei (Budapest: ELTE Bolcseszettudomanyi kara, 1984), 
428-9. 
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Hungary and even, for a time, in foreign affairs. On 
schmerling's insistence, Apponyi was also dismissed, on 
March 30, 1863. 
*** 
The casualties and devastation of the revolution and 
civil war of 1848-49 left a legacy of heightened national 
animosity in Transylvania. This was particularly the case 
for Hungarians, whose political class was almost unanimous in 
resenting the Austrian absolutist regime that followed. The 
abortive Hungarian revolt in Transylvania in 1852 convinced 
the opposition that external assistance was necessary for a 
successful insurrection. Austrian diplomatic isolation 
facilitated the rebels' search for allies: the France of 
Napoleon III and, ironoically, the newly united Danubian 
Principalities of Prince Cuza offered their support. Hence 
Hungarian nationalism in Transylvania gained a volatile and 
contradictory connection with the new Romanian state south 
of the Carpathians. 
The Austrian military and financial debacle 1n 1859 
accentuated the importance of both the Hungarian opposition 
and of the Austrian advocates of liberal constitutionalism. 
Hungarian conservatives-- aristocrats and Catholic 
prelates-- won the accession of the Emperor to a federalist 
reform of the empire. In less than a year, the pendulum 
swung half the way back: in February, 1861 Anton von 
Schmerling secured the Emperor's approval of a centralist 
100. Redlich, II, 309-29. 
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constitution, the February Patent. The pendulum swing was 
partial because the newly restored provincial autonomy 
remained, and because of the concomitant administrative 
dualism at the highest level. Franz Joseph himself was 
ambivalent on the question of dualism, and hence often 
allowed considerable play for the contending Austrian 
centralists and Hungarian conservatives in the Council of 
Ministers. Austrian centralists won one partial victory in 
late 1861 and another in 1863. 
The defeat of the Old Conservatives' compromise plan 
in 1863 brought with it also the victory, after a struggle 
that began in 1861, of Schmerling's views on the 
Transylvanian question. Transylvania was also the subject 
of animated debate in the sessions of February and March, 
1863. The debate involved several key issues: the constitu-
tional restoration in Transylvania, provincial autonomy and 
the role assigned to Transylvania by the February Patent, 
and domestic and international aspects of the nationality 
question. The political and social movements in 
Transylvania functioned, in a sense, as a reflection of the 
liberal-aristocratic antithesis in the Council of 
Ministers. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
TRANSYLVANIAN ADMINISTRATION AND SOCIETY 
The constitutional independence of Transylvania signi-
fied by the restoration of the Transylvanian Court Chancel-
lery in October, 1860 was a logical consequence of the Old 
conservatives' stated intention to restore the "historical-
political individualities" and the pre-1848 constitutions. 
Yet they had hoped, for reasons of nationalist ideology, 
that the union of Hungary and Transylvania in 1848 would be 
1 
respected, and the popular clamor for the laws of 1848 
and the union in particular caused them to favor the union 
even more strongly. Baron Kemeny and Count Imre Mik6 agreed 
only on December 9-10 to accept the positions of Transylvanian 
Court Chancellor and Governor, but with the stipulation 
2 
that their positions were "provisional." 
The German ministers opposed the union because they felt 
this would inordinately increase the influence of the 
3 
Hungarians in the still unsettled affairs of the empire. 
They also contested the validity of the union law of 1848 
because of the irregular circumstances of its approval by 
4 
the king and its promulgation in 1848. They recalled from 
1. Apponyi and Szecsen had argued in the Council of 
Ministers on October 16, 1860 for the union, but were op-
posed by Rechberg and Plener, and the emperor declared that 
the Transylvanian Court Chancellery would be restored. 
Redlich, I, 617. 
2. Tr6csanyi, 645. 
3. Statement by Schmerling in POM, V,2, 217 (July 19, 
1861) . 
4. Schmerling in ibid., 464 (October 29, 1861). 
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1848-49 that the national minorities could provide a useful 
counterweight to the Hungarian claims, and hence they empha-
sized the known opposition of the Romanian and Saxon politi-
5 
cians to the union. 
The Old Conservatives themselves recognized already 
before October 20 that more care must be taken than in 1848 
to respect the desires of the nationalities in 
6 
Transylvania. The emperor expanded on this idea in his 
letter to Rechberg of October 20, to which we have already 
referred. The peasant emancipation and the establishment of 
equal civil rights, he wrote, had made necessary a revision 
of the Transylvanian constitution. For this reason he 
called for the convocation of a conference "of various 
nationalities, religions, and classes" to discuss a reform 
of the electoral law which 
corresponds to the needs of the formerly 
privileged nations, religions, and classes, but 
also the interests of those nations, religions and 
classes hitherto excluded from these political 
rights. 7 
Kemeny thus undertook the "provisional" direction of the 
Transylvanian Court Chancellery under very different circum-
stances than his predecessors. 
5. Mecs~ry in POM, V,l, 197 (March 21, 1861). 
6. Emil Dessewffy's September, 1860 project for a 
federalist coup included an imperial edict to the Governor 
of Transylvania which recognized that the feudal privileges 
of the former landowners had been abolished. In light of 
the new circumstances, the Governor should establish a com-
mittee on the composition of the Transylvanian diet which 
would consider "all justified and sober desires of the 
various nationalities." Deak Ferencz besz~dei, II, 249. 
7. Ibid., II, 283-4. 
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*** 
The Court Chancellery 
The Chancellery had been the leading political and 
administrative body for Transylvania since the final years 
8 
of the seventeenth century. Like the Hungarian Court 
chancellery and the Croatian-Illyrian Court Dikasterium/ 
Chancellery, it had its seat in Vienna. Of the three of-
fices, only the Hungarian Court Chancellor bore the title of 
minister and was hence entitled to regular, voting partici-
pation in the Council of Ministers. The Transylvanian Court 
Chancellor appeared in the Council of Ministers, like the 
others who were not regular members, only as a Referent, 
i.e. to provide information on matters within his compe-
9 
tence. 
Like the ministers, the Court Chancellor presented 
policy initiatives for higher approval through the presenta-
tion of alleruntertanigste Vortrage an den Kaiser via 
Archduke Rainer to the Emperor. Each Vortrag included an 
Entwurf zum allerho~hsten Entschluss for the emperor/s ap-
proval, and the Emperor determined whether consultation in 
the Council or a Conference of Ministers was desirable 
before granting approval to the Entschluss. 
The Chancellor directed the composition of Vortrage and 
of correspondence with coordinate and subordinate officials 
8. Kutschera, 195. 
9. Mecsery and Szecsen successfully argued that Kemeny 
should not be required to sign the February Patent since he 
was the head of a mere "administrative jurisdiction", and 
not a Landesminister. POM, V,l, 102 (February 24, 1861). 
63 
through a staff of approximately fifty men. The most im-
portant of these were the four councillors; Kemeny appointed 
a Hungarian Roman Catholic, Hungarian Protestant, a Saxon 
10 
Lutheran and a Romanian Greek Catholic as councillors. 
Each councillor had responsibility for certain categories of 
affairs, and handled the relevant correspondence with the 
assistance of a secretary and Konzipist of his own nation-
11 
ality and religion. All matters, except sensitive ones 
disposed of by the Chancellor with his personal secretary, 
were presented orally and voted on by the councillors in 
daily sessions of several hours presided over by the Chan-
cellor. In the case of disagreement on a major Entwurf for 
the emperor, the minority position was recorded in a separate 
12 
Entwurf called the Separatvotum. 
13 
The Chancellery began operation on December 28, 1860. 
On January 4 and 7 Schmerling and Lasser, the director of 
his legal section (the former Ministry of Justice) informed 
the Transylvanian Governor and Court of Appeals of their 
subordination henceforth to the Chancellery. Count Miko 
accepted his appointment as constitutional Governor, but the 
10. G. Hofrat, H. udvari tanacsos. Prior to 1848 
there were six. The Romanians considered the number of 
Romanians appointed by Kemeny inadequate. 
11. G. Hofsekretar, H. udvari titkar; G. Hofkonzipist, 
H. udv ar i fugaTrna:zo-.-- ---- --
12. The description of Chancellery procedures, which were 
established in the late eighteenth century, is from 
Trocsanyi, 43-51. The Chancellery had 52 regular (not 
honorary) officials in 1863: Erdely Nagy-Fejedelemseg tiszti 
nevtara az 1864-dik evre (Kolozsvartt: A rom. kath. lyceum 
konyvnyomdajaban, 1864)~ 15-16. 
13. The Hungarian Court Chancellery had begun operation 
already on November 4-- Sashegyi, 373. 
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restoration of the historical form of Gubernium and counties 
was heavily debated in the Council of Ministers 1n January 
due to the rebelliousness of the restored counties in 
Hungary and the growing influence of Schmerling. Kemeny's 
proposal was accepted, however, for the constitutional ad-
ministration to take the place of the absolutist organs on 
14 
April 15, 1861. One of Kemeny's first important tasks as 
Chancellor was the convocation of the consultative confer-
ence specified in the imperial rescript to Rechberg on 
October 20. 
*** 
The Conference in Gyulafehervar 
The Transylvanian administration was going through a 
confused transition period. Baron Ferenc Kemeny, the 
President of the diet in Kolozsvar in 1848, was appointed as 
15 
Chancellor on November 29, 1860. Count Imre Miko occu-
pied his old office as head of the restored Transylvanian 
Gubernium or provincial government and began to organize his 
staff in Kolozsvar. Yet the absolutist Civil and Military 
Governor of Transylvania, Prince Friedrich von Liechtenstein, 
16 
continued in office in Hermannstadt until April 21. 
14. Ibid., 391-2. Sashegyi implies that the decision to 
restore the Transylvanian constitutiion had not yet been 
made when the matter came before the Council of Ministers, 
but Tr6cs~nyi, 645-6 shows this was not the case. 
15. His official appointment came only on December 9; Rolf 
Kutschera, Landtag und Gubernium in Siebenburgen 1688-1869 
(Koln: Bohlau, 1985_)_,-191, 197; Zsolt Trocsanyi, Erdelyi 
kormanyhatosag~ leveltarak (Budapest: Akademiai, 1973), 645; 
Berzeviczy, Az abszolutizmus kora, III, 152. 
16. During-the transition period Kemeny and Liechtenstein 
exchanged sporadic reports about general political and ad-
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The task of the conference in Gyulafehervar was the 
representation of all nationalities and classes at the 
forthcoming Transylvanian diet, i.e. the electoral law under 
which the deputies would be selected. Kemeny's own views 
and the persons he chose to call to the conference assured 
that broader constitutional questions, rather than the 
electoral law, would dominate the discussion. Kemeny sought 
to delay the conference, but finally convened it on February 
17 
11-12, 1861. The forty participants included 24 
Hungarians, eight Saxons and eight Romanians-- the latter, 
18 
of course, far below their percentage of the population. 
A contemporary categorized eighteen of the Hungarian 
participants as conservatives, and only six as liberals. 
Hungarian liberals resented this imbalance and the unconsti-
tutional role assigned to the conference. But like the 
conservatives in Hungary, those at the conference abandoned 
their own principles and supported the liberal demands. All 
the Hungarians supported the position presented in the 
speeches by the host Roman Catholic Bishop, Lajos Haynald, 
and the liberal leader, Count Domokos Teleki: that the laws 
of 1848 must be maintained, and that among these was the 
union of Hungary and Transylvania which made a new 
ministrative matters; MOL, D228, 1860-61. Trocsanyi's des-
cription of the transition (645-6) does not discuss the 
hierarchical relationship of Schmerling and Kemeny. 
17. Sashegyi, 392. 
18. The Hungarians were equally divided among three con-
stitutional-administrative categories: the noble counties, 
the Hungarian towns and the Szekler districts-- Sz~sz, "Az 
abszolutizmus kora Erdelyben," 1477. 
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Transylvanian diet both superfluous and illegal. 
The views of the Saxons were less unanimous. Most of 
the Saxon political meetings in December and January sup-
ported the view expressed in the press of Hermannstadt, 
welcoming the Diploma and reserving approval of the union 
19 20 
for the upcoming diet. Some of the borderland Saxon 
communities, however, favored the Hungarian party and the 
21 22 
union, like Bistritz and Schassburg. The 
Kronstadter Zeitung (Kronstadt) spoke out in favor of the 
union, but wondered, after the publication of the names of 
those who had been invited to the conference, whether it was 
worthwhile for the Saxons to go since Kemeny had guaranteed 
23 
a majority for himself in advance. Three of the Saxons at 
the conference supported the motion of Haynald and Teleki. 
The five others supported the motion presented by Konrad 
Schmidt, which had been adopted by the Saxon national con-
24 
ference in Hermannstadt. Like the Hermannstadter 
19. The Hermannstadter Zeitung wrote on January 3, 1861 
that the union was "verhangnisvoll fur den Bestand der 
Rechte der Sachsischen Nation und ihrer deutschen Nationali-
tat." p. 2. 
20. I.e. on the border of the Fundus Regius (see below). 
21. The Mayor of Bistritz visited Miko with a delegation 
on January 7 and spoke in favor of the union. 
Hermannstadter Zeitun3 No. 6, January 24, 1861, p. 59. 
22. The town sent a 48-man delegation to Baron E6tvos 1n 
January with a declaration in favor of the union. 
Kronstadter Zeitung No. 6, January 11, 1861, p. 34. 
23. Kronstadter Zeitung No. 3, pp. 17-18; No. 14, January 
25, 1861, p. 85. 
24. roan Pu9cariu, Notite Qesp~e intamplarile 
contemporane (Sibiiu: Tiparul tipografiei arhidieczane, 
1913), 55; according to Urmossy, only three supported 
Schmidt's motion, while the other two were absent from the 
final vote; Urm6ssy, I, 264. 
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zeitung, Schmidt accepted the validity of the 1848 laws, 
including the union, but argued that the union must be 
ratified by the diet. He offered a detailed proposal for 
the electoral law with an electoral base of 8 fl. and extra 
weight given to urban interests. Saxons, Hungarians and 
25 
Romanians would be represented almost equally in the diet. 
The Romanian view, like that of the Hungarians, was 
nearly unanimous by the time of the conference. The 
Romanian press welcomed the Diploma, and called for improved 
Romanian representation. This was the burden of two peti-
tions sent to the emperor, the first on November 7 re-
26 
questing permission to hold a national conference. A 
Romanian delegation of twenty spent the second half of 
November and most of December, 1860 in Vienna, meeting with 
Goluchowski, Kemeny, and Lasser, and presenting their peti-
tion to Franz Joseph on December 10. Permission to hold the 
conference was granted and several Romanians were appointed 
to the Chancellery during the delegation's stay in Vienna, 
27 
though less than had been hoped. 
25. Urmossy, I, 259-60. 
26. Josan, "Documente inedite privind lupta national~ a 
romAnilor din Transilvania in anul 1861," Apulum 17 (1979), 
540; Simion Retegan, Dieta romaneasca a Transilvaniei (1863-
63) (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1979) 38. -
27. ~ulutiu led the delegation to Vienna and remained 
there until December 23. AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG 1861/123 
contains the complete record of the delegation's work, 
including Sulutiu's correspondence with Saguna. Contempor-
aries reported that Schmerling had granted permission for 
the conference orally, though Miko and Kemeny claimed he had 
no authority to grant such permission (Urmossy I, 250-2). 
While it is true that Schmerling sought to encourage the 
Romanian movement against the Hungarians, the question of 
legality was spurious since the Hungarians and Saxons were 
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The Romanian conference was held in Hermannstadt 
between January 13 and 16, n.s. The conference of 150 
Transylvanian Romanians declared its adherence to the six 
points of the militant second Blaj Assembly of May, 1848, 
especially concerning the maintenance of Transylvanian au-
tonomy, and approved a memorandum to Franz Joseph protesting 
against the ethnic balance of the personnel appointed by 
Kemeny to his Chancellery. A Romanian National Committee 
was also appointed, headed by $aguna and Greek Catholic 
28 
Metropolitan $ulut;:iu. The conference devised an 
electoral law based on a minimum tax assessment of 5 fl., 
29 
and elected a twenty-man permanent national committee. 
Sulutiu presented this program at the Gyulafehervar conference, 
30 
and it was supported by all eight Romanian members. 
Kemeny presented all three motions at the Ministers' 
31 
Conference on March 14. He stated that all three were 
holding meetings without special permission. 
28. Simion Retegan, Dieta rom&neasc~ a Transilvaniei 
(1863-1864) (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1979), 38-9~--------
29. Josan, "Documente," 540-l; Pu$cariu, 52-4; Urmossy 
I, 251-4; Miklos Mester, Az auton6m Er_§..§J.Y ~.§ ~ !.9!!1~n 
nemzetisegi kovetelesek az 1863/64. evi nag.Y_.§zebeni orsz<ig-
gyulesen (Budapest: --DunantulPecsi- Egyetemi Konyvkiado-es -
Nyomda R.-T. Pecsett, 1936), 71-81. In addition to the 
official participants there were also several hundred spec-
tators, including Romanian law students who gave vocal sup-
port to the nationalists. (Mester, op.cit., 74). 
30. Only seven Romanians were present at the conference. 
TheGreek Catholic dean of Gyulafehervar, Augustin Pop, was 
excluded at the insistence of $ulut;:iu because of his unionist 
views expressed at the national conference. (loan PU$Cariu, 55). 
Both Pop and Court Secretary designate Dimitrie Moldovan were 
publicly recorded as having been "absent due to illness'', Pop 
on the original protocol and Moldovan when he later published a 
speech as the Romanians' eighth participant. On Pop's rela-
tionship with $ulut;:iu and the nationalists, see Chapter VIII. 
31. An unofficial protocol of the conference was 
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unacceptable: the Hungarian one because the emperor had 
ruled that the union must be deliberated upon by both the 
32 
Hungarian and Transylvanian diets, the Saxon and Romanian 
ones because they supplanted the electoral law valid 1n 
1847, which had been passed by the diet of 1791. He added 
that the Romanian electoral proposal 
would not only be based on democratic principles, 
which are incompatible with monarchic ones, but 
was against all reason and would certainly lead to 
the collapse of any empire ruled by a monarch. 33 
He proposed instead a much more moderate electoral law, with 
a tax base of 8 fl. 40 kr. The debate in the Conference of 
Ministers on March 14 and 21 ended in stalemate. The ques-
tion of political representation would remain the most ex-
plosive one in Transylvania. Schmerling and Lichtenfels 
found Kemeny~s proposal completely inadequate from the 
standpoint of the nationalities. Lasser complained that 
Kemeny was consulting directly with the emperor concerning 
34 
Transylvania, circumventing the Council of Ministers. 
The controversy in the press over the speeches at 
Gyulafehervar and the rumors of discord within the Council 
of Ministers itself were an inauspicious preliminary to the 
restoration of the constitutional administration. Two other 
published in German: Die Karlsburger Beratungen 
(Hermannstadt, 1861), and the speeches were published and 
commented on in most of the Transylvanian newspapers. 
32. Yet at the conference Kemeny and Miko were among those 
who voted for this motion. 
33. Redlich, II, 242. 
34. Ibid., II, 241-6. Persistent, unconfirmed press 
reports maintained that Schmerling and other German minis-
ters threatened their resignation at this time; Redlich, II, 
247; Rogge, II, 105. 
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factors also complicated the transition. While Miko began 
the organization of the Gubernium at the end of December and 
of the counties in succeeding weeks, the Locumtenency led by 
Civil and Military Governor Prince Friedrich von 
Liechtenstein continued in office until April 21. 
Liechtenstein was openly hostile to the Hungarian movement. 
Furthermore, the restored counties in Hungary began in 
January to enact resolutions demanding the restoration of 
all the laws of 1848 and calling on the population to 
withhold the payment of taxes. Such conditions made the 
35 
task of Governor Miko all the more difficult. 
*** 
The Constitutional Restoration 
The Gubernium, like the constitutional Locumtenential 
36 
Council in Hungary, was organized on the principle of the 
dicasterium. Its function was to carry out directives from 
the Chancellery, but by its composition it exercized a 
constitutional control function on the policies that were 
37 
set for it. The representation of the Transylvanian 
35. Kutschera, 191. 
36. L. Consilium B~3l~m Locumteniale Hungaricum, G. 
StatthElterei, H. Helytartotanacs. 
37. The dicasteria were introduced in the Habsburg lands 
beginning in the fifteenth century to replace purely elective 
corporative bodies. With time they behaved increasingly like 
mere arms of the abolutist state, though the rationale of 
representation remained. See the articles "kormanyszekek 
(dicasteriumok),"and "helytart6tan~cs,"33-5, Ma~yar t6rteneti 
fogalomgyujtemeny, I (Eger: Reves Megyei Leveltar, 1980), 33-5, 
488-9 .. This explains Redlich's remark that, through the 
dissolution of the corporative Locumtenential Council of 
Hungary in November, 1861, the Governor of Hungary became a 
"dictator''. Redlich, II, 94-5, 185. 
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nationalities and religions among the Chancellery council-
lors in the 1860s was an ad hoc, exceptional arrangement; 
their representation and that of various Transylvanian in-
stitutions among the sixteen Gubernium councillors was 
specified in several laws of 1791. These required the 
greatest possible equality of the three dominant nations and 
four religions among the councillors, and also ex officio 
councillor status for the Roman Catholic Bishop, the Presi-
dent of the diet, the director of the provincial financial 
authority (whose office was subordinate to the Ministry of 
38 
Finance), and the elected leader of the Saxons, the Comes 
The Gubernium had two sections, a political and a judicial 
senate, each headed by a Vice President. The judicial 
senate was the Transylvanian supreme court. 
Procedure in the Gubernium was similar to that in the 
Chancellery. The chief categories of officials were the 
same: councillors, secretaries and Konzipisten. Each 
councillor had responsibility for certain categories of 
affairs, and presented these with his proposal for action at 
the general sessions. These took place several times a week 
for four hours in the morning. The rule that the Governor 
38. J.H. Benigni von Mildenberg, Handbuch der Statistik 
und Geo~aphie des Grossfurstenthums Siebenburgen 
(Hermannstadt: W.H. Thierry's Buchhandlung, 1837), 97; 
Kutschera, 157. The diet was supposed to nominate candi-
dates for Chancellor, Governor and Gubernium councillors. 
From among these the emperor would appoint the respective 
officials, who were then subject to confirmation by the 
Diet. In the absence of a diet, the appointed Chancellor 
and Governor after 1861 were only "Presidents" of the Chan-
cellery and the Gubernium, and their confirmation was never 
brought before the diet in 1863-64. (Benigni, 96-7, 105.) 
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voted last on the councillors' proposals reinforced the 
decision-making authority of the councillors, but the 
Governor was required to present both the minority and 
39 
majority opinions to the Chancellery. 
Whatever the desire of the conservatives Kemeny and 
Mik6 to return to the system of 1848, circumstances made 
this impossible. First among these circumstances was the 
pressure at the court to appoint more Romanians. In his 
letter of December 21 to Kemeny, the emperor repeated his 
instructions of October 20 to Rechberg concerning 
Transylvania. He called for the reappointment of the 
officials of 1848 on the provincial level, but also the 
appointment of members of the other nationalities wherever 
those of 1848 were unavailable. He also stipulated that 
churches and schools could determine their own official 
language, and participants in local assemblies choose the 
40 
language of deliberation. Mike's eleven nominees as 
councillors on December 28, 1860 included three Romanians 
who had served in the absolutist Locumtenency of 
41 
Transylvania. An equal number of subordinate Romanian 
officials were assigned to the Romanian councillors, and a 
proportionate number of Romanians appointed at the court of 
42 
appeals (Erdelyi kiralyi itelo tabla) in Marosvasarhely. 
39. Trocsanyi, 156-72; Kutschera, 164-5. 
40. Okmanytar Erdely legujabb jogtortenetehez, Ed. 
Jozsef Sandor (Kolozsvar: Stein Janos, 1865), 117-19. 
41. Retegan, "Lupta national& a rom&nilor in jurisdictiun-
ile Transilvaniei in anul 1861," Anuarul Institutului de 
Istorie ~ Arheologie Clgi 13 (1970), 162. 
42. loan Pu9cariu, 53. He indicates four Romanian 
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A press report of April 29, 1861 stated that the 92 offi-
cials of the Gubernium included 78 Hungarians, seven Saxons 
43 
and seven Romanians. Naturally both Romanian and Saxon 
politicians were dissatisfied with these proportions. 
Changes in the regional administration also gave the 
Romanians a somewhat better position than before 1848. The 
four military border regiments had been dissolved in 1851, 
and the local administration integrated with that of the 
surrounding area. For the Szeklers of the two regiments in 
Csik and Haromszek districts, the dissolution satisfied an 
old grievance, since the predominantly free Szekler popula-
tion resented the imposition of military discipline and the 
44 
limitations on the choice of education and profession. 
The Romanian perception of the border regiment system was 
much more positive, since many serfs gained greater economic 
45 
autonomy and educational opportunities. Given the 
material and cultural progess the Romanians of the border 
regiments had made, their reintegration into Hungarian or 
Saxon-administered areas was problematic. A Romanian was 
placed at the head of the newly created district of Nasaud, 
councillors, but the fourth, along with a Romanian Vice 
President, were only appointed during the Provisorium. 
43. Kronstadter Zeitung No. 34 of 1861 (April 28), p. 
342. 
44. Samu Benko, "Szekely diakok harca a Habsburg-
hatalommal a tanulas jogaert," in Sorsformal6 ertelem, 183-
205. Disagreeing with the Szekler tradition that the entire 
nation resented the institution of the border regiments, 
Kutschera states that the local Szekler nobility spearheaded 
the violent resistance to militarization and "instigated" 
resistance by the peasantry. Kutschera, 227, 230. 
45. Laszlo Makkai, Magyar-roman kozos mult (Budapest: 
Teleki Pal Tudomanyos Intezet, 1948), 168-9. 
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which corresponded to the former Second Romanian Border 
46 
Regiment. On the territory of the former First Romanian 
Border Regiment, a Romanian became the head of the district 
of FAgAra~, and the restored counties of Hunyad and Felsd-
Feher including other parts of the former first regiment 
also received Romanian chiefs. The latter two, however, 
were noblemen bearing only moderate sympathy for the 
47 
Romanian national movement. Major parts of the first 
regiment fell under Saxon administration. Romanian lay and 
church leaders protested the cession of the four counties of 
the Partium to Hungary between December, 1860 and March, 
1861. These counties had Romanian majorities and a large 
Romanian nobility which could have increased the socio-
economic weight of the Romanian population in 
48 
Transylvania. 
Kemeny adopted the same principle for the restoration 
of the local administration as for that of the Gubernium: 
the officials of 1848 should be reappointed wherever possi-
ble, and the others with some consideration for the 
Romanians. In practice, the prefects (H. foispan, 
fokiralybiro, fokapitany) of the restored Hungarian and 
Romanian counties and districts were, with only the excep-
46. Kemeny opposed the establishment of the new district, 
"weil der Bezirk zu klein ausfallen wfirde und die Sympathien 
seiner ausschliessend romanischen Bewohner sich dem Nachbar-
lande zuwenden durften." POM, V,l, 198-9 (March 21, 1861), 
198-9. 
47. roan Pu~cariu, 56; Retegan, "Lupta nationala a 
romanilor," 163. 
48. Retegan, Dieta romaneasca a Transilvaniei, 189. 
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tions mentioned above, Hungarian noblemen from a few 
outstanding families: 
Table 1: Transylvanian Prefects Outside the Fundus 
Regius in 1861 
_!!_!:t.Qgarian counties 
Also- Feher 
Belso-Szolnok 
Doboka 
Felso-Feher 
Hunyad 
Kolozs 
Kukullo 
Torda 
Romanian Fagaras; _____ _ 
Nasaud 
Szekler 
Aranyos 
Csik 
Haromszek 
Maros 
Udvarhely 
districts 
districts 
foispan 
Gyorgy Pogany 
Farkas Veer 
Baron Daniel Banffy 
Augustin Laday 
Baron Ferenc Nopcsa 
Count Ferenc Beldi 
Count Farkas Bethlen 
Baron Gyorgy Kemeny 
fokapitany 
roan Lemeni-Bran 
Alexandru Bohatel 
fokiralybir6 
Gergely Beldi 
Antal Miko 
Count Denes Kalnoky 
Count Mihaly Toldalaghi 
Gabor Daniel (49 
As in the past, the prefects were royal appointees. Under 
them was the heart of the constitutional administration: the 
county and district general congregations. The chief task 
of the congregations was to elect the local administration, 
so the method of their selection was crucial. Kemeny and 
Miko had contradictory goals: to preserve the land from 
Hungarian radicalism by coopting the most responsible, mod-
erate leaders, preserve Hungarian rule, but also placate at 
least some of the Romanians. Kemeny's solution, which we 
will discuss at length, was perhaps the most prudent one, 
but it satisfied nobody, least of all the Romanians. 
An Austrian historian writing at the beginning of this 
century remarked that the restoration of the constitutional 
49. The Saxons restored to the administration were, of 
course, generally not noblemen. 
76 
administration ln Transylvania was a crucial mistake from 
the standpoint of the proclaimed equality of nationalities 
50 
and the centralist February Patent. As we have seen, the 
centralists in Vienna were aware of the problem, but the 
council of Ministers itself was divided. To understand the 
significance of the restoration and how the ruling nation-
alities were able to prevail despite inferior numbers, we 
need to consider how the administration was supposed to 
operate-- legalism was a dominant trait of Hungarian poli-
tics-- and the Transylvanian society that was subject to it. 
*** 
Administration in the Noble Counties and Szekler Districts 
The Transylvanian jurisdictions which existed for 
several hundred years up to 1849, and then from 1861 until 
the partial reorganization in 1876, can be grouped into 
three areas according to their location and administrative 
system: the Hungarian or noble counties (H. magyar nemes 
the Szekler region (H. szekely szekek, sz~keJY!old), 
and the Saxon region (L. Fundus regius, G. §acpsisch~ Stuhle 
und Distrikte, Konigsboden, H . .!s:.i.I~l..YJolg). The 
organization of the two Romanian districts most closely 
resembled that of the counties, hence they are usually 
grouped with them. There were three Transylvanian censuses 
50. Heinrich Friedjung, cited by loan Lupa$, "Vieata $i 
faptele mitropolitului Andreiu $aguna," in Mitropolit~l 
Andreiu baron de §~~na (Sibiiu: Editura consistoriului 
rnitropolitan, 1909), 241. 
77 
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between 1850 and 1869, taken under very different 
circumstances: 
Table 2: Transylvanian 
1850 
Noble counties 1,040,000 57% 
szekler region 370,000 20 
Fundus Regius 410,000 23 
1,820,000 
Population by Historic Regions 
1857 1869 
1,167,145 59.1% 1,292,512 61.5% 
400,534 20.2 427,642 20.3 
406,521 20.5 381,573 18.2 
1,974,530 2,101,727 (51 
The chief official of the county or district, whom we 
shall designate as the prefect, was appointed by the monarch 
52 
on the recommendation of the Gubernium. The prefect cor-
responded with the Gubernium and presided over the General 
53 
Congregation. The congregation of each county or district 
traditionally met four times a year, and was composed of all 
noblemen owning noble (nontaxable) land in that county or 
54 
district. It nominated three candidates for middle-level 
administrative and judicial offices (subordinate to the 
prefect) for appointment by the Gubernium, elected the 
51. Wagner, Historisch- statistisches Ortsnamenbuch fur 
Siebenburgen (Koln:-B6hlau, 1977), 163, 299, 351; Farka_s __ 
Bethlen, "Adatok Erd~ly viszonyair61 klilonos tekintettel az 
adozasi rendszerre," Statisztikai es nemzetgazdasagi 
kozlem~nyek 4 (1867), 13; Keleti, 69. Wagner and Bethlen 
recalculated the 1850 and 1857 censuses to correspond to the 
historical jurisdictions restored after 1861, and both sub-
tracted the Partium since it was rejoined to Hungary in 
1860-61. 
52. L. supremus comes, H. foispan, G. Obergespan, 
R. comite suprem; [in the districts] L. supremus capitaneus, 
H. fokapitany, G. Oberkapitan, R. capitanul suprem. 
Istvan Deak prefers the English term lord lieutenant for 
foispan; Deak, 15. Unlike in two counties of Hungary, the 
office of prefect never accrued to certain church offices in 
Transylvania. 
53. L. congregatio g§neralis sive marchalis; H. osgyules, 
kozg~les; G. Markalkongration. 
54. One from each of the Hungarian received religions: Roman 
Catholic, Reformed, and Unitarian. 
79 
others from the three nominees of the prefect for each 
position, and elected deputies to the diet. The congrega-
tion also supervized officials, debated matters of public 
concern, answered public and private petitions, and settled 
legal cases brought before it. The chief assistants of the 
prefect were the county judge and the prefect's deputy, who 
had certain police responsibilities. Each county or 
district was divided into several subdistricts, each headed 
by a szolgab{ro who acted as head of the local nobility, 
55 
judge and agent of the prefect. 
The administration of the Szekler districts was very 
similar to that of the noble counties and districts. The 
same regulations applied to the functions of the congrega-
56 
tions and officials. Two important distinctions were in 
the election of officials (there were no preliminary nomina-
tions by the prefect), and also in the broader eligibility 
for participation in the congregation, which included pri-
marily landed noblemen but also representatives of the free 
55. County judge = L. supremus jude~ nobilium, H. fob1ro, 
G. Oberrichter; deputy prefect or subdistrict chief = L. vice 
comes, H. alispan, G. Vicegespan; subdistrict = L. 
processus, H. ~ra~; L. vicejudex noblium, H. szolgab1r6, 
G. Stuhlsrichter, Unterrichter, R. jude cercual. 
Benigni, 104-9; Joseph A. von Grimm, Die politische Verwaltung 
in Siebenburgen (Hermannstadt: Theodor Steinhaussen, 1856), 
8-9; Kutschera, 30-2; Deak, 15-16. The diet of 1791 estab-
lished regular procedures for the congregations and offi-
cials; see Die wichtigsten Verfassungsgrundgesetze des Gross-
furstenthums Siebenburgen von altersher bis in die Neuzeit 
(Hermannstadt: Theodor Steinhaussen, 1861), 140-5." 
56. The prefect was called the fokiralybiro (L. supremus 
judex regius), his three to four deputies were alkiralybira~ 
(L. vicejudex regius), and the counterpart of the szolgabirO 
was the dullo. 
80 
57 
peasantry. The different social structure helps to ac-
count for these administrative differences. 
Historians have described the counties and Szekler 
districts as "autonomous noble republics." What was the 
size of the politically active population? Baritiu wrote 
that five percent of the Transylvanian population was noble, 
which was an even higher percentage of the population than 
in Poland. Others cite a figure of 30,000 noble families, 
58 
which gives a slightly higher percentage. Calculations of 
their number were rare, since the landed nobility was not on 
the tax rolls and voting at the congregations was not form-
ally recorded. The only Transylvanian census to record all 
the noble families, that of 1767, gave the following figures 
for landed (untaxed) noble, sandalled or poor noble (taxed), 
serf and free peasant families: 
Table 3 : Categories of Taxed Population ln 1767 
Transylvania Noble counties Szekler region 
(without Partium) 
Landed 4,586 l. 8% 2,764 2.1% 1,072 2.9% 
Sandal led 12,811 5.0 6,202 4.7 3,335 9.0 
Serfs: [a] 107,945 41.8 73,425 55.5 10,722 28.9 
[ b] 45,495 17.6 53,705 25.5 3,655 9.9 
Free peasants55,247 21.4 2,814 2. l 16,565 44.7 
[a = jobbag:y; b = zse]J~!:; see footnote 6 9 . ] 
57. Kutschera, 35-6. 
59 
58. Victor Chereste~iu, A balazsfalvi nemzeti g:yules 1848. 
majus 15-17. (Bukarest: Polltlkalklado~ 1967), 67, 120. 
Benigni, 38-9, indicated 29,510 noble families (20,639 tax-
free, 8449 sandalled, 422 Boerones) for 1772, for a total of 
9.8% of all families. Csetri and -Imreh fail to mention the 
tabulation of 1772. The sandalled nobleman (H. bocskoros 
_!!erne_§, ki_Enemes, R. neme§) was a poor nobleman who 
resembled the free peasant in all but judicial status. 
59. Elek Csetri and Istvan Imreh, Erdely valtozo 
tarsadalma J]67_:J-l3l1- (Bukarest: Kriterion, 1980), 26, 31, 
36. 
81 
only landed noblemen were entitled to membership in the 
congregations in the noble counties and districts. If their 
number increased at the same rate as the rest of the Tran-
sylvanian population, there would have been an average of 
five to six hundred landed noblemen in each county and 
60 
district in 1861. The sandalled nobility were eligible 
61 
for all offices except those at the highest level. Calcu-
lations of noble electors in Transylvania in 1863 (57,303 in 
the noble counties and districts and the Szekler region) and 
1869 (74,134 in all Transylvania) dropped the distinction 
62 
between the landed and sandalled nobility. Upon compari-
son with the earlier proportions it appears that these 
figures are too high; they do, however, confirm the evidence 
in the 1767 census that noblemen were a much higher per-
63 
centage of the population in the Szekler region. 
The controversial Szekler military nobility accounts in 
large part for the regional variations and for the greater 
political participation in the Szekler region. Popular 
tradition maintained that all three classes of Szeklers were 
noblemen and free, though this was clearly no longer the 
60. The population of Transylvania doubled in the 
century before 1861; Bela Kiraly, Hungary in the Late 
Eighteenth Cen_:t~ The_ Declin~ of Enlightened Despotis!!! 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 242. 
61. Laws 12, 17, and 18 of 1791, in ~i~ wichtigsten 
Verfassungsgesetze, 142-3, 147-9. 
62. Retegan, Di~ta romaneasca ~ Transilvaniei, 257, 262-
3. 
63. With a multiplier of five for each family, the data 
would produce a noble population between thirteen and 
eighteen percent of the total for all Transylvania. 
82 
64 
case after the sixteenth century. Many Szeklers claimed 
that the civil equality granted by the revolution of 1848 
extended political rights to all three orders. The rebel-
liousness of the lowest class, originally directed against 
the upper orders, became increasingly anti-Austrian, 
especially in the revolution in Haromszek in 1848-49. 
Political tradition and the larger size of the congregations 
thus made the Szekler districts more difficult for the 
65 
government to manage in the 1860s. 
*** 
Peasant Society 
We can distinguish political life in the counties and 
in the Szekler region not only by the size of the nobility 
and the composition of the congregations, but by the size of 
the formerly unfree population. Where it existed, serfdom 
left a bitter legacy of poverty and class resentment. The 
percentage of the taxed population of the noble counties and 
districts that were serfs rose to 92.4% in 1821; in 1848, 
85.5% of the 1537 villages there were inhabited by serfs and 
64. The Austrian census in the Szekler region in 1552 
reported "A szekelyek mind nemesek es adomentesek, bar harom 
rendre oszlanok ... " Orban,~ szekelyfold leirasa I (Pest: 
Rath Mor, 1868), 6. 
65. Despite the limitation of the assemblies' membership 
to 100 in the Instruction of March 26 (see Chapter III) the 
assembly in Szekelyudvarhely in 1861 had 1200 members--
Orban I, 14. But Orban exaggerated when he wrote that "a 
SZekely koztarsasagi szervezet szellemeben es politikai 
ertelemben teljesen egyenlo volt minden szekely, s tomegesen 
megjelenhetett a kozugyek felett intezkedo osgyuleseken vagy 
marchalisokon.", loc cit. Most lower class Szeklers were in 
fact excluded from politics. 
83 
66 
feudally dependent miners. The polarization between the 
Hungarian aristocracy and the enserfed, mostly Romanian 
population was strongest here. In the Szekler region, the 
serfs (39% in 1821) were increasing and the free peasantry 
declining, but free peasants still constituted nearly one-
third of the population, and three-quarters of the 435 vil-
67 
lages were partly dependent and partly free. 
The chief positive achievement of the revolution in 
68 
Transylvania had been the peasant emancipation. As 1n 
Hungary, the emancipation law of June 6, 1848 abolished 
69 
corvee on the landlord's land by urbarial serfs, i.e. 
those serfs who paid taxes to the state on their land. 
These serfs gained unencumbered title to their land. 
Allodial serfs, those whose lands had not been taxed and 
hence remained the legal property of the landlords, were 
66. Csetri and Imreh, 31; ikos Egyed, "Adatok az erd~lyi 
falu t~rsadalmi tipol6giaj~h6z," in Egyed, Falu v~ros 
civilizacic5. Tanulmanyok a jobba_g_y!elszabaditaS es a kap-
italizmus tortenetebOl ~rdelyben 1848-1914 (Bukarest:-
Kriterion, 1981), 18. Egyed lists the counties and FAg~ra~ 
separately (half of the 65 villages in Fagara~ were of the 
mixed dependent/free variety), and they were combined here. 
The district of Nasaud had not yet been formed. In 1847, 
80% of the taxed population in the noble counties were 
serfs-- Miskolczy, "Erd~ly a reformkorban (1830-1848)," in 
Erd~ly tortenete, III, 1213. 
67. Csetri and Imreh, 36; Egyed, loc.cit. Here 56% of 
the taxpayers were serfs in 1847-- Miskolczy, loc.cit. 
, 68. Arguing with certain unnamed Romanian historians, 
Akos Egyed insists that this, and not the nationality con-
flict, was the most lasting consequence of the revolution in 
Transylvania. Egyed, "A jobb~gyrendszer megsz~ntet~se 1848-
ban Erdelyben," in Egyed, 68-9. 
69. There were two categories of serfs: full or proper 
serfs (H. jobbagy, R. iobagi) and cottagers (G. Hausler, 
H. zsellerek, R. jeleri) depending on the amount of land 
they farmed and paid taxes on. 
84 
excluded from the emancipation. Nearly two-thirds of the 
Transylvanian peasantry, or 173,781 serf holdings, were 
emancipated in this way. The freed serfs accounted for 84% 
of the feudally dependent population in Transylvania in 
70 
1848. This represented a much higher percentage of the 
peasantry than in Hungary, where other types of holdings 
71 
were more common. The remission of corvee was also a more 
dramatic gain than in Hungary, since twice or three times as 
much corvee was required for an equal amount of land in 
72 
Transylvania. 
The lack of a previous regulation of peasant and 
landlord holdings (urbarium), as existed in Hungary, and the 
tremendous regional variation in types of landholding added 
to the difficulty of the emancipation in Transylvania. Some 
of the freed serfs were able to take advantage of the unset-
tled conditions in the Revolution to successfully lay claim 
to even more land than they had possessed before. Many of 
these gains were called into question once order had been 
restored. The village forests and pastures, formerly shared 
with the landlord, and the allodial serfs' lands were also 
under dispute. The imperial patents of 1853 for Hungary and 
1854 for Transylvania stipulated the conditions for the 
70. Josef A. von Grimm, _!2~.§ lJ!:.!?~!:i~lw_§.§..§D iP. Siebenbi.irgen 
(Wien: Friedrich & Moritz Forster, 1863), 150; Egyed, "A 
jobb~gyrendszer megsztintet~se," 96-9; 78% according to 
Szasz, "Az abszolutizmus kora Erdelyben," 1457. 80% of the 
disencumbered land became Romanian property. 
71. Janos Varga, ~..§~ ~nd Probleme de~ bauerlichen 
Grun_9.!?..§?l!-_?:.§§ in. lJn_q§._!n 1767-1849 (Budapest: Akademie, 
1965), 115-16. 
72. Cherestes>iu, ~ p~J.§~.§_t9lvi !!emzeti gyules, 53. 
85 
emancipation of the allodial serfs and sought to resolve the 
problem of land ownership by establishing urbarial courts 
which would mediate the claims of the landlords and the 
freed serfs in each community. Due to the difficulties of 
documenting ownership in Transylvania, urbarial cases pro-
ceeded much more slowly there. In Hungary, land ownership 
in nearly half the emancipated villages had been regulated 
by private agreement or by the urbarial courts by 1864. In 
Transylvania, private agreements were much more unusual and 
the landlord or peasants requested court procedures in two-
73 
thirds of the cases. The Transylvanian courts began 
operation in 1858, but only actually began to decide cases 
in 1863, when the political struggle there had reached a 
74 
crucial stage. 
75 
By 1870 only 4% of the cases had been 
resolved. The fact that most of the former serfs were 
Romanians added to the political volatility of the problem. 
Some leading Romanian politicians provided their legal ser-
vices to the peasants. Hungarian historians formerly al-
leged that the courts were partial to peasant claims, but 
76 
most now agree that they favored the Hungarian landlords. 
73. P~l S~ndor, "Ergebnisse der Grundbesitzregulierungen 
in Ungarn im Lichte dreier Quellen," Acta Historica 
(Budapest) 21 (1975), 430; Iosif Kovacs, Desfiintarea 
relatiilor feudale in Transilvania (Cluj: Dacia, 1973), 110-
12. 
74. Kov~cs, 101. 
75. Lajos Ffir, "Jobbagyf6ld-- parasztf6ld," in Istv~n 
Szabo, ed., ~ parasztsag ~arorsz~gon ~ kapitalizmus 
kor~ban 1848-1914. Tanulmanyok, I (Budapest: Akademiai 
kiado, 1972), 140-47. 
76. Albert Berzeviczy, Az absolutizmus kora, II 
(Budapest: Franklin, 1925), 66 and Istvan Nagy, A 
mezogazdas~g Mag~rO!:.§~§son az abszolutizmus koraban, 1849-
86 
Regional variations in landholding exaccerbated the 
land disputes. The disposition of the forests formerly used 
by the Romanian serfs of the Muntii Apuseni and Hunyad 
county caused considerable unrest in the 1860s. The 
villagers of the military border regiments were legally free 
peasants, yet after the regiments were disbanded in 1851 
77 
many of them lost possession of their lands. In contrast 
to the mass emancipation in the Hungarian counties, most 
serfs of the Szekler region lost their land because it was 
78 
declared to be allodial. Such social grievances provided 
fertile ground for political agitation in the 1860s. The 
peasant unrest, the good intentions of the liberal 
nobility in 1848, and imperial officials all contributed to 
the passage of the peasant emancipation of 1848 through 
1854. Undeniably, the majority of the peasantry benefitted 
greatly, but vexing social questions remained unresolved. 
The emancipation legislation of 1848-54 left many 
groups of peasants dissatisfied. Many of the freed serfs 
waited for urbarial courts to resolve their land claims; 
Saxons and Romanians disputed the lands of the former border 
regiments; most explosively, the Romanians of the Muntii 
1867 (Budapest: Franklin, 1944), 17, maintain the former 
view, and Rogge, I, 336, and Kovacs, 101-23, maintain the 
latter. view. 
77. loan Pu9cariu, 26-7. 
78. Egyed, "Vazlatok a jobbagyfelszabad{tas es zseller-
k~rd~s t6rt~net~r6l a Sz~kelyf6ldon (1848-1896)," in Egyed, 
102-25. As a result of this as well as general economic 
backwardness and political disaffection, there was steady 
Szekler emigration to other regions and countries throughout 
the second half of the century. See Gyorgy Bozodi, Sz~kely 
banja (1943, 3rd ed.; Budapest: Magveto, 1985), 152-87. 
87 
Apuseni found themselves deprived of the forest lands that 
were very important for their livelihood, and the former 
szekler serfs on the lands called siculica hereditas 
(szekely orokseg) were expropriated because this land was 
classified as allodial. The dispossessed Szeklers and the 
Romanian minority in the Szekler region, who were over-
whelmingly former serfs, at times made common cause, but 
79 
they were politically and numerically weak. The social 
question was more significant in the counties, the former 
land of serfdom, in the 1860s. 
The counties contrast even more strongly with the 
social structure in the Fundus Regius. To refer to two 
indices cited for the noble and Szekler regions: more than 
two-thirds of the taxed family heads in the Fundus Regius in 
1821 were free peasants, and fully 84% of the 271 villages 
80 
in 1848 were of the free peasant type. Only one in 1242 
persons in the Fundus Regius was a nobleman, compared to one 
in 34 in the noble counties and districts and one in seven 
81 
in the Szekler region. There was a small (15%) serf 
79. In contrast to the noble counties and districts, 
only one-third of the total population of the Szekler region 
were serfs. Yet only a small percentage of these were freed 
in 1848. At least half of those remaining were Szeklers 
(those on the siculica hereditas), but the remainder were 
Romanians. Egyed shows that half of the unfreed serfs in 
the Szekler region were praedalistak (124,9), and according 
to Orban (II, 5-7, III, 6, 24-5) these were Romanians or 
Magyarized Romanians. 
80. Csetri and Imreh, 41; Egyed, 18. 
81. Gellner, "Reaktion und Vormarz," 1n Geschichte der 
Deutschen auf dem Gebiete Rumaniens, I, General ed. Carl 
Gellner (Bukarest: Kriterion,-1979), 267. His data are from 
the 1840s. 
88 
population in the Fundus Regius, but in most cases their 
collective "landlords" were the cities of Hermannstadt and 
82 
Kronstadt. 
We do not possess precise nationality statistics for 
83 
Transylvania in the 1860s. Karoly Keleti used the 1869 
census to project the nationality statistics from elementary 
school admissions. His results are as follows: 
Table 4 : Nationalities in the Three Regions, 1869 
Hungarians % Romanians % Germans % Total % 
A 241,574 18.7 945,443 76.2 64,043 5.0 1,292,512 59.1 
B 377,637 88.3 47,776 ll. 2 2,118 0.5 427,642 20.2 
c 30,010 7.9 188,533 49.4 158,128 41.4 381,573 20.5 
A= Noble counties; B= Szekler region; C= Fundus Reg ius 
Thus more than four-fifths of the Romanians lived in the 
noble counties and districts, more than three-fifths of the 
Germans lived in the Fundus Regius, and more than half of 
84 
the Hungarians in the Szekler region. The census data of 
the mid-nineteenth century do not permit a correlation of 
85 
nationality with social class. But if one considers that 
82. Csetri and Imreh, 41; Egyed, "Adatok," 18-21. 
83. The census of 1850, (in MOL. F55l, bundle 2) has 
never been published; excerpts are in Sellner and Bielz. It 
recorded both nationalities and religions, but according to 
the absolutist jurisdictions. The 1857 census, in Orszagis-
mei tabellak ... , records religions, but not nationalities. 
The same is true for the 1869 census, ~magyar szent 
korona ... , which at least uses the jurisdictions in effect 
after 1861. 
84. Keleti, 72. Using the 1850 census, Miskolczy ("Erd~ly 
a reformkorban," 1196-7) calculated similar figures for the 
pre-1848 jurisdictions: 
Hungarians Romanians Germans Total 
A 159,396 15.2% 781,791 74.5% 49,166 4.7% 1,049,049 57.5% 
B 303,975 81.5 54,246 14.5 1,163 0.3 372,912 20.4 
c 25,063 6.2 207,810 51.8 141,425 35.2 401,251 22.0 
D 488,434 26.8 1,043,847 57.2 191,754 10.5 1,823,222 
A= Noble counties; B= Szekler region; C= Fundus regius; D= Total 
85. Pal Balogh and Oszkar Jaszi performed such calcula-
tions at the beginning of the twentieth century, but due to 
89 
most townsmen and noblemen in the noble counties and dis-
tricts were Hungarians, it is evident that the the cate-
gories of former serfs and Romanians were nearly contiguous 
in this area. The Szekler region was ethnically homogenous, 
and most of the former serfs were also Szeklers. The 
Romanians there were almost all former serfs, many of whom 
86 
rapidly Magyarized after the emancipation in 1848. 
The Saxon towns were more ethnically heterogeneous than 
the Hungarian ones. Saxons were represented disproportion-
ately in urban trade. This was true even in the hetero-
geneous district of Kronstadt, where three-fourths of the 
194 registered merchants in 1844 were Romanians, but the 
majority of workers were members of Saxon rather than 
87 
Romanian guilds. The feudally dependent villages in the 
districts of Hermannstadt and Kronstadt were similar in 
ethnic composition to the surrounding countryside, predom-
inantly Romanian but including many Saxons and Hungarians as 
rapid social change in the intervening period their data are 
of only limited relevance. 
86. Orban, I 15, II 5-6, confirmed by Ferencz Kozma, A 
Szekelyfold kozgazdasagi es k6zmuvelodesi allapota 
(Budapest: Franklin, 1879), 76-7, referred to this Magyari-
zation. Balogh wrote that many of the Greek Catholic and 
Orthodox communities of the Szekler region were exclusively 
Hungarian-speaking by the end of the nineteenth century; see 
Chapter VII. 
87. Thomas Nagler, "Contributia sa9ilor la dezvoltarea 
economica a Transilvaniei in a doua jumatate a secolului al 
XVIII-lea 9i prima jumatate a secolului al XIX-lea," in 
Studii de istorie ~ nationalitatilor conlocuitoare din 
Romania ~ ~ infratirii lor cu natiunea romana. Nationalita-
tea germana, II (Bucure9ti: Editura politica, 1981), 102. 
The Romanian merchants dominated the trade with the Romanian 
Principalities, which was the source of Kronstadt's wealth. 
90 
88 
well. The numerous wealthy rural communities included 
Romanian ones that could afford to establish generous endow-
ments for the education of village children in prestigious 
schools and even to buy military exemptions for the vil-
89 
lage. The greater wealth of the Romanians in the Fundus 
Regius brought them advantages in cultural and political 
organization, but probably made them more moderate than 
90 
those in the counties. 
*** 
Hungarian and Saxon Towns 
The towns of the noble counties and Szekler districts 
were a further distinctive administrative and social 
category. They were of three types: royal free towns, 
privileged noble towns, and market towns. They were politi-
cally and juridically independent of the counties and dis-
tricts which surrounded them. Officials were elected by the 
town citizens, who were a larger percentage of the popula-
tion than the noblemen in the counties and districts, com-
prising all married home-owning males, but excluding the 
workers and servants. They elected the chief official, the 
88. Gollner, "Reaktion und Vormarz," 266. 
89. The Romanian village of Satulung in the district of 
Kronstadt boasted such a school foundation and military 
exemption.--Retegan, "Contributii privind organizarea com-
unitatii sate9ti din Transilvania la mijlocul secolului al 
XIX-lea," Anuarul Institutului de Istor.i.~ .2i Ar_!:l.§.Q].Q_gie 
Cluj-Napoca 19 (1976), 197. --
90. This explains in part the elevation of the Romanian 
merchant "village" (population 6012) of Re:;>inar to the rank 
of market town for the 1863 elections, and also the appor-
tionment of two deputies for the surrounding subdistrict 
(Filialstuhl) of Saliste and Talmaciu. All three 
deputies elected were moderates. 
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permanent representative assembly, and town representatives 
91 
to the diet. The twelve to one hundred members of the 
representative assembly represented the districts of the 
town and areas of economic administration. Its president 
was a sort of ombudsman, who also sat on the town council, 
92 
but without voting. The most powerful body was the coun-
cil. Its members were the mayor and ten councillors elected 
for life, and it acted collectively in much the same way as 
the Gubernium. The election of the centumviri and the 
councillors observed the equality of the three feudal na-
tions and of those received religions present in the com-
93 
munity. 
In 1861 there were in the noble counties and the 
Szekler region five royal free towns, three privileged noble 
towns, and twelve market towns, with an average population 
94 
of 4279. The noble towns were founded by noblemen who had 
taken up residence there, while the market towns derived 
their privileges partly from local economic importance, 
91. Mayor= L. judex primarius; H. fobiro; G. 
Oberrichter; assembly= L. electa communitas, centumviratus; 
H. valasztott kozonse3, klilEQ t~na~~' Qag~tanacs. 
92. The president was L. orator, H. szonok; the town 
council was L. magistratus, sen~~u~; H. belso tanacs, 
kistanacs; G. Rat. 
93. "Varosi onkormanyzat," in Magyar tortenelmi 
fogalomgyujtemeny II, 1000-5; Benigni, 125-30; Kutschera, 37-8; 
Avram Andea, "Organizarea administrativa, dezvoltarea demografica 
~i urbanistica," in $tefan Pascu, ed., Istoria Clujului, 
215-21. Unlike the other sources, Andea states that the 
councillors were elected annually. 
94. Totals averaged from Orszagismei tabellak Erdely 
nagyfejedelms~ Q~p~s~~~ viszonyairol, mint melle~t 
politicai felosztasaban szukse~s valtoztatasok iranti 
torvenyjavas latokhoz [Title of fr-agment from 185 7 census 
publication preserved in the Universitatsbibliothek, Vienna]. 
92 
partly from the influence of the local landlords who dom-
inated them. Administratively the three categories differed 
in the names and sizes of the administrative bodies and the 
degree of aristocratic influence. The free towns elected 
two deputies each to the diet, the others one each. 
The towns of the noble counties and the Szekler dis-
tricts were important Hungarian political centers, in part 
due to the liberal proclivities of the middle class and the 
leadership role of the towns in high culture, but increas-
ingly so because of the Romanian preponderance in the 
countryside of the noble counties. The towns were only 5.7% 
of the populations in the counties and Szekler region in 
1850, but were overwhelmingly Hungarian. The results of the 
elections of 1863 would accord the Hungarian towns the 
symbolic leadership of the Hungarians in the counties which 
the nobility lost in the elections in the counties themselves. 
The administration of the Fundus Regius resembled that 
of the Hungarian towns. All married, homeowning Saxon males 
could vote for or be elected one of the fifty to one hundred 
members of the representative assembly. Replacement members 
were elected to the assembly from among three candidates put 
forward by the town council. As in the royal free towns, 
the assembly was led by an Orator, supervized economic 
administration, and elected local council members. Councils 
were elected in the rural localities by all landowning 
freemen, and they or the village assembly elected the body 
93 
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of local officials. The autonomy of small rural 
localities was more extensive than in the noble counties and 
Szekler region. 
Unlike the councils in the Hungarian towns, those of 
the chief towns in the Saxon districts functioned simul-
96 
taneously as the supreme body for the entire district. As 
in the Hungarian town councils, many senators had sub-
stantive areas of responsibility or Fachreferate within the 
city, but in addition many also had responsibility to per-
iodically visit a number of subordinate communities (Stuhl-
und Distriktsin~~ktorat~). The senate upheld royal and 
97 
local regulations in the localities of the district. Each 
community sent two representatives to the biannual district 
assembly, and the district seat sent six. This assembly 
elected the district/s two deputies to the diet, and also 
the chief political and judicial official, mayor or prefect, 
98 
of the district. For the election of district officials, 
members of the district seat/s assembly were coopted into 
95. Assembly = 9usserer !3-at; Hundertschaft; Orator = 
Sprecher, Wortmann; the assembly and senate in the smaller 
localities were called the Altschaft and the Ortsvorstand or 
Gemeindeamt. For the above~Kutschera, 46-50. 
96. The seat of a Saxon district was the Stuhlvorort or 
Distriktsvorort. Only seven of the eleven district seats 
had elected town councils, and six of these had the rank of 
royal free towns. For these seven towns the Magistrat and 
Stuhlsamt were the same body. 
97. Georg Eduard Muller, §!~ble und Distrikte als 
Unt~rt~i,Jungen §er Si_§benburgisch-Deutschen Nationsuniver-
sitat (Hermannstadt: Krafft & Drotleff, 1941), 42-3, 67, 
232-7. 
98. Depending on local usage, the chief official was 
called the Burgermeister, Stuhlrichter, K6nigsrichte~, 
Distriktoberrichter, or Distriktrichter. Muller, 196. 
94 
the district assembly in sufficient number to equal those 
from the rest of the district. 
A further peculiarity of the district assemblies was 
that each of the eleven sent two deputies to the annual or 
biannual assembly or Konflux of the Saxons, commonly refer-
red to as the Universitat. Unlike the other two ruling 
nations of Transylvania, the Saxons also had a chief offi-
cial of their own, the Comes nationis saxonicae, appointed 
by the emperor from among three candidates agreed upon by 
the district assemblies and the Konflux. The Comes nom-
inated three candidates for each senate position for elec-
tion by the town assemblies, and three for each prefect for 
election by the district assemblies. The Comes was ex 
officio member of the Gubernium, and supervized the execu-
tion of imperial decrees in the Fundus Regius. The Comes 
and Konflux together constituted the Nationsuniversitat 
(universitas nationis saxonicae), which in a formal but 
inconsistently applied sense was subordinate not to the 
99 
Gubernium, but only to the Emperor. 
*** 
The traditional leading organs of administration for 
Transylvania, the Court Chancellery in Vienna and the 
Gubernium in Kolozsvar, were reestablished in 1860-61. Both 
bodies, but especially the Gubernium, were dicasteria, 
99. Kutschera, 41-4; Benigni, 112-21; Muller, passim. 
The Privilegium Andreanum of 1224, confirmed on several 
occasions in the seventeenth century, arguably subordinated 
the Saxons directly to the king. 
95 
i.e. composed of officials who were simultaneously 
representatives of feudal corporations. Romanians were now 
added to these bodies as de facto representatives of their 
nation, but 1n numbers far below their percentage of the 
population. 
Three regions of Transylvania had distinctive 
administrative forms and population, and each was the domain 
of one of the three feudal "nations": the noble counties of 
the Hungarians, the Szekler region, and the Fundus Regius of 
the Saxons. Hungarians and Szeklers spoke the same Hungarian 
language, shared the same political consciousness, and pos-
sessed a landed noble elite. The noble counties and Szekler 
region differed in important ways, however. The Hungarian 
nobility of the counties ruled a predominantly Romanian and 
formerly enserfed population that resented its underprivi-
leged political and social position. The Szekler nobility 
was a larger percentage of its region's population, politics 
was more broadly based, and the population was overwhelm-
ingly Hungarian-speaking and less polarized in a socio-
economic sense. Romanians constituted a small majority of 
the population of the Fundus Regius and enjoyed a far better 
socioeconomic position than their counterparts in the 
counties, but like the latter they were essentially excluded 
from the local administration. Saxon and Hungarian towns, 
even where they were ethnic islands in a Romanian sea, 
remained the political domain of the respective ruling 
nationalities. 
96 
This system of political and social privilege was at 
issue in the debate over the Transylvanian electoral law 
during these years. Constitutional law and geography were 
important considerations in the activity of not only 
politicians but, as we will see, the religious communities. 
97 
CHAPTER THREE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RESTORATION AND SCHMERLING PROVISORIUM 
Hungarian-Romanian relations reached a crucial phase 
during the 1860s. Both Transylvania and the Danubian 
Principalities were important arenas for this relationship. 
This chapter will trace the course of Transylvanian politics 
from 1861 to 1865, pointing out the role of Hungarians and 
Romanians outside the empire as well as in Transylvania and 
Hungary. 
The threat posed by the Hungarian emigres and their 
domestic supporters was a weighty consideration in the 
decision to restore the constitution in Hungary and 
Transylvania in 1861. The emigres' apparent strength but-
tressed the Old Conservatives' call for concessions. On the 
other hand, the revelation that the moderates led by Ferenc 
Deak dominated the political opposition seemed to make con-
cessions less urgent. The political activities of the 
national minorities had a sobering effect on the Hungarian 
l 
leadership, undermining the influence of the radicals. 
The declining influence of those Hungarians who sup-
ported the emigre leadership was similar in Transylvania. 
l. Redlich demonstrates the relevance of the radicals 
for the Old Conservatives' concession strategy. Gyorgy 
Szabad stresses the importance of the Slovak Congress in 
June, 1861 for the victory of Deak's party in the diet. 
Political Trends, 108-16. Yet diplomatic developments, 
Italian politics, and most of all the capture and extradi-
tion of Laszlo Teleki in December, 1860 greatly weakened the 
emigres in this period.--Lukacs, 170-94. 
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The strength of the party is difficult to judge. The num-
erous demonstrations in favor of the union with Hungary and 
the laws of 1848, held in March and April, 1861, included 
sporadic manifestations of Kossuthist sympathies. Demon-
strators commemorating soldiers who had fought against 
Austria in 1848-49 waved the national flag and sang the 
2 
revolutionary "Klapka march." Many supporters of the 
radicals were Hungarian school students, whose views were 
frowned upon by their more conservative teachers and school-
mates. This was the case at the hanging of a flag inscribed 
"1848" at the Reformed College in Kolozsvar on March 15, 
1861. The Austrian commandant threatened to shoot the flag 
down, but the school principal and higher-born students 
3 
prevailed on the radical to take the flag down. The 
Catholic priest in Cs1ksomly6 was investigated by the au-
thorities after allegedly praising Kossuth and Garibaldi in 
4 
a sermon in May. The return of Transylvanians who had 
served in the Hungarian Legion in Italy helped to increase 
the ranks of the radicals. Many were disillusioned by their 
experiences in Italy, but others were eager to join the 
5 
oppositional movement at home. 
2. The radicals at one such demonstration in Schassburg 
included Saxons and Romanians. Urmossy I, 268-71. 
3. Lajos Sarkany, "Losonci Bar6 Banffy Dezso emlekezete," 
and Lajos Rethy, "Szeljegyzetek Br. Banffy DezsO'rol," 
Kolozsvasi reformat~s ~oll~ium ertes1toje 1911/12, 9-34 and 
35-46. Sarkany maintained that Banffy, one of the students 
and son of the prefect designate, was a leader of the radi-
cals. Banffy's more plebeian classmate Rethy recalled 
Banffy was one of the moderates in the incident. 
4. See Chapter V. 
5. The papers of Chancellor Kemeny and his successor 
99 
As the chance of renewed war in Italy faded, the im-
portance of the Principalities as a potential field of 
operation for the emigres increased. The Prime Minister of 
Moldavia from April, 1860 to February, 1861, Mihail 
Kogalniceanu, sympathized with the emigres. He gave refuge 
to thousands of Transylvanian Hungarian who entered 
Moldavia, including Berzenczey, the reputed leader of the 
6 
Kossuthists in Transylvania. Arms depots and military 
camps were established for the emigres. Prince Cuza may not 
have had active knowledge of these arrangements, but the 
Wallachian government was also favorable to the emigres. It 
permitted the appearance of a Kossuthist newspaper in 
7 
Hungarian from September to December, 1860. The arms 
shipment to the Principalities provided for in the agreement 
of 1859 was a fiasco, and weakened the position of 
Kogalniceanu. The shipment in five Italian ships in 
December, 1860 came to the attention of the great powers, 
8 
who forced Cuza to sequester it. 
contain regular reports from Mecsery on the return home of 
Legion members-- MOL, D228 1861-63 passim. 
6. Bobango, 106-8. Kogalniceanu rejected Austrian 
demands for their extradition. 
7. Karoly Kollo, "Az elso bukaresti magyar nyelvu lap," 
Ket irodalom me~_?.9:Y~~.Q~ T~_Qul.!Il..§DY.2ls ~ .!".9.!!_lan-magy~_!" ir_Qdalmi 
kapcsolatok torte_Qetebol (Bukarest: Kriterion, 1984), 157-
72. The publisher of the Bu)sar_§sti Magyar Kozlony was 
Ferenc Koos, a Transylvanian clergyman who headed the 
Hungarian Reformed congregation in Bucharest. 
8. Lukacs, 162-3; Jelavich, Russia and the Formation, 
125-6. The scandal of the Italian arms may explain the 
suppression of the Kozlony and the decision of many of the 
emigres to leave for Italy. Two groups totalling 295 left 
Galati for Italy in March and April, 1861 to enlist in the 
Legion after spending the winter in Moldavia.-- Csetri, 35-
6 . 
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The prospects for collaboration between the emigres and 
Prince Cuza deteriorated in the course of 1861. Klapka and 
the Prince concluded an agreement in January, 1861 
concerning the storage of of a portion of the Italian arms 
shipment that had been salvaged and the recognition of 
equal rights for the Hungarians and Romanians in 
9 
Transylvania. But under the influence of the 
"Dacoroman" party in Bucharest, the view became more prev-
alent that such assurances were inadequate. The Dacoromans 
included several influential Transylvanian Romanian emigres. 
The faction was strongly concerned with the affairs of 
Transylvania and sought, in the long run, its annexation by 
10 
Romania. The Hungarian emigres were bound by personal 
conviction and the state of opinion among Hungarians at home 
to insist on the territorial integrity of Hungary. Their 
open letter to Garibaldi to this effect, in August, 1861, 
ll 
prompted outrage in the press of Bucharest. 
While the Austrian police and military were concerned 
about the arms smuggling and clandestine propaganda of the 
Hungarian emigration, many aristocrats attributed Romanian 
radicalism to Dacoroman agitation from Bucharest. The pre-
feet of Hunyad county, Baron Ferenc Nopcsa, wrote to Kemeny 
that the purpose of the Romanian opposition to elected 
9. Lukacs, 164; the text of the agreement is in Borsi-
Kalman, ll-14. 
10. The Transylvanian-born Alexandru Papiu-Ilarian 
became a leading foreign policy advisor of Cuza and wrote a 
major memorandum to him in January, 1860 propounding these 
ideas. It is quoted at length in Borsi-Kalman, 67-71. 
ll. Curticapeanu, 422-5. 
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county officials was to obstruct any possibility of Hungarian-
Romanian compromise in the county assembly of July 8, 1861. 
The goal was to create anarchy and facilitate the union of 
the county with neighboring Wallachia. He wrote that the 
leader of the conspiracy, roan Crainic, was a former Aus-
trian officer who had been in Romania since April and was 
seeking a commission in Cuza;s army. Nopcsa argued that the 
union of Transylvania with Hungary was the best way to 
12 
defeat this secessionism. The correspondence of Baritiu 
with Bucharest during 1861 suggests that Crainic had little 
official support there, and that Transylvanian matters were 
13 
considered an internal Austrian affair. Papiu-Ilarian 
himself wrote to some of the radicals in Transylvania of-
fering his advice. The program he urged on them, and on 
the readers of his book published at the end of 1861, was not 
unification with the Principalities but support for the 
Austrian policy of Transylvanian autonomy versus demands for 
14 
union with Hungary. The real significance of Dacoroman 
12. Nopcsa to Kemeny, Deva, July ll, 1861 (MOL D228, 
1861/305). Nopcsa was a conservative aristocrat of Romanian 
origin. 
13. Ioan Maiorescu, a Transylvanian emigre who became a high 
educational official in 1859, noted Crainic;s visit to the 
Ministry of War in his letter to Baritiu of January 15/27, 1861. 
He remarked that due to the dislike for foreigners in the 
Walachian army Crainic had little prospect of being accepted 
there. In his letter of October 4/16, he stated that concord 
between the nationalities, not secession, was the proper objec-
tive. GBCS, I, 407-8, 411. 
14. Letters to Iosif Hodo9 and Ion Axente Sever, Ia~i, 
June 9 and October 16, 1861. Iosif Pervain and roan 
Chindri~, ed., for~spondenta lui Alexandru Papiu Ilarian 
I (Cluj: Dacia, 1972), 106-9. Ilarian was surely aware that 
his letters might be read by the authorities. Nopcsa men-
tioned Axente as one of the radicals at the Deva assembly. 
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agitation in the Principalities lay in the weakening of 
Romanian collaboration with the Hungarian emigres. The 
material support sent to the Transylvanian Romanians by the 
Principalities was negligible, and the sources of the 
Transylvanians' actions must be sought in internal 
15 
conditions. 
*** 
Local Politics 
The Old Conservatives could not hope to restore completely 
the pre-1848 organization of Transylvania in April, 1861. 
The revolution itself had brought innovations in county 
administration. The establishment of civil equality implied 
a broadening of the social composition of the administra-
tion. Yet the aristocracy feared that the new electoral law 
would enable commoners and non-Hungarians to gain control of 
the congregations. Law XVI of 1848 therefore provided for 
the one-time election of county commissions to supplant the 
congregations; but these were in fact similar in composition 
Ilarian's book was The ~On§ti!ution9_l ~QdeQendence of Tran-
sylvania, published-I~ several languages at the end of 1861 
and beginning of 1862. On December 17 the Gubernium ap-
proved the recommendation of the Kronstadt police to not 
only permit the importation of the book but to encourage its 
distribution. Grigore Ploe$teanu, "Marturi privind bio-
grafia $i opera lui Al. Papiu Ilarian," Vatra 1983 #2, p. 7. 
15. In connection with a trip through Transylvania by 
Ilarian, $aguna's inspector of schools, Paul Vasici, wrote 
Baritiu from Hermannstadt in January, 1861: "Declararea 
principelui Cuza in privinta neutralitatii [on the 
Transylvanian question] au produs aicea cea mai placuta 
intip~rirea. E buna $i pentru noi, caci vor mai inceta a ne 
negri in colori posomorite, cum sint inimile cele rele." 
GBCS, II, 53. The Hungarian allegations of irredentist 
influence were a source of embarassment for the 
Transylvanian Romanians. 
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16 
to the latter, only smaller. After considerable contro-
versy in the Council of Ministers in 1861, Kemeny secured 
imperial sanction for the restoration of this system. His 
Provisional Instruction of late March called on the newly ap-
pointed prefects of the noble counties and Szekler dis-
tricts to appoint commissions of fifty to one hundred 
members with "suitable" representation of all classes and 
religions. Kemeny issued similar instructions to Franz 
Salmen, the Saxon Comes of 1848 who was restored to this 
function. Wherever possible, the senators and assembly 
members of 1848 should be restored to office, and replace-
ments elected by the competent Saxon bodies. 
The idea of appointing rather than electing the county 
and district commission members originated in 1848, but it 
became apparent that such commissions could not restore 
public confidence. Hungarian and Romanian politicians often 
agreed that the new commissions should be elected by county 
congregations including non-noble elements. Even so, the 
electoral assemblies were composed chiefly of landowners. 
Disregarding the provisional instructions, congregations met 
in Kolozs county and Fagara9 district in May and elected 
commissions with over 400 members, mostly Romanians in 
17 
Fagara9 and Hungarians in Kolozsvar. Other congregations 
accepted the use of the Romanian language in local adminis-
16. Gyorgy Spira, "Polgari forradalom ( 1848-1849)," in 
Magyarorszag tortenete 1848-1890 I (Budapest: Akademiai 
kiado, 1979),-109; Deak-,-98; "Varmegyei allando bizottmany," 
Ma_g_y_9!: _t_9rtenejmi %_2~om__gyujtemeny II, 985-6. 
17. Retegan, "Lupta juridictionala," 172, 180-82. 
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tration. They elected many Romanians to the commissions and 
to public office, though in numbers too small to correspond 
to the Romanian percentage of the population or to satisfy 
18 
the Romanian politicians. The elected commissions 
routinely exceeded the specified limit of one hundred mem-
bers. Clergymen led the Romanian opposition in several of 
the assemblies: Metropolitan 9ulutiu in Also-Feher county, 
Greek Catholic dean loan Fekete Negrutiu in Kolozsvar, and 
the Orthodox dean Nicolae Crainic in Hunyad county. Every-
where except in the two Romanian districts, the Hungarian 
aristocracy dominated the proceedings, and in the majority 
of cases the officials of 1848 were restored to their former 
positions. 
The Romanian movement was partly responsible for the 
failure of the government's plan. More important was the 
resistance of the nobility. Not only did it declare the 
Provisional Instructions illegal, as did the Romanians in 
19 
several assemblies, , but it denounced the restoration of 
Transylvanian autonomy and the prospective diet as well. 
Some assemblies even selected deputies to the diet in Pest, 
but Miko acted energetically to prevent their appearance 
20 
there. Resolutions interdicting the payment of taxes, 
18. Retegan notes, however, that in terms of the use of 
the Romanian language and the appointment of Romanian offi-
cials the assemblies were far more conciliatory than those 
of 1848. Ibid., 168-70. 
19. Ibid., 171. 
20. Miko telegrammed Deak on May 9 that Franz Joseph had 
ordered him to prevent the Szekler deputies' participation 
"urn jeden Preis''i Deak should read the text of this order to 
any that might arrive and ask them not to appear at the 
105 
labelled "Te_I.!:Orl:.§I!!US der Behorden" by the Austrians, were 
also passed. The Hungarian leaders held a meeting in Kolozsvar. 
They agreed that without union with Hungary the regime was 
illegal, but that appointment to county offices might be 
accepted in order to facilitate the end of the absolutist 
21 
regime and the eventual achievement of their goals. 
The ends and means of the Old Conservatives were con-
tradictory, and the Chancellery and Gubernium found them-
selves in an anomalous position with respect to the 
Hungarian majorities in the assemblies. The latter declared 
the Chancellery and Gubernium illegal, sought to send depu-
ties to the diet in Pest, disregarded procedural instruc-
tions and discouraged the payment of taxes. But two factors 
brought a considerable rapprochement between the counties 
and elected officials on the one hand and these superior 
officials: the increasing evidence that the Chancellery and 
the Gubernium were defending Hungarian interests against 
Viennese centralism, and the apparent collusion of the lat-
ter with Romanian demands which threatened all Hungarian 
noblemen, regardless of their constitutional views. 
The Gubernium moved reluctantly to the establishment of 
the Romanian district of N~s~ud, whose assembly met only 
four months after the imperial decree establishing the dis-
trict in March, 1861. The Gubernium stubbornly refused to 
recognize the election of a predominantly Romanian body of 
diet. MOL F263. 1861/342; AS Cluj. Corespondenta Miko Imre, 
1861/123. 
21. Urmossy, I, 277-8. 
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officials in Fagara9, although the Hungarians were less than 
22 
5% of the population of the district. In the counties, 
on the other hand, the Gubernium resolutely upheld the 
decisions of committees and congregations despite protests 
against the inadequate representation of the majority 
Romanian population in the press and in petitions to the 
23 
court. 
The center of the Romanian resistance was, as in the 
past, the county of Also-Feher. In these years considerable 
conservative-liberal collaboration developed among the 
county's Hungarian nobility. Also-Feher was the most popu-
lous county of Transylvania, and like the others it was 
heavily Romanian. It also contained the seat of the Greek 
Catholic Archbishopric in Blaj, the Roman Catholic Bishopric 
in Gyulafehervar, and the Reformed College in Nagyenyed. 
All three were enormously wealthy, and the prelates and 
church officials, as major landowners, weighed heavily in 
county politics. The Romanians repeatedly demanded the 
election of county officials by a congregation similar to 
22. Retegan, "Lupta,'' 179-81; 0rm6ssy's account of the events 
in Fagara9, I, 283-6, is sarcastic and anti-Romanian. 
23. Ibid., passim. As noted earlier, Baron Nopcsa's 
origins made his attitude more ambiguous than that of the 
other prefects. By admitting village representatives and 
all the village pastors to the county congregation he per-
mitted a Romanian majority to form, and the Hungarian 
minority, though concurring with his opposition to the 
Romanian radicals, objected to the unconstitutional way in 
which he steamrollered both Romanian and Hungarian obstruc-
tion; MOL D228, 1861/305. The Nopcsa family was heavily in 
debt, and its petition to the Ministry of Finance for relief 
was under consideration throughout the summer of 1861; see 
POM V,2, 113-15. 
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that which met in Hunyad in July. Led by Sulutiu, they 
rejected the reelection of the commission of 1848 by the 
county assembly in Nagyenyed on April 21-22. All the 
Romanians elected there and in the local assemblies declined 
to take their posts, while those Hungarians sent to replace 
them were not recognized by the Romanians. A new 
congregation called on June 26-27 met with similar failure, 
and renewed attempts at general congregtions on September 16 
24 
and October 17 were also boycotted by the Romanians. 
Miko repeatedly called for armed force in order to "restore 
order," end extremist agitation and compel obedience to the 
officials, but this was refused by the higher authori-
25 
ties. 
The Saxon establishment, in contrast to the Hungarian 
one, approved the restoration of Transylvanian autonomy, 
with the sole exception of the district of Schassburg refer-
red to earlier. Five districts of the Fundus Regius had 
24. Retegan, "Lupta," 173-7. 
25. On May 26 Degenfeld warned the Council of Ministers 
that the use of the military "nur durch die Notwendigkeit 
der Aufrechterhaltung der offentlichen Ruhe und Ordnung 
bedingt, nicht aber von dern Einschreiten der Parteien urn 
Assistenz abhangig gernacht werde." POM v,2, p. 79. Mecsery 
and Degenfeld personally assured roan Ratiu, who was in 
Vienna as part of a delegation, that orders had been given 
forbidding the use of the gendarmes and military against 
Romanian opponents of the county administration. See his 
letter of July 8 to Baritiu, in Keith Hitchins and Liviu 
Maior, ed., Co~espon§enta lui roan Ratiu ~~George Baritiu 
(1861-1892) (Cluj: Dacia, 1970), 57-8. Referring to the 
widespread civil disobedience in Also-Feher, the provincial 
commander Lieutenant Field Marshal Montenuovo laconically 
remarked in November that the prefect, Gyorgy Pogany, 
"scheint nicht rnehr der Herr in seinern Hause zu seyn ... " but 
ignored the question of sending troops. Montenuovo to Miko, 
in AS Cluj, Corespondenta Miko rrnre 1861/220. 
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saxon majorities, including Schassburg, and in these dis-
tricts the restoration of the old oligarchy aroused far less 
Romanian objection than in the counties. But none of the 
other, predominantly Romanian districts elected more than 
three Romanian senators, and not many more to the assembly. 
The rural population was excluded from these elections. 
After a Romanian protest to the Emperor, a Romanian was 
added to the senate in Hermannstadt as inspector for the 
wealthy Romanian subdistrict of Sali9te, but the local popu-
lation refused to recognize him. A Romanian delegation to 
Salmen demanded half of the members of the Konflux, which 
had never included a single Romanian, for its nation; only 
four were granted. Miko and Kemeny responded more favorably 
to Romanian complaints against the Saxon restoration, even 
annulling the elections in two small, overwhelmingly 
26 
Romanian districts. For reasons of imperial policy these 
complaints aroused little effective solicitude in Austrian 
circles. 
*** 
Kemeny and Schmerling 
The decisive imperial question was the implementation 
of the February Patent through the convocation and comple-
tion of a Reichsrat enjoying sufficient public confidence 
26. Retegan, "Lupta," 181-5. The statement by Szasz, 
"A megyekhez k~pest itt l~nyegesen rosszabb helyzetben vol-
tak a romanok."(l487) is partially correct, but misleading. 
Materially the Romanians were better off, and while it is 
true that their representation was truly less, so also were 
the social and political conflicts. 
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to approve the budget and improve the budget situation. The 
election of Reichsrat deputies by the diets of the Austrian 
hereditary provinces presented little difficulty, and the 
Reichsrat convened on May 1, 1861. Despite the flaws in 
parliamentary representation and prerogatives of the new 
body, the day marked a landmark in the history of Austrian 
27 
constitutionalism. However, the incomplete member-
ship of the Reichsrat was its great flaw. Article ten of 
the fundamental law accompanying the February Patent stated 
that only the Gesamtreichsrat {of all the lands) had compe-
tence in matters concerning the entire empire, especially 
the state budget. But only the engerer Reichsrat, or that 
of Cisleithania, convened on May 1. Thus the Reichsrat 
could legally fulfill the task which was its raison d'etre 
only if the Hungarian lands could be induced to send their 
deputies, as well. 
Not only the Hungarian, but also the Croatian diet had 
to be dissolved because of its refusal to send deputies to 
28 
the Reichsrat. On the day of the passage of the Patent, 
the Emperor called on Kemeny to report on the method of 
selecting deputies from Transylvania. Kemeny requested the 
27. The reaction of eyewitnesses and the Vienna press 
to the Emperor's speech at the opening ceremony was en-
thusiastic. The state celebration included a high mass in 
the cathedral, cannon salutes, military parades and the 
ringing of all church bells in the the city. Malfer, in his 
introduction to POM V,2, ix-x. 
28. The Croats were originally less opposed to the 
Patent than the Hungarians, but finally refused to send 
deputies to the Reichsrat after repeated demands for the 
representation of the Military Frontier at the diet were 
rejected. Malfer, in POM V,3, xiv. 
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Gubernium s opinion a month later, and the latter delib-
erated on the question on April 15, its first day of opera-
tion. The unanimous opinion of the ten councillors in 
attendance was that since the union law of 1848 was still 
valid, the plan to convoke the Transylvanian diet should be 
29 
abandoned. Kemeny could thus claim to the Romanians that 
while he desired to convoke the diet, he was unable to do so 
30 
against the opposition of the Gubernium. 
In a formal sense, Kemeny may have been correct. But 
beyond the question of legality, the composition of the 
prspective diet was crucial for the Hungarians. They had 
nothing to fear fron1 a diet so composed that it would reject 
the Patent and insist on the union. Franz Joseph demanded 
that the electors include former serfs. In rejecting the 
proposals of the Gyulafehervar conference in his Vortrag of 
March 4, Kemeny proposed an electoral law that would pre-
31 
serve aristocratic hegemony. After a bitter debate in 
the Council of Ministers, Franz Joseph approved this pro-
posal on March 24, and Kemeny reported the decision to the 
29. The letters of Franz Joseph and of Kemeny and 
the opinion of the Gubernium are in Sandor, 135-9, 144-5, 
and MOL, D228 1861/153, 161. 
30. Kemeny made this declaration to the Romanian deputation 
on July l. Ratiu to Baritiu, in Corespondent-a lui loan 
Ratiu cu George BarJ:__tjg Jl£361=~21J, 51-2. 
31. Electors would be those entitled to vote by the law 
of 1791 (landed nobility in the noble counties and Szekler 
districts) plus 5070 of the emancipated serfs, based on a 
minimum tax assessment of 8 fl., most of the latter 
Romanians. Kemeny tendentiously emphasized this Romanian 
majority, neglecting to mention the other electors, who were 
mostly Hungarians, or draw a total picture. Redlich II, 
241-5; POM V,l, 164. 
lll 
32 
Gubernium two days later. By its decision of June 1 the 
Gubernium rejected this measure as well, stating that the 
law of 1791 cited by Kemeny was superceded by that of 
33 
1848. The later law provided for village representatives 
as well as a tax assessment category which would increase 
the total electorate in the noble counties and Szekler 
districts by 3600, but still leave a noble majority in the 
34 
electorate. 
The traditional Hungarian political class which would 
dominate the electorate was clearly opposed to the Patent 
and the Reichsrat. Schmerling and his allies therefore 
would not accept such an electoral law. 
The report of Kemeny of March 4 had been lithographed 
for examination by the Council of Ministers. In the debate 
on March 14, all non-Hungarian members opposed Kemeny's 
proposal. These ministers demanded that Romanian repre-
sentation be not merely piecemeal, but in a proportion much 
closer to their share of the Transylvanian population. The 
old constitution and electoral laws, if they prevented this, 
must be modified. However, after the restricted conference 
35 
of March 21 the Emperor accepted Kemeny's proposal. 
32. POM V,l, 165; S~ndor, 144-5. 
33. S~ndor, 146-51. 
34. Retegan, Dieta romaneasca a Transilvaniei, 260-1. A 
comparison of Kemeny~s-s070iand lS,OOO electors in the tax 
category cited by the Gubernium on October 3 (Sandor, 177) 
suggests-- it is not explicitly stated-- that two-thirds of 
those assessed at 8 fl. were landed noblemen. In the elec-
torate of 110,000 in 1868 according to the 1848 law, two-
thirds were noblemen. The third estate, the former serfs, 
constituted only 10.6%. 
35. Rainer chaired the Council of Ministers on March 
112 
The Emperor may have been swayed by Sz~csen's argu1nent 
against the strategy of the Austrians: an electoral law 
introduced in absolutist fashion would only increase the 
Hungarian opposition, and it was dangerous and inadvisable 
to subvert the social structure through a radical electoral 
36 
reform. 
As the Transylvanian counties organized and issued 
their oppositional declarations, Schmerling conceded that it 
might be three months before the Transylvanian diet could 
convene. He therefore argued for the direct election of 
deputies to the Reichsrat in circumvention of the diet, but 
37 
was defeated. The Hungarian ministers clearly sought to 
postpone the diet, whether from opposition to its convoca-
tion or in the hope that the political climate would later 
38 
be more favorable to its success. On June 5 Szecsen 
defended the delay in the convocation of the diet on the 
14, and seven ministers plus Lichtenfels opposed the pro-
posal POM V,l, 148-54); only five were present (Rainer, 
Schmerling, Mecsery, Kemeny, and Szecsen) at the decisive 
conference on March 21, chaired by the Emperor (Ibid., 196-
9 ) • 
36. "Allein man milsse sich hilten, von Regierungs wegen 
die sozialen Verhaltnisse umstilrzen und aus ubelverstandener 
Humanitat die grosse Masse der Ungebildeten uber die Ge-
bildeten stellen zu wollen. Kemeny added: " ... wenn die 
Romanen auf dem Landtage die Majoritat erhielten, dies so-
viel hiesse, als das ganze Land der Willkilr der zwei romani-
schen Bischofe preiszugeben, welche bekanntlich einen unbe-
schr~nkten Einfluss auf die Bevolkerung uben." Redlich II, 
245; POM, V,l, 197. This exaggeration reflected a common 
Hungarian perception. 
37. The Council of Ministers session of April 26: 
Redlich II, 245-7; POM V,l, 300-3. 
38. Redlich (II, 245) alleges the former, but there is 
more evidence for this in the case of Mikcl than of Kemeny. 
The Chancellor was apparently earnest in his commitment to 
the Emperor's expressed policy. 
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grounds that it would be divisive to call it while the 
39 
Hungarian diet was in session. Kemeny stated that the 
convocation required an imperial command. Upon the request 
of the Council of Ministers, Franz Joseph issued this com-
40 
mand on July 29, calling for a report by August 10. 
The mutual desire of the non-Hungarian ministers and of 
the Romanians for an increase in the representation of the 
latter made possible a sort of collaboration between 
41 
them. At the beginning of June, the Romanian Permanent 
Committee empowered a deputation of three to represent the 
national interest at the court. Consequently Iacob Baloga, 
Ilie Macelariu and roan Ratiu departed for Vienna on June 
42 
15. It is important not to exaggerate the influence 
which they exercized on events. Still, beginning with 
their imperial audience on July l they met with several of 
the German ministers and received encouraging responses to 
43 
their specific proposals concerning the diet. Of 
greatest consequence was Schmerling's decision, at the 
urging of the deputation, to confer with the Romanian Chan-
cellery councillor Vasile Ladislau Pop. Schmerling assured 
39. POM V,2, 104. 
40. Ibid., 245-7, 259. 
41. "Imprejurarile creeaz~ astfel conditiile unei cola-
borari, cu caracter inegal ~i instabil, care va dura pina in 
1865, cind negocierile dualiste, al carer pericol a existat 
in tot acest timp, devin publice."-- Retegan, 58. 
42. Josan, "Documente inedite privind lupta nationala a 
rom~nilor din Transilvania in anul 1861,'' Apulum 17 (1979), 
542. 
43. Letters of July l to 30, in Corespondenta Ratiu-
Baritiu, 50-71; on this deputation see also Hitchins, 
Orthodoxy and Nationality, 125-8. 
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pop that the electoral law would have to be broadened and 
44 
the number of Romanian voters increased. 
When the Chancellery ratified Kemeny's plan for the 
diet on August 6, 1861, Pop dissented and presented a sep-
arate opinion. Consequently Kemeny's presentation to the 
Council of Ministers on August 24 included both proposals, 
45 
which were debated on that day and again on September 9. 
The three principal disputed points were the place of convo-
cation, the articles to be submitted for passage by the 
diet, and the electoral law. Kemeny proposed Kolozsvar as 
the site of the diet, and Pop, Hermannstadt. All German 
ministers preferred the Saxon Hermannstadt over Kolozsvar, 
where they claimed the Saxon and Romanian deputies would be 
terrorized. Schmerling and his allies also supported Pop's 
proposal of articles establishing the Romanians' legal 
equality and their status as a fourth constitutional nation 
(Inartikulierung), demanded already at Blaj in 1848 and at 
46 
the Romanian conference in January. The electoral 
proposals agreed that the noble electorate should be supple-
44. Letters of July 18 and July 30, in Ibid., 65-6, 69-
70. Little is known about the activity of the deputation in 
August, but apparently at least two of them remained in 
Vienna-- Josan, 544. Szasz (1490) credits the delegation 
with convincing Schmerling of the need to broaden the elec-
toral law. 
45. POM V,2, 360-4; MOL D228, 1861/322, 323. 
46. The question of Inartikulierung was primarily a 
symbolic one, but the Transylvanian Romanians attached great 
importance to it. The Hungarians insisted that the declara-
tion of civil equality in 1848 made the distinction of 
feudal nations irrelevant. The former practice of curial 
vote (vote by feudal nations) was at any rate abandonded in 
the statutes of the 1863 diet. 
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mented by one determined by tax assessment. Kemeny's m1n1-
mum assessment of 8 fl. would exclude the head tax of 5 fl., 
47 
and that of Pop would include it. After Schmerling, 
Mecsery and Rechberg arranged a group meeting with the 
Emperor, he accepted Pop's proposal on September 11. A 
compromise was reached on the site of the diet, Mecsery 
48 
suggesting Gyulafehervar for this purpose. The Emperor's 
acceptance of the proposal of Pop made the position of 
49 
Kemeny untenable, and he resigned on September 19. 
The convocation of the diet still had to overcome the 
50 
opposition of the Gubernium. Meeting in special session 
on October 3, the Gubernium approved a long address to the 
Emperor, citing many Transylvanian laws to demonstrate the 
47. Franz Joseph had excluded the head tax in his 
Instruction of March 24 (Sandor, 145), but Lichtenfels 
argued that this was not a formal law and that the Emperor 
had later expressed the desire to modify it. POM V,2, 363-
4 . 
48. According to the Romanian Chancellery Konzipist 
Pu9cariu, the Emperor originally decided in favor of 
Kemeny's proposal, but then reversed himself. The protocol 
of the Council of Ministers indicate the contrary, how-
ever.-- Pu$cariu, 57; Retegan, 58-9. Both writers indicate 
that the proposal of Gyulafehervar came from Pop, but were 
apparently unaware of the private audience and Mecsery's 
compromise proposal; see POM V,2, footnote p. 364. Retegan 
argues that Romanian contemporaries exaggerated the impor-
tance of Pop's proposal. But from a procedural standpoint 
it was crucial. 
49. Pu~cariu, 57-8. Most Romanians denounced Kemeny's 
policies as anti-Romanian. PU$Cariu insists he was forced 
out of office as the victim of Schmerling's conflict with 
the Hungarian extremists, had good intentions toward the 
Romanians and was preferable to those who succeeded him in 
1865. 
50. The edict of convocation for November 4 was sent to 
the Gubernium on September 14; the text is in Sandor, 162-
65. 
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51 
illegality of the convocation and of the electoral law. 
comparing the electoral law to that approved earlier, the 
address pointed out that the electorate would thereby in-
crease more than ten times, to 160,000. The responsible 
elements of society would be fair game for "the ignorant, 
52 
crude masses easily misled by demagogues and agitators." 
This was an exaggeration, since the persons granted the vote 
by the new law were less than one-fourth of the adult male 
53 
population. The three conservative Romanian councillors 
Aldulian, Dunca, and Lazar issued a separate opinion agreeing 
with the constitutional stance of the majority, but urging 
that preparations be made for the diet anyway because it had 
54 
been commanded. The sole Saxon councillor, Konrad 
Schmidt, gave a third opinion which was in complete agree-
55 
ment with the edict of convocation. 
The defiant statement by the Gubernium must have left 
51. On Bishop Haynald~s exceptional participation in 
this session, see Chapter VI. The address of the Gubernium 
is in Sandor, 165-80. 
52. " ..• ez altal a volt jogosultak es egyeb erdekeknek a 
helyes monarchiai orszaglasi elvek szerint el nem mellozheto 
es meg nem semis1theto jogos befolyasa a bujtogatok es 
izgatok altal a legkonnyebben felrevezetheto ertetlen nyers 
tomegnek lenne predaul kiteve." Sandor, 177-8. 
53. According to various calculations in 1862 and 1863, 
the electorate in 1863 was between 70,563 and 97,915. The 
miniumum tax assessment applied to noblemen as well. MOL 
D228, 1862/206, 414; 1863/828; Retegan, Dieta romaneasca a 
Transilvaniei, 63, 257. 
54. Sandor, 180-3. The Romanian separate vote was a 
weak compromise that satisfied no one; it aroused doubts at 
the court concerning the loyalty of the Romanians, and the 
Romanian deputation insisted repeatedly that it did not 
represent the views of the Romanian leadership and public 
opinion.-- Josan, 559-61. 
55. Sandor, 183-4. 
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the court temporarily undecided on what to do. The address 
56 
only came before the Council of Ministers on October 19. 
In the meantime the Romanian Permanent Committee had decided 
on october 2 to send a new deputation to Vienna, led by 
9ulutiu. It arrived on October 8, conferred frequently with 
the Romanians holding high office there, and regularly 
visited the Emperor and high officials until its departure 
57 
from Vienna at the end of November. 
Nationalist animosities reached a new height in Also-
Feher county. Romanian communities rejected the officials 
elected by the county congregations of September 16-17 and 
October 17, who for their part refused to collect taxes. 
Prefect Pogany and Governor Mike appealed to Montenuovo for 
troops to restore order, but the latter refused. The 
alleged Romanian "agitators" were loyal subjects of the 
imperial government, wrote Montenuovo, while the congrega-
tion majorities had "openly expressed their sympathy for 
Garibaldi and consorts." He added, ironically, that troops 
were unavailable because they were employed elsewhere in tax 
58 
execution. Many of the leaders of the Romanian civil 
disobedience were clergymen, and local Hungarian officials 
alleged they were receiving orders from the Archepiscopal 
56. POM V, 2, 446-52. 
57. Pu9cariu kept the official protocol of the deputa-
tion's activities; it is preserved in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, CM 
709/1861, and published in Josan, 555-71. 
58. MOL, F263 1861/2579. Montenuovo to Miko, October 27, 
1861. Pogany immediately denied the charge of Garibaldist 
sympathies in the congregations: Pogany to Miko, October 31, 
in F263 1861/2602. 
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59 
chancellery in Blaj. The charge may have been an attempt 
to undermine the prestige of ~ulu~iu at a time when he was 
in Vienna, lobbying the court on behalf of the Romanians. 
The first fruit of this lobbying was the well-informed, 
unfavorable reception given to the Gubernium address when it 
60 
came before the Council of Ministers. The debate in the 
council of Ministers was a virtual repeat of those of the 
previous month. The interim director of the Chancellery, 
Daniel Kab6s, presented the address of the Gubernium, which 
he supported in many respects, and a dissenting opinion by 
Pop, which he attacked, and called for a delay of the diet 
until December 2. All ministers, including the Hungarians, 
rejected Kab6s' report; he was not invited back when the 
debate was resumed twelve days later, presided over by the 
61 
Emperor. Schmerling gave the introductory report at this 
session, arguing that new leadership was necessary in the 
Chancellery and Gubernium before the diet could be convoked 
62 
with a reasonable chance of success. The centralist 
former Minister of Justice Count Ferenc Nadasdy became the 
59. Pogany to Miko, October 30, in MOL, F263 1861/2585. 
60. The comportment of the Gubernium would have exas-
perated the ministers in any case, but the information 
provided by the deputation helped the ministers to make up 
their minds on a matter not within their immediate exper-
tise. 
61. POM V,2, 464-6. Pu9cariu preserved a copy of Pop's 
opinion of October 10 in his personal archives; Alba Iulia. 
Muzeul Unirii, Arhiva. 6205/6. Kabos gained the post by 
virtue of his seniority among the Chancellery councillors--
Ibid., V,2, 365. 
62. Franz Joseph decided on the spot that the convoca-
tion must be delayed until the necessary personnel changes 
and preparations had been made. Consequently the convoca-
tion only ensued in 1863. 
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new Chancellor, was confirmed in office on November 7 and 
raised to the rank of voting minister. After Mike declared 
his reluctance to convoke the diet, Nadasdy recommended his 
dismissal. This was approved by the Council of Ministers on 
63 
November 17, and enacted a week later. The new Governor, 
Lieutenant Field Marshal Count Ludwig Folliot-Crenneville, 
64 
was appointed on November 26. 
*** 
The Transylvanian Provisorium 
As in Hungary, the Provisorium replaced the conserva-
tive leaders in the Chancellery and provincial administra-
tion with an absolutist official and a soldier. Throughout 
the decade of absolutism Nadasdy served in high judicial 
65 
posts in Hungary and in Vienna. Crenneville had an 
exclusively military training. He was considerably less 
independent in personality than Nadasdy, but with time he 
63. POM V,3, 28-31. Schmerling remarked sharply: 
"Belangend den Grafen Mik6 so sei es wohl unm6glich, mit 
einem solchen Gouverneur weiter zu regieren, der sich nicht 
bequemen will, in die Tendenzen der Regierung einzugehen, 
weshalb es dringend notwendig sei, ihm durch eine andere 
vertrauenswtirdige Pers6nlichkeit zu ersetzen."--Ibid., 30. 
Mik6 for his part was correct in stating that Hungarian 
opinion and the county administration would preclude a 
workable diet, and that Gyulafehervar lacked the necessary 
facilities. Mike's declaration is in Redlich II, 254-5. 
64. POM V,3, session of November 22, 1861, pp. 43-44. 
To prepare for the diet Nadasdy proposed to place the 
administration of the land "in krAftige H~nde," offering the 
post "einstweilen einem hohen Militir." He and Degenfeld 
settled on Crenneville, who was the brother of the Emperor's 
court adjutant, of French origin but possessing estates in 
Hungary and a good facility in Hungarian. 
65. Szasz, "Az abszolutizmus kora Erd~lyben," 1491. He 
states that compatriots considered him "the most hated 
Hungarian." 
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became involved in sterile jurisdictional struggles with 
66 
Montenuovo and, beginning in 1865, with Nadasdy. 
The disunity over Hungarian questions in the Council of 
Ministers also reemerged concerning Transylvania. After 
Nadasdy's report of November 17, Forgach warned against 
incautious action in Transylvania because this would under-
67 
mine the officials' prestige in Hungary. He opposed 
Nadasdy's proposals for judicial reform, and he was absent 
when the administrative reforms were discussed two weeks 
68 
later. As a minister, Nadasdy was clearly in a much 
stronger position than Kemeny had been, and would prove to 
be Schmerling's strongest and most faithful ally in the 
69 
Council of Ministers after Lichtenfels. 
The essence of the Provisorium, as in Hungary, was the 
dissolution of the constitutional county assemblies where 
they had been successfully established in 1861. Nadasdy 
requested that the new administration strictly observe 
66. Klima 92-5; Kutschera 308-9. 
was basically personal in nature and 
were military men of identical rank, 
confusion as Szasz (1491) implies. 
The rivalry with Montenuovo 
owing to the fact they 
and not due to procedural 
67. POM V,3, 31. Plener thereupon remarked: ''bbrigens 
wahrnehme er hieraus mit tiefem Bedauern, dass jene Einstim-
migkeit und Einigkeit im Ministerrate auf diese Art 
nicht vorhanded sei, wie er sie nun erzielt sich gedacht 
habe." 
68. Ibid., session of November 22 (45, 47); session of 
December 7 (94). 
69. Redlich calls Lichtenfels "wahrend der ganzen Dauer der 
Schmerling'schen Regierung ... die starkste Stutze des 
Staatsministers und seiner Politik" (II, 306), and Nadasdy "der 
getreue Knappe des Staatsministers ... der womoglich noch 
zentralistischer dachte als sein Chef."(319) Chef should be 
understood, of course, in the sense of faction leader rather 
than administrative superior. 
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imperial regulations: it should not hinder the payment of 
taxes, and it should assist in military recruitment, uphold 
the Provisional Instruction of March 1861, and recognize the 
February Patent and take measures to facilitate the election 
70 
of deputies to the Reichsrat. Dissolving the illegally 
constituted assemblies, Nadasdy proposed a new statute for 
the counties, approved by Franz Joseph on November 27 and 
71 
definitively promulgated on December 12, 1861. 
The new statute contained elements of the Provisional 
Instruction of March, 1861, liberal elements from the 
February Patent, and also openly absolutistic ones. 
Permanent commissions in the counties and districts would 
elect the local officials as they had in the past. Unlike 
the Instruction of March, 1861, the new statue prescribed 
membership in the commissions according to the principle of 
economic Interessenvertretung which Schmerling had 
established for the Reichsrat statute and the Diets in the 
hereditary provinces. Half the commission members would be 
elected by the large landowners, one-third to half would be 
elected by appointed representatives of the villages, and 
the remainder by the local chambers of commerce. Constitu-
70. POM V,3 (November 17), 29. 
71. The debate on November 25 (Ibid., V,3, 61-4) con-
cerned the general principles underlying the statute; the 
Chancellery decree of November 28 (1861/3895) is reproduced 
in Sandor, 219-22. On December 7 the Council of Ministers 
quickly approved the proposed electoral statute (POM, V,3, 
94-6; the ensuing Chancellery decree of December 16 
(1861/4095) and excerpts from the definitive regulation are 
in Sandor, 230-4. The complete county statute and electoral 
statue are in Sammlung der wichtigsten Staatsacten II, 98-
122, and in the printed original in MOL D228 1862/258. 
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tional, military and financial matters, and instructions to 
the Deputies to the diet, were excluded from the competence 
of the commissions, and the prefects given nearly absolute 
powers. 
Even Hungarians in the opposition had to admit that the 
Transylvanian Provisorium was much more moderate than that 
in Hungary. No military courts were introduced, nor were 
72 
the police powers of the governor greatly increased. 
With an eye toward the eventual success of the diet, one 
hoped to limit Hungarian alienation to a necessary minimum. 
The Hungarian opposition had in fact been less extreme than 
73 
in Hungary. Urmossy cited three reasons for the 
increasing moderation of the Hungarian opposition at the end 
of 1861: hope for support from the emigration faded as its 
dependence on Cuza, who himself desired Transylvania, in-
creased; the course of the Hungarian diet prompted 
Transylvanian Hungarians, as well, to see Deak as their 
leader; and the threat posed by Romanian aspirations had a 
sobering effect. In sum, "fear for one/s nationality made 
74 
abhorrent the idea of revolution." 
The response of the opposition to the Provisorium, 
72. Albert Berzeviczy, Az 9~E2lutizmus kora 
~~gy~rorszagon III, 391. 
73. Malfer, "Einleitung," in POM V,3, xlvii. Schmerling 
argued on November 25 that the electoral statute "den Beweis 
liefern wird, dass man nicht gesonnen ist, in Siebenburgen, 
wo eine so einstimmige Renitenz wie in Ungarn nicht 
eingetreten ist, alles konstitutionelle Leben zu 
suspendieren." POM V,3, 63. 
74. "A ~emzetis~get valo f~lt~s perhorreskalta a forra-
dalmat." Urmossy I, 346-9. 
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after nearly a year of defiant manifestoes and a final 
75 
protest by the Gubernium on December 17, was moderate. 
The Hungarian prefects decided at a meeting in Kolozsvar in 
December to resign from their offices with the exception of 
Pogany, since the danger entailed by surrendering the 
leadership of Als6-Feher to a Romanian was considered unac-
ceptable. About a third of the Gubernium councillors 
resigned or retired, and were replaced by other Hungarians, 
Romanians, and Saxons. Pop became one of the Vice Presi-
dents of the Gubernium, but the Hungarians retained a 
76 
majority of voting councillors. Most Hungarian prefects 
and county officials resigned in January, while the 
Romanians remained in office. To assist the recruitment of 
replacements, Crenneville secured an increase in the pre-
77 
fects; salaries. Two of the new prefects were Romanians, 
the county official Vasile Buteanu and the former 
Chancellery official loan Pu~cariu. Outside of the Szekler 
region and Fundus Regius, six of the ten prefects were now 
Romanians. The other replacements for the aristocratic 
prefects of 1861 were veterans of the absolutist adrninistra-
tion of the 1850s and people of lesser birth: 
75. The Gubernium resolution 1861/13,017, denouncing 
the Provisorium, is published in Sandor, 223-29. 
76. Before the dismissal of Haynald (who rarely attended 
the Gubernium) in 1863, the division of Vice Presidents and 
councillors was ten Hungarians, five Romanians, and four 
Saxons. Tiszti nevtar 1864, 17. Not all councillors were 
Referents, while some Referents were secretaries or lower 
functionaries. Trocsanyi, 649-50. 
77. POM V,3 (January 10, 1862), 186-7. 
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Table 5: Transylvanian 
Regius in the 
* carryover from 1861 
, Hun~arian counties 
Also-Feher 
Belso-Szolnok 
Doboka 
Felso-Feher 
Hunyad 
Kolozs 
Kukullo 
Torda 
Romanian districts 
Fagaras 
Ntl.saud 
Szekler districts 
Arnanyos 
Csik 
Haromszek 
Maros 
Udvarhely 
Prefects Outside the Fundus 
Provisorium 
foispan/administrator 
*Gyorgy Pogany 
Daniel Pataki 
Vasile Buteanu 
*Augustin Laday 
*Baron Ferenc Nopcsa 
Gusztav Groisz 
loan Pu9cariu 
Istvan Zullich 
fokapitany/administrator 
*loan Lemeni-Bran 
*Alexandru Bohatel 
fokiralybiro/administrator 
J6zsef Dindar 
Adam Szabo 
Imre Daniel 
Albert Horvath 
Gusztav Lukacs (78 
In addition, the first Romanian chief of a Saxon district was 
appointed, Ilie Macelariu in Reussmarkt. 
Many of the appointees were Romanians and Germans, but 
it is incorrect to argue, as did some Hungarian 
contemporaries, that nearly all the resigned officials were 
replaced by non-Hungarians, or even that Romanians dominated 
79 
the Transylvanian administration under the Provisorium. 
The property provisions in the county statute assured that 
Hungarians retained a comfortable majority in most county 
commissions, even if the prefect was a Romanian, and they 
put aside ideology to assure that their interests were 
78. Prefects who had not been confirmed in office by 
the district assembly were officially known as 
administrators. 
79. Urmossy, II, 16; [Domokos Teleki], Siebenburgen und 
die osterreichische Regierung in den letzten vier Jahren 
(Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1865), 67-71. 
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80 
protected. Many Hungarians were found to replace the 
officals who resigned. The number of Romanian civil 
servants in Transylvania doubled between 1860 and 1863, but 
still only numbered 300, or one-ninth of the total, in the 
81 
latter year. 
*** 
Criticism of the Provisorium 
Romanians made important gains at all levels of the 
administration, but less than they had hoped for in the fall 
while lobbying the court for the appointment of a Romanian 
82 
as Chancellor or Governor. The Romanians' petition for 
the dismissal of Pogany, their greatest nemesis, was also 
83 
disregarded. The conventional objection to the 
appointment of Romanians, the shortage of suitable indivi-
duals, remained valid. "Suitable" should be understood not 
only in terms of education and training, but also property 
and social outlook. The Saxons were more satisfactory in 
all these respects, and their loyalty to the court was 
unquestioned. There was no Provisorium in the Fundus 
Regius. The Saxons enjoyed an accretion of power during the 
80. Mester, 132. 
81. Retegan, Dieta romaneasca ~ Transilvaniei, 21-2. 
82. Josan 546, 552; Retegan, op. cit., 54. The only 
Romanian whom the Council of Ministers considered for Chan-
cellor on October 29 was Baron Nopcsa, who was not on the 
deputation's list. POM V,2, 465. 
83. The Romanians of Also-Feher petitioned the Emperor 
for the dismissal of Pogany on September 9, 1861. The 
document was forwarded to Kemeny the next day, who requested 
a report from Miko. MOL D228 1861/348. $ulutiu repeated the 
request in a letter to Nadasdy on January l, 1862. Ibid., 
1862/70. 
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provisorium which, relative to their percentage of the popu-
lation, was even greater than that of the Romanians. 
The Schmerling years marked the high point of Saxon 
influence in Vienna. The number of Saxon councillors in the 
Gubernium and Chancellery increased, to four of nineteen in 
the former and two of five in the latter. Hungarian 
Chancellery councillors were thus in the minority for the 
first time. Baron Franz von Reichenstein, one of the new 
councillors, became Nadasdy's closest associate in the Chan-
cellery and his deputy when he fell ill in the fall of 
84 
1863. 
Possibly of equal importance for court politics was the 
appointment of a Saxon to head the imperial Press Management 
Bureau (Press-Leitungs-Buro). This body was under the 
authority of Mecsery from the time of its establishment in 
85 
1860, but then from May, 1861 under that of Schmerling. 
The Press Director, Count Eugen Drotlef von Friedenfels, 
supervized domestic and foreign press coverage and paid 
honoraria to journalist for articles favorable to the re-
gime. According to his job description, he took orders from 
Schmerling, but was also entitled to operate "independently 
84. Sashegyi, 392-3. Reichenstein's extensive corres-
pondence with Nadasdy and Transylvanian politicians in 1863-
64, preserved in Vienna, indicates he played a crucial role 
in the period. According to Szasz (1491), some (unidenti-
fied) contemporaries viewed Reichenstein as "the evil spirit 
of the Chancellery." 
85. Ernst Weisenfeld, Die Geschichte der politischen 
Publizistik bei den Siebenburger Sachsen (Limburg an der 
Lahn: Limburger Vereinsdruckerei, 1938), 73; POM V,l, 82. 
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86 
and on his own initiative." At the request of 
schmerling, in March, 1862 the annual budget of the Press 
Bureau was quadrupled to 350,000 fl., most of this to be 
87 
used for influencing domestic journals. Press questions 
frequently arose in the Council of Ministers, with Rechberg 
88 
complaining about liberal attacks on the conservatives. 
The Saxon municipalities, allied with the German 
language press, sought to prod the centralist forces to a 
more energetic revision of the Transylvanian constitution in 
1862. Three grievances gave rise to particularly sharp 
criticism of the moderate Provisorium regime in the Saxon 
and Viennese press: the retention of Haynald in the 
Gubernium despite his public speeches against the Diploma 
and Patent, the Gubernium's unfavorable treatment of an 
address by the Saxon Konflux of March, 1862 to the Emperor, 
and the continued domination of the counties by the landed 
aristocracy under the new statute. Mecsery and Nadasdy 
ordered an investigation of the authors of the articles, 
89 
but no measures were taken against them. 
The address by the Konflux prompted a highly signifi-
86. Weisenfeld, 73. Friedenfels also became a council-
lor in the Transylvanian Court Chancellery, replacing the 
retiring Count Salmen, in 1863. 
87. POM V,3, 303-4. At the end of 1862, Schmerling 
established a government press agency, the General-
Korrespondenz aus bsterreich, and recommended it for his 
colleagues' "gutige[n] Unterstutzung und moglichst 
h~ufige[n] Benutzung." Circular letter to N~dasdy, in MOL 
D228 1862/617. 
88. Redlich II, 760-3. 
89. MOL D228 1862/152, 208, 258, 275 (April through July, 
1862). Chapter VI will devote special attention to Bishop 
Haynald. 
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cant debate, with the Saxons, not the Romanians, taking the 
lead in the struggle to modify the Provisorium. At the end 
90 
of its session in November and December, 1861, the 
Konflux elected a committee of seven to prepare a bill 
concerning national equality in Transylvania. The committee 
report declared Transylvania an integral part of the empire 
and hence duty bound to send deputies to the Reichsrat. The 
rights of the Romanians would be guaranteed by the creation 
of a Romanian district, partly from the Fundus Regius but 
primarily from the counties, in addition to Hungarian, 
Szekler, and Saxon districts. The assembly accepted the 
report in February, and formulated it as an address to the 
Emperor on March 29, 1862. The address ended with the 
declaration that the proposals were made in consciousness of 
the Saxons' ancestral mission of service ad retinendam 
91 
coronam. 
The proposal to reorganize the districts of 
Transylvania was highly controversial. The Hungarian 
Kolozsvari Kozlony, the Romanian press, and the minority 
vote of Lassel in the Konflux all rightly objected that the 
distribution of population in Transylvania precluded equita-
92 
ble ethnic boundaries. The Gubernium refused to forward 
90. Before the convocation of the Konflux on November 
25, Salmen was replaced as Comes by the more popular and 
energetic Schmidt, and promoted to the Chancellery. 
91. The address, and the dissenting opinion by the 
deputy of Kronstadt, August Lassel, supporting the union 
with Hungary, are in Sandor, 243-61. 
92. Urmossy II, 21-9; Retegan, "Interferente politice romAno-
sase9ti in perioada guvernarii liberale (1860-1867)", in Studii 
de istorie ~ nationalitatilor conlocuitoare din Romania £i a 
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the address to the Emperor, but after a storm of protest by 
the German press and the intervention of Schmerling the 
93 
Gubernium changed its position. On May 17 the Konflux 
elected a deputation to lobby for its proposal at the court. 
In June the delegation was celebrated with great fanfare by 
the Viennese press, by Schmerling and his allies, and by the 
94 
German deputies in the Reichsrat. The Emperor approved 
the request for a special Saxon court of appeals in 
Hermannstadt and for salary increases for officials, but 
gave no response to the remainder of the address. This 
would come only after several more months of political 
95 
maneuvering. 
Because of its tactical alliance with the Saxons the 
Romanian movement in the Fundus Regius exercised moderation 
in its calls for greater representation. This rationale was 
infr~_tir_i_i .1.9£ _fU naliunea roman a I I ( Bucure~ti: Edi tura 
politica, 1981), 139. The Romanian deputy from Broos supported 
the motion of Lassel in the Konflux. 
93. The Viennese Ost-Deutsche Post of May 15 attributed 
the retreat of the Gubernium to the power of the press, 
adding: "Warum-- wenn es erlaubt ist, zu fragen-- wird von 
der ungeheuren moralischen Macht [of the press] uber die 
reaktionaren Pygmaen so gar kein Gebrauch gemacht, da doch 
der Erfolg ein so leichter und sicherer ist?" This certain-
ly exaggerates the power of the press, but Nadasdy sent a 
copy of the article to Crenneville. MOL D228 1862/208. 
94. Friedrich Teutsch, Geschichte der §i~be~bu~~~ 
Sachsen fur das Sachsische Volk vol. 3 (Hermannstadt: W. 
Krafft, 19 fo)~- 4Ts-=-17:---- -·-
95. Urmossy mistakenly wrote that the Romanian Chancel-
lery councillor Dimitrie Moldovan was "totally won over to 
the Saxon cause." Moldovan and the two Hungarian council-
lors defeated a motion by the two Saxon councillors in June 
that the Emperor should reply to the Saxons' legislative 
proposals. Yet even the more general response adopted by 
the majority on June 20 was rejected by the Emperor. 
Urmossy II, 38. 
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not operative in the counties, where the Hungarian-Romanian 
conflict continued despite the Provisorium and the delay in 
convening the county commissions until September, 1862. 
peasant unrest led to vandalism of landlords's forests in 
the second half of 1862, and the incidents continued for the 
96 
next few years. Hungarian landowners and the Gubernium 
equally condemned such acts, but the position of the Gubernium 
was somewhat ambiguous since it was aware of the causes of 
the discontent and the involvement of many politically reliable 
Romanian parish priests. Thus the Gubernium appealed to the 
bishops to repudiate vandalism, but later rejected harsh police 
97 
measures proposed by the landowners. 
The rural unrest was connected in the mind of the 
aristocracy with the specter of "Dacoromanism". Many 
attributed the expropriation of land by rebellious peasants 
to Papiu-Ilarian's allegation in his book that Transylvania 
was "a Romanian land," or ought to belong to the 
98 
Romanians. It must at least be granted that the popular 
book and Romanian successes in the Principalities stren-
gthened Romanian independence and militance. The formal 
unification of the Romanian Principalities in early 1862 
96. Retegan, "Frimlntiri tar~ne§ti din muntii apuseni 
in an11 guvernarii liberale," Acta Musei Napocensis 12 
(1975), 331-45. The Hungarian press and local officials 
accused Romanian politicians of instigating the vandalism, 
but there is no direct evidence of this. Urmossy II, 39-40. 
97. The Gubernium's letter to the bishops is in MOL F263 
1861/3008 (December 18, 1861); concerning the police mea-
sures, see Kovacs, Desfiintarea relatiilor feudale in 
Transilvania 94-5. 
98. brmossy II, 40; Curticapeanu, 431. 
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was celebrated by the Romanian press, and the Romanians of 
Kronstadt sent a congratulatory delegation to Prince 
99 
cuza. The Principalities provided subsidies for 
Transylvanian Romanian education during these years. 
100 
Agents of the Hungarian emigration in the Principali-
ties in 1862 reported that Dacoromanian sentiments were 
stronger, and readiness to collaborate with the Hungarians 
101 
considerably less, than two years earlier. In view of 
this and the decreasing likelihood of a renewed Franco-
Italian offensive, the emigre leaders sought new ways of 
overcoming Romanian hostility to their movement. In April, 
1862 Klapka and Kossuth formulated a plan for a Danubian 
Confederation with a migrating central parliament as the 
goal of an Hungarian-Romanian-Croatian-Serbian revolutionary 
alliance. What was crucial for Hungarians and Romanians: 
Transylvania would constitute one of the autonomous 
constituent states in the confederation, in personal union 
with Hungary, if this were accepted by a plebiscite. 
Through a misunderstanding, the plan appeared in the Italian 
press on May 18, 1862. The publication was disastrous for 
the popularity of the emigres among Hungarians at home, a 
fact which Kossuth recognized immmediately. The censors in 
Hungary recognized this also, and allowed publication and 
extensive criticism of the plan in the Hungarian press 
99. Urmossy II, 17. 
100. Berindei, 237-8; documents for 1860-63 in Vasile 
01 tean, ed. , Acte, docum~nt~ §i _§crJE_gri .9-i.!! _;>_shei i 
Bra9ovului (Bucure9ti: Minerva, 1980), 150-9, 260-3. 
101. Borsi-Kalman, 89-93. 
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beginning on June 6. To submit the Transylvanian union to a 
plebiscite was, in the eyes of the Hungarian nationalists, 
unforgivable. One radical wrote in his diary that "proc-
lamations of this sort drive people to [the Austro-
Hungarian] compromise ... if I must enter a Reichsrat, then 
I'd rather go to the Germans in Vienna than to the Serbs in 
102 
Belgrade." Klapka remarked prophetically: 
If they [the Hungarians at home] are incapable of 
any concessions to the nationalities, then they 
shouldn't dream of independence, but come to an 
agreement with the Austrians. Under the paternal 
protection of the Habsburgs they can dispense with 
any concern for the Serbs and Romanians. 103 
The Dualist system would indeed strengthen the hand of the 
Hungarians vis a vis the nationalities. 
This fiasco, and dissension in the emigre leadership 
decisively lessened the threat of the radicals to the re-
gime. In Transylvania, the surrender of Berzenczey to the 
104 
Austrian authorities in June was demoralizing. A pro-
Italian demonstration at the Reformed school in Fogaras in 
105 
July was an isolated incident. 
102. Lukacs, 202-23; the quotation is from Zoltan Szasz, 
"Donaukonf6deration oder Donaumonarchie. Eine Alternative 
zur ungarischen Politik im 19. Jahrhundert," in Osterreich-
ische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische 
Klasse, Anzeiger 116, number 15 (1979), 22-35. The 
Hungarian paper that published the plan was the Surgony of 
Pest, organ of the Old Conservatives. Because only 
Kossuth's name appeared on the text, the reputation in 
Hungary of coauthor Klapka suffered relatively little 
damage; Szasz (1488-9) mistakenly assigns sole authorship to 
Kossuth. 
103. Cited by Szasz, 1472-3. 
104. Lukacs, 223-33; Urmossy II, 51-2. 
105. 1'he local commandant reported to Montenuovo on 
July 9 that the students waved Hungarian flags and banners 
inscribed ''Viva i bravi fratelli della Lombardia" on the 
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In June and July Governor Crenneville conducted a tour 
of inspection in Transylvania. He reported that conditions 
were favorable for the convocation of the county commissions 
106 
according to the statute of December, 1861. The new 
prefects had appointed their officials at the beginning of 
1862. To prepare for the diet, Nadasdy believed they would 
need to demonstrate their ability to preside over the 
elected commissions and thereby secure a modicum of popular 
legitimacy for the appointed officials. The county com-
missions convened on September 25, 1862, and generally 
107 
achieved this goal. Many commissions demanded a restora-
tion of full legality, and at times the Romanians joined the 
Hungarian majority in opposition. This was a bearable result 
because the declarations were far more loyal and less radi-
cal than those issued by the counties in 1861. Even the 
oppositional addresses contained a different tone, calling 
for "the convocation of our lawful diet" (ambiguously, but 
probably that of Hungary) but also the "modification of the 
laws of 1848 [a reference to the union or the electoral 
law?] to the satisfaction of the various nationalities" and 
108 
even agrarian legislation. 
anniversary of the Austrian defeat in 1859. MOL D228 
1862/299. The school was in the Hungarian-ruled market town 
of this name, not under the Romanian district administration. 
106. MOL D228 1862/201, 233, 272, 277. Crenneville left 
Pop in charge of the Gubernium in his absence. 
107. In his reply to Crenneville's seventy-page report on 
the commissions, Nadasdy expressed satisfaction that, "mit 
alleiniger Ausnahme des Thorda'er Komitates, die Haltung der 
Beamten der Erwartung der Regierung entsprach"-- N~dasdy to 
Crenneville, October 20, in MOL D228 1862/507. 
108. Address to the throne of Belso-Szolnok county (the 
134 
Archduke Rainer asked Nadasdy to report on the Saxon 
and Romanian petitions concerning the diet in the Council of 
Ministers on October 10. The report on the Romanian 
petition was very general, and occasioned little debate. 
Concerning the Saxons, the address of March 29 and the 
Chancellery's opinion of June 20 were finally presented 
formally to the Council of Ministers. They received a 
positive reception. The imperial decree of October 13 
praised the constitutional principles expressed in the Saxon 
address, and ordered that measures be taken for the convoca-
109 
tion of the diet as soon as possible. 
Nadasdy submitted his proposals concerning the diet, 
including the electoral law that had been proposed by Vasile 
Pop and approved in September, 1861, and they passed on 
110 
November 2, 1862. Later in the same month the Saxon and 
Romanian leaders were informed that preparations for the 
111 
diet had begun. In December the Chancellery began to 
receive the electoral tables, calculated from the tax 
first commission to be convened), September 26, in Sandor, 
268-74. Though the address insisted on the validity of the 
union and hence implied that only the Hungarian diet was a 
legal one, the the formulation was in other respects 
conciliatory. Urmossy's portrayal of the commissions' ses-
sions is misleading, particularly his statement that Nadasdy 
was confused and disappointed by the results. tirmossy II, 
92-103. 
109. HHSA. Kabinettskanzlei 1862/3225= Council of 
Ministers 1862/1073. Nadasdy noted that the State Council 
had assisted him in the preparation of the decree. 
Rechberg, Forgach and Esterhazy demanded that the Emperor's 
name not be too closely associated with the Patent, diet and 
Reichsrat, but were only partially successful. 
110. MOL D228 1862/544. 
111. Urmbssy II, 65-6. 
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112 
records. 
The Hungarian ministers and members of the Gubernium 
offered determined opposition to the execution of Nadasdy's 
plans. Romanian leaders petitioned on December 2 for 
permission to hold a national conference, like that held in 
1861, in preparation for the diet. Both they and Nadasdy 
desired such a conference in order to assure political 
discipline and unity. The Gubernium resisted such permis-
sion, arguing that it would encourage the Hungarians to 
demand a similar conference and strengthen naco-Romanian 
tendencies. The Council of Ministers and Emperor only con-
113 
ceded the holding of the conference in February, 1863. 
The project of reform for Hungary of Apponyi and 
Forgach came before the Council of Ministers on March 11 and 
provoked more debate concerning the execution of the 
February Patent. N~dasdy declared that "if this program is 
accepted, all my efforts will have been in vain, for if the 
Transylvanians learn that the constitutional question is 
still undecided, then all that has been achieved will be 
114 
destroyed." Schmerling supported him fully. Despite the 
recent initiatives concerning Transylvania, the Emperor 
apparently remained undecided about the diet. Concurring 
with the Hungarian ministers and Rechberg, he declared that 
112. MOL D228 1862/615ff. 
113. Hitchins, Orthodoxy and Nationality, 135. 
Crenneville reported that the Szeklers in fact requested 
permission to hold a national conference of their own, but 
it was denied. Crenneville to Nadasdy, January 11, 1863, in 
MOL F264 1863/43. 
114. Redlich II, 314; HHSA KZ 924. 
136 
the international situation was too dangerous to risk 
poisoning public opinion in Hungary by taking "drastic mea-
sures." Schmerling replied to Rechberg: "In the long run it 
is untenable to rule absolutely in one part of the empire 
and constitutionally in the other."-- meaning that the Patent must 
finally be implemented ("durchgesetzt") in 
115 
Transleithania. Faced with the threatened resignation of 
Schmerling and Nadasdy, the Emperor dropped the reform plan 
and on March 21 confirmed his approval of Nadasdy's proposal 
116 
of November 2 concerning the diet. 
*** 
The Showdown in Transylvania 
The new year brought intensified political activity in 
Transylvania. On January 14 the Saxon Konflux reconvened in 
Hermannstadt. The assembly approved six laws passed by the 
Reichsrat in 1862, subject to imperial sanction, in order 
that they might be applied in the Fundus Regius. As in the 
case of the previous year's assembly, Hungarian public 
opinion and the deputies from Kronstadt objected to this 
expansion of the legislative prerogatives of the Nations-
117 
universitat. A further dissent from the generally 
progovernment tone of the assembly was the appeal by 
115. Session of March 18: Redlich II, 317-21; HHSA KZ 
1074. 
116. On March 21 Nadasdy instructed the Chancellery to 
recommence its preparations for the diet, interrupted during 
the Council of Ministers debate, "mit thunlichster 
Beschleunigung." MOL D228 1862/544-.-
117. The protest declaration of March 31 by the assembly 
of the district of Kronstadt to the Nationsuniversitat is in 
Sandor, 291-5. 
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Gubernium councillor Jakob Rannicher for the election of the 
comes, Konrad Schmidt, who had been appointed at the end of 
118 
1861. 
The Chancellery sought, by a renewed convocation of 
the county commissions at the end of March, to strengthen 
the moderate Hungarian party. Replying to the address of 
Belso-Szolnok county of the previous September, the Chancel-
lery responded carefully, in some cases positively, to its 
legislative proposals, but firmly rejected the claim to the 
119 
continued legality of the union. The outcome of the 
commission sessions was similar to that in September: those 
under Romanian control formulated addresses supporting the 
central government, while the others repeated their usual 
constitutional standpoint. Some counties voted to confirm 
the appointed officials in office, but others refused. The 
alignment of the Hungarians and Romanians relative to each 
other was inconsistent. The general tone was oppositional, 
but moderate. Once again Nadasdy found reason for mild 
optimism. 
The remaining, and perhaps most unpredictable, 
component of the upcoming diet were the Romanians. Their 
118. Urmossy II, 79-84. Rannicher condemned Salmen's 
action in resigning before the Konflux could elect a re-
placement. Salmen resented the imputation of illegality at 
the end of his forty years as a Saxon official; see his 
letter to Lutheran Bishop Binder of March 15, 1863 in AS 
Sibiu. Episcopia evanghelica C.A. Fondul Superintendential, 
1863/224. 
119. As it frequently did in 1862-63, the Chancellery 
solicited opinions and revisions from the State Council; 
Urmossy II, 91. The text of the reply to the county by the 
Gubernium on March 4 is in Sandor, 283-91. 
138 
pro-government, like those of the Saxons, were not in 
doubt, but their gains under the Provisorium fell far short 
of what they had hoped for. The Romanian bishops desired 
that their conference demonstrate the loyalty and unity of 
the nation, so that the court would recognize it as an ally. 
The government ignored a demand by the majority of the 
deputies that a civil rights bill be among the requested 
items of legislation, but in other rerspects the conference 
120 
of April 20-23 fulfilled its purpose. It sent a delega-
tion to Vienna, which was received very favorably there at 
the beginning of May. 
Nadasdy openly stated the purpose of the diet in the 
Council of Ministers: "the Transylvanian diet should be so 
composed that the majority will be favorable to the 
121 
government and send deputies to Vienna," the same princi-
ple which the centralists had proclaimed in 1861. The 
resolutions of the county commissions demonstrated that the 
county electoral laws of December, 1861 would not serve this 
purpose. The key had already been found, namely a lower tax 
base for the electoral law. The Chancellery and State 
Council prepared a new electoral law on this basis and rules 
of order, which were revised and approved by the Council of 
122 
Ministers on April 9. They were promulgated on April 21. 
120. Hitchins, Orthodoxy and Nationality, 136-8; 
Retegan, Dieta romaneasca a Transilvaniei, 56; see Chapter 
VI. 
121. Redlich II, 314. 
122. The Council of Ministers had deputized a committee 
of five to prepare the final draft, and four of them were 
centralists: Mecsery, Nadasdy, Lichtenfels, Geringer; 
139 
The electoral law-- which Forgach criticized for 
failing to take into account Transylvania's "historical 
conditions"-- increased the electorate from 11,496 in 1848 
123 
to nearly 100,000. Four-fifths of the electorate were 
payers of 8 fl. or more in direct tax, regardless of birth. 
Less than one fourth of the Transylvanian nobility were 
admitted to the vote. For the remainder of the electorate, 
various categories of professionals, including teachers and 
the clergy, were automatically enfranchized for the first 
time. Of 40,692 voters registered in the eight counties, 
28,559 or 70% were Romanians: an unprecedentedly high per-
centage, though still below their percentage of the popula-
124 
tion. The Romanians naturally enjoyed a secure majority 
of the electors in the two Romanian districts, and the 
Hungarians had the majority of the voters in the Szekler 
districts and the Hungarian towns, which voted separately 
for their deputies. Officials did not calculate the ethnic 
breakdown of the voters in the Fundus Regius, but the 
greater monetary wealth of the Saxons assured their 
dominance in the electorate there. The regalists (members 
Forgach was the fifth member. Redlich II, 329-30; HHSA 
Kabinettskanzlei, 1863/ 1372. 
123. Redlich II, 330 cites Forgach' remark in the 
Council of Ministers. For the electorate in 1848 see 
Retegan, Dieta romaneasca a Transilvaniei, 258-9, and in 
1863 the voting records in-MOL D228 1863/828. The source 
cited by Hitchins, Orthodoxy and Nationality, p. 138, on the 
size of the electorate accepted the tendentious estimates of 
15,000 and 160,000 provided by the Gubernium in October, 
1861. 
124. Retegan, op. cit., 67, 257. According to Szasz 
(1493), only one-fifth of the nobility was granted the vote. 
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appointed to the diet by the Emperor) had constituted two-
thirds of the diet membership in 1848. They were now re-
duced to only forty, or one fourth of the members, over the 
125 
objection of the Gubernium and of Forgach. 
Unlike in the past, the deputies would not be bound by 
instructions from the county and municipal assemblies that 
elected them, but freely elected by electoral districts 
having an average population of 30,000 and by the voters of 
the privileged towns. The size of the districts varied 
greatly. The population per deputy in the Fundus Regius was 
much smaller than in the counties, thereby increasing the 
126 
number of Saxon deputies. The electoral law and dis-
tricts were designed to prevent any of the three nationali-
ties from gaining an absolute majority. But the easier 
electoral requirements, increased number of deputies from 
the counties and the granting of deputies to several 
additional Romanian localities greatly improved the Romanian 
position compared to previous diets. 
The supervision of the elections was in the hands of 
electoral commissions that were appointed by the county 
commissions and municipal assemblies. Due to the composi-
tion of the latter, Saxons and Hungarians dominated the 
125. Redlich II, 331. Rogge reports the Gubernium 
majority proposed that Hungarian regalists be appointed in 
sufficient numbers to guarantee a Hungarian majority-- Rogge 
II, 210. In practice only 34 regalists were actually named 
to the diet, divided equally among the three nationalities--
Retegan, 78, op. cit. 
126. Half of the voters were in the eight counties, but 
they elected only 33 deputies, while the Hungarian towns 
elected an equal number of deputies. 
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electoral commissions in most of the Fundus Regius and in 
127 
six of the eight counties. The Romanians also lacked the 
social influence and electoral experience of their rivals, 
who were more experienced politicians. For the Romanians, 
the leadership provided elsewhere by the local officials and 
the property owners was offered by the clergy. 
Both 9ulutiu and 9aguna published pastoral letters to 
their clergy in May concerning the elections. They ordered 
the clergy to assemble the voters at the voting places, see 
that they not divide their votes among more than one candi-
date, and that they resist Hungarian attempts to influence 
128 
their votes by threats or favors. The Hungarian and 
Saxon bishops published no similar pastoral letters. 
The Chancellery encouraged this organizing activity by 
the Romanian clergy. Romanians alleged that the Hungarians 
were seeking to lessen voter participation by claiming that 
one voter could vote in the name of all the voters in one or 
more villages, saving people the inconvenience of travel and 
loss of work. Nadasdy wrote all eight bishops in 
Transylvania on June 9 requesting that they urge all voters 
129 
in their churches to participate in the elections. Two 
127. Retegan, op. cit., 66. 
128. Ibid., 68-9. ~ulutiu's circular of May 11 is in AS 
Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1863/393; that of ~aguna from late May 
is published in Gh. Tulbure, Mitropolitul Saguna. Opera 
literara, scrisori pastorale, circulari ~colare, diverse 
(Sibiu: Tipografia arhidiecezane, 1938), 447-50. 
129. MOL D228 1863/439. The eight bishops were 9ulutiu 
and two of his suffragan bishops, Alexi of Szamosujvar and 
Dobra of Lugos, ~aguna, Haynald, Binder, the Reformed Bishop 
Bodola and the Unitarian Bishop Kriza. 
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of the Romanian bishops replied with assurances that they 
130 
were taking the necessary measures. 9ulu~iu apparently 
took primary responsibility for the Romanian voters in the 
counties. He issued another, even more detailed pastoral 
131 
letter concerning the elections on June 15. 
The Hungarian bishops apparently made no written 
132 
response to Nadasdy's appeal. Bishop Binder was more 
forthcoming than his Hungarian colleagues. He sent a confi-
dential letter to all the Lutheran deans, calling on them to 
use discretely all their influence to ensure the election of 
deputies "of proven loyalty to the government and to 
133 
imperial unity." The centralist, pro-government attitude 
of the Saxon voters was only in doubt in the district of 
Kronstadt. Nadasdy wrote separately to the loyal Bishop 
Binder concerning the Hungarophile sentiments of the rural 
population there, accusing some of the Lutheran clergy of 
134 
indifference to the government's desires. The dean of 
130. Telegram of 9aguna to Nadasdy, June 12 (MOL D228 
1863/455), letter of Dobra to Nadasdy, June 13 (MOL D228 
1863/479), letter of Saguna to Nadasdy, June 14 (MOL D228 
1863/485). Bishop Alexi was mortally ill, and died on June 
29. 
131. Sandor, 297-300, and AS Alba Julia, MRU FG 
1863/449. 
132. The letter of Nadasdy is preserved in Alba Iulia, ERC 
1863/1587, (Categoria 35), and Cluj-Napoca. Episcopia 
reformata, Puspoki leveltar 1863/529. Neither archive indi-
cates any action was taken. The Unitarian Consistory does 
not indicate any action in connection with the election, and 
I was unable to view the personal papers of Bishop Kriza. 
133. Ms. "Rundschreiben /VII/ jedoch an die Dechanten 
allein," undated. AS Sibiu. Episcopia evanghelic~ C.A. 
Fondul Superintendential 1863/327. 
134. Nadasdy to Binder, June 3, in AS Sibiu, loc. cit. 
1863/323, also in HHSA Nachlass Reichenstein. Box lb, II 
Reservats-Prasidialakten 1863-65. 
143 
the most oppositional region of the district, rara 
Birsei/Burzenland, reported that he called the Saxon clergy 
together and urged them to use their influence with their 
parishioners. They convinced the members of three parishes 
to vote for the government candidate, but failed in most of 
135 
the others. 
The Romanian and Saxon clergy were useful to the 
government in the electoral campaign. Following the 
explicit directives in the bishops' pastoral letters and 
personal instructions, the Romanian parish clergy assembled 
the largely illiterate voters, ordered them to vote for the 
candidate designated by the Permanent National Committee in 
Hermannstadt, and in many cases personally led them to the 
polling-places. The Hungarian press and contemporaries 
charged that the clergy controlled voting behavior by 
threats of anathema (afurisenie), but no impartial observers 
confirmed this and it was naturally denied by the 
136 
Romanians. 
The campaigning of the the Saxon clergy was less con-
troversial, in part because it rarely involved contests 
against the Hungarians but also because the greater 
education and wealth of the Saxon clergy and voters could 
137 
not be denied. The Lutheran clergy were highly educated 
and used their oratorical skills effectively in collabora-
135. Friedrich Philippi to Binder, Prejmer, June 27, in AS 
Sibiu, loc. cit., 1863/376. 
136. Retegan, Dieta romaneasca a Transilvaniei, 72-3; 
Urmossy II, 113-14. 
137. See Chapter IV. 
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tion with the lay professional politicians. 
Hungarian cultural and political leadership was firmly 
in the hands of the nobility and its allies in the urban 
municipalities. But in the countryside, their higher educa-
tion and moral leadership gave the Hungarian clergy consid-
erable influence among those Hungarian peasant voters 
enfranchised for the first time. The Romanian press 
recorded cases in Als6-Feher where the Reformed clergy 
threatened Hungarian supporters of the Romanian candidate 
138 
with exclusion from the congregation. A writer in the 
Szekler region reported that the Szekler voters-- like the 
Romanians in other areas-- entered Kezdivasarhely under the 
leadership of two local pastors, one Roman Catholic and one 
Reformed, holding a banner with the portrait of Count Imre 
139 
Miko, a local candidate. 
The Gubernium reported the registered voters, turnout, 
and results of the election, which took place during the 
final days of June and the beginning of July. These are 
140 
the aggregate results: 
138. Retegan, op. cit., 74. 
139. Gyorgy Szentivanyi to Miko, 
4, in AS Cluj-Napoca. Fondul Muzeul 
Mik6 Imre 1863/52. 
; 
Sepsi Szentivany, July 
Ardelean, Corespondenta 
140. The report accompanied Crenneville~s letter to 
Nadasdy of July 31 (Gubernium Presidium 1863/4072) in MOL 
D228 1863/828. The electoral data was missing for the 
Hungarian market town of Mocs and for one electoral district 
in the counties. I excluded two electoral districts in 
the counties from the averages because of incomplete data. 
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Table 6: Voting in the Election of 1863: Registered 
Voters, Turnout, and Deputies by Region and Nationality 
Reg.v. Voting Turnout Dep Reg.v/dep R H s 
a) 26 Hungarian Towns 
5 Free Towns 2409 1466 60.9% 10 240.9 10 
3 Noble Towns 646 437 67.6 3 215.3 3 
18 Market Towns 936 1718 88.7 19 107.8 3 15 1 
Total 4991 3399 72.6 
b) Noble Counties and Districts 
8 Counties 46901 39145 83.9 
2 Rom. Distr. 4191 3269 78.0 
c) Szekler Region 
5 Districts 9104 
d) Fundus Regius 
8 Free Towns 4807 
1 Market Town 108 
11 Districts 18929 
6513 
3327 
72 
14512 
89031 70459 
71.5 
69.2 
66.7 
76.7 
79.3 
32 161.0 
33 1421.2 
5 838.2 
13 700.3 
16 300.4 
1 108 
25 757.2 
125 718.0 
3 28 1 
30 2 1 
5 
13 
1 15 
1 
8 1 16 
48 44 33 
Thanks to the differing size of the electoral districts and to 
the tax requirement, the Romanian deputies were fewer than the 
Romanian percentage of the population, and the Saxons more. The 
overrepresentation of the Saxons carne at the expense of the 
Romanians in the Fundus Regius. The apportionment of mandates in 
the counties was equitable. From the Hungarian standpoint, 
however, the results in the counties were the most 
unprecedented and worrisome aspect of the election. 
The high voter turnout in the huge electoral districts 
of the counties reflected the high level of politicization 
141 
and discipline of the Romanian voters. The contest was 
social as well as national; the opposing candidates in many 
districts were a baron or count versus a commoner. The 
Romanian press reported that in some districts the Hungarian 
141. The Romanians also hotly contested the elections in 
some of the market towns, most of which were Hungarian 
islands in Romanian surroundings. 
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peasantry voted for the Romanian candidate against the 
142 
Hungarian aristocrat. The Romanians' success far 
exceeded their influence in the local adrrtinistration, and 
gave a stronger "message" to the Hungarian opposition than 
143 
had the introduction of the Provisorium. 
After the nomination of 33 regalists, the proportions 
at the opening of the diet on July 15 were 58 Romanians, 56 
144 
Hungarians, and 44 Saxons. Fifteen Romanians and five 
Saxons were clergymen, and 36 Romanians and 22 Saxons were 
145 
civil servants. The profile of the 44 Hungarian deputies 
was very different. Only one was a clergyman, seventeen 
bore the title of baron or count, and the leading families 
of Bethlen, Kemeny, Miko and Banffy were represented by 
three members each. For the Hungarians, the prospect of 
constituting a minority in the diet had been the implicit, 
rarely expressed dilemma for the past two years beyond the 
customary rhetoric about constitutional legality. Would the 
142. Retegan, Dieta romaneasca a Transilvaniei, 73. 
The electoral data are inconclusive in this regard. In 21 
electoral districts in the counties where identifiably 
Hungarian and Romanian candidates opposed each other, voter 
turnout was 84.7%, and 76.9% of the votes were cast for the 
Romanian candidate, while 70.2% of the registered electorate 
in the counties were Romanians. A higher rate of abstention 
by registered Hungarian voters could account for the 
difference, however. 
143. The electoral committees of Also-Feher denied the 
certification of the Romanians elected in four districts, 
but eventually certified three of them on orders from the 
Gubernium. Retegan, op. cit., 74-6; MOL D228 1863/828. 
144. Retegan, op. cit., 78. 
145. Szasz, 1496. Urmossy and Szasz point out that only ten 
Romanian and Saxon members were independently employed. This 
contrasted with the Hungarian deputies, but only because the 
Hungarian politicians had been excluded from office or resigned 
during the Provisorium due to their political views. 
147 
Hungarians attend the diet to protect their interests there? 
The police reported in March that while the Hungarian radi-
cals favored a boycott of the diet, Deak advised the 
Hungarians to attend. He reasoned that if the Hungarians 
behaved in a moderate fashion the prospects of a new 
Hungarian diet and a compromise solution might be improved. 
The more radical Hungarians advocated a boycott of the 
diet, and they won out. On the eve of the diet, the depu-
ties met in the Herrnannstadt horne of one of their number, 
Count Benedek Mikes, in the presence of the Hungarian 
opposition leaders Kalman Tisza and Count Gyula Andrassy. 
Tisza and Andrassy advised the deputies not to enter the 
147 
diet. The only known, abbreviated protocol of their 
meetings does not indicate the presence of Tisza or 
Andrassy. It demonstrates the boycotters' decisive rnotiva-
tion was that, as a minority in the diet, they feared they 
could not pass the legislation they desired. Their consti-
148 
tutional strictures were only an afterthought. Secret 
consultations of the Hungarian, Saxon and Romanian deputies 
149 
at this time were unsuccessful. The Hungarian and 
Szekler deputies and eight of the eleven regalists issued 
declarations to the Emperor and to the diet announcing the 
146. Mecsery to Nadasdy, March 23, 1863 in MOL D228 
1863/182. 
146 
147. Szasz, 1494-5. Contemporaries assumed that the politi-
cians from Budapest instigated the boycott-- Retegan, op. 
cit., 83; Urrnossy II, 117; Police of Kassa to Mecsery, July 
31, in HHSA, Inforrnationsburo 1863/7235 (Elenchus 79). 
148. The protocol, by Salamon Gajzag6 of Szarnosujvar, is 
in OSzK, Fol.Hung. 1430. 
149. loan Pu9cariu, 74-5. 
148 
boycott. The declarations, while couched in very loyal 
terms, insisted that the laws of 1848 and earlier were the 
only legal basis for constitutional liberty and for the 
150 
rights of the nationalities. 
The Emperor's immediate rejection of the boycott 
declaration apparently surprised the moderate leaders 
Haynald, Kemeny, and Mike, who had thought they could hope 
for support in high places. Imperial dissatisfaction cen-
tered particularly on Haynald, who was dismissed from his 
position on the Gubernium and pressured to resign from his 
151 
episcopal see. At the end of December he finally did so. 
The Hungarian arguments in favor of the boycott had 
little effect on the Saxons and Romanians. The Saxons of 
Kronstadt district, were, once again, an exception; their 
two deputies joined the Hungarian boycott. As proposed by 
Pop in August, 1861, the first three articles of legislation 
(konigliche Propositionen) were for the constitutional 
equality (Inartikulierung) of the Romanian nation and reli-
gion, the use of the Hungarian, German, and Romanian 
languages in administration, and procedural matters at the 
152 
diet. The passage of the first two bills in the course 
of August and September was a great symbolic victory for the 
150. Published in Sandor, 309-17. 
151. The Viennese police reported special displeasure at 
the court at the behavior of Haynald-- Report of August 3, 
in HHSA, Informationsburo 1863/7347 (Elenchus 204). On the 
abdication of Haynald, see Chapter VI. 
152. The articles were listed in the convocation 
rescript of April 21 (Sandor, 295-7) and in the opening 
speech from the throne presented on July 15 (Sandor, 330-8. 
149 
the Romanian national movement. 
Despite this success, there were secret contacts 
between Romanian and Hungarian radicals in the sun@er of 
1863. The police reported considerable sympathy for the 
Hungarian radicals among the Romanians of Maramaros county, 
north of Transylvania in Hungary. At the same time they 
reported the Romanians had received proclamations from 
Prince Cuza ordering them to support, if it took place, a 
Romanian insurrection airning at the unification of 
Transylvania with Romania. Agitators reportedly distributed 
the proclamation in Transylvania and called on the Romanians 
to boycott the Reichsrat, but no copy of this proclamation 
153 
has been preserved. 
Renewed negotiations between Cuza and the Hungarian 
emigration seemed to provide a military basis for this 
threat. General Turr arrived in Bucharest and secured an 
audience with Cuza on May 28. His attempts to gain Romanian 
support for a small incursion into Transylvania were unsuc-
cessful, however. Turr was unwilling to offer any guaran-
tees concerning the Transylvanian Romanians, and Cuza made 
154 
this a precondition of a military undertaking. Austrian 
speculations that the Hungarian emigres had conceded Cuza's 
153. Police of Kassa to Mecsery, June 13, in HHSA, 
Informationsburo 1863/5479 (Elenchus 79) and Romanii la 
1859. Unirea principatelor romane in con9tiinta europeana I 
(Bucure9ti: Editura 9tiintifica 9i enciclopedica, 1984), 
573; Flener to Nadasdy, July 15, in MOL D228 1863/824. 
154. R.V. Bossy, L'Autriche et les Principautes-Unies 
(Bucharest: Moniteur officiel, 1938), 94-6; Curticapeanu, 
433-5. 
150 
rule of Transylvania in exchange for full support of an 
155 
insurrection were apparently unfounded. 
Differences did exist among the Romanian deputies con-
cerning the election of deputies to the Reichsrat. Austrian 
police reported Turr secured the commitment of several 
Romanian boiars in the Principalities to lobby in 
156 
Transylvania against participation there. The militant 
faction in the diet, led by ~ulutiu, sought to delay the 
election. Nadasdy and Reichenstein were very concerned 
about the influence of Papiu-Ilarian, who visited 
Hermannstadt in August and September, on this group. His 
goal, Nadasdy wrote, was to either to prevent the election 
of deputies to the Reichsrat or to exact a high price in 
157 
political gains for the Romanians. The factional 
difference among the Romanians-- between the unconditional 
centralists led by 9aguna and the nationalists under 
$ulutiu-- continued after Papiu's departure from 
158 
Hermannstadt, however. Only after the passage of the 
155. This rumor was transmitted by the Austrian Consul in 
Constantinople, Count Ludolf, on July 4 and repeated by 
Rechberg in a letter of July 9: Bossy 356, 358; see also 
Borsi-Kalman, 145-7. 
156. Anonymous report appended to Mecsery to Nadasdy, 
June 17, citing an intercepted letter of Turr-- HHSA 
Informationsburo 1863/5433 (Elenchus 344); Turr appealed to 
the Romanians in the Dace-Romanian organ in Bucharest, 
Romanul, to refuse participation in the Reichsrat-- Szasz, 
1501. 
157. Ploe9teanu, 7; Nadasdy to Reichenstein, September 7, 
in HHSA, Nachlass Reichenstein. Box lb, Korrespondenz 
Reichensteins, besonders mit Nadasdy, number 11. 
158. Anonymous report from the diet, September 13, in 
Nachlass Reichenstein, Box lb. II. Reservats-Prasidialakten 
1863-65, number 52. 
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diet~s priority legislation at the end of September was it 
possible to commence the election of deputies to the 
159 
Reichsrat. In view of Austria~s poor relations with 
Romania, it is difficult to credit a Moldavian aristocrat~s 
claim that the Romanians entered the Reichsrat on instruc-
160 
tions from Cuza. Cuza himself assured the Hungarian 
emigres a year later that he had never conducted 
161 
"propaganda" among the Transylvanian Romanians. 
The entry of the 26 Transylvanian deputies into the 
162 
Lower House of the the Reichsrat on October 20, 1862 was 
the greatest, perhaps only substantial victory of 
Schmerling~s Hungarian policy. By implementing the February 
159. The Emperor gave the order to commence the election 
of deputies to the Reichsrat on September 27-- Sandor, 325-
8. $ulutiu chaired the committee which prepared the diet~s 
response of October 5 to the imperial rescript. 
160. Prince Dimitrie Cantacuzino, a Moldavian boyar with 
connections in Bucharest and Transylvania, informed an 
advisor of Schmerling that the Transylvanian Romanians 
"regarded Cuza as their prince," but assured him that Cuza 
had "instructed" the Romanians to enter the Reichsrat. 
Julius Frobel, Ein Lebenslauf. Aufzeichnungen, Erinnerungen 
und Bekenntnisse II (Stuttgart: Verlag der J. Cotta~schen 
Buchhandlung, 1891), 301. Frobel was Schmerling~s most 
loyal jounalistic ally and advisor on German policy; see 
Redlich II, 384. Cantacuzino was Frobel~s brother in law, a 
moderate liberal with business ties to the Szekler region; 
see Imreh, "Legaturile dintre Bretcu 9i Moldova in prima 
jumatate a secolului al XIX-lea," in Viata cotidiana la 
secui (Bucuresti: Kriterion, 1982), 376-9. I have seen no 
evidence of such an instruction by Cuza other than the 
recollection by Frobel. 
161. Seherthoss to Klapka, August 8, 1864, in Borsi-
K~lm~n, "Klapka, Cuza ~s Arthur Seherthoss: 1864. 
(Szemelvenyek egy 19. szazadi magyar-rom~n megegyez~si 
kis~rlet dokumentumaib6l)," Szazadok 119 (1985), 827. 
162. The deputies included thirteen Romanians (four 
clergymen), ten Saxons (one cleric) and three Hungarians 
(one cleric), and nine appointees to the Upper House. The 
latter included four bishops ($aguna, $ulutiu, Binder, and 
Titular Bishop Fogarasy). Kutschera, 131. 
152 
patent in Transylvania, he was able to proclaim that the 
Reichsrat was no longer "narrow," but represented the entire 
empire and was hence fully entitled to approve the budget 
and other empire-wide matters. The Transylvanian deputies 
soon realized the ambiguity of this victory and of their 
position in the Reichsrat. Schmerling faced growing 
opposition in that body, not only from conservative 
federalists who had criticized the Patent from the beginning 
but also from German liberals. They derisively referred to 
the pro-government loyalists as Schmerling's puppets 
("Statisten"). Most of the Saxon and Romanian deputies 
remained on the side of the government, but a few Romanian 
and Saxon liberals joined the liberal opposition to 
Schmerling in the Reichsrat sessions of 1864-65. 
The constitutional experiment in Transylvania continued 
until Schmerling's fall in June, 1865, but with no new 
initiatives. The Emperor nullified the mandates of the 
eight boycotting Hungarian regalists at the end of July, 
1863. He ordered four successive rounds of elections to 
replace the boycotting deputies from August, 1863 to August, 
163 
1864. Despite considerable administrative pressure, the 
winners of the elections refused their seats in the diet in 
all but three cases. Bishop Haynald, once his status as a 
regalist had been revoked, won an election in the Armenian-
Hungarian city of Erzsebetvaros, and declined his seat there, 
163. Vortrag of Nadasdy, July 23, in MOL D228 1863/648; 
Szasz 1497. 
153 
as well. The court found several new Hungarian regalists 
who agreed to take their seats, including the Unitarian dean 
of Rimetea, Antal Koronka, the Roman Catholic dean of 
csikrakos Jeremias Eranosz, and the Roman Catholic Canon and 
164 
Titular Bishop in Oradea, Mihaly Fogarasy. 
The prospects for a successful diet in Hungary and 
Croatia did not improve after the Austrian success in 
Transylvania. The lack of further progress undermined the 
Emperor's confidence in Schmerling, who was forced onto the 
defensive by the clericals and conservatives at court, 
the so-called "camarilla led by M6ric Esterhazy." Symbolic 
of this defensive posture, Schmerling was unable after mid-
1863 to add to the modest list of liberal legislation he had 
sponsored in the Reichsrat in his first two years concerning 
165 
justice, church affairs and education. His ability to 
control the Reichsrat had been his saving grace for Franz 
Joseph, so when this disintegrated he became expendable. As 
his star fell in the Reichsrat, it fell also at court. 
*** 
Anton von Schmerling sought to weaken the influence of 
164. Kutschera, 123 confuses Koronka with Gubernium coun-
cillor Laszl6 Koronka and incorrectly refers to Eranosz as a 
Romanian, p. 131. On Eranosz and Fogarassy, see Chapter 
VI. 
165. In May, 1863 a secular imperial education council 
was established under the direction of the former President 
of the Lower House of the Reichsrat. Ostensibly its 
competence included Transleithania, but it had little power 
there. As signs of Schmerling's declining influence in 1864 
Rogge cites the dismissal of his ally Degenfeld, and the 
transfer of Schmerling's own brother, a high official in the 
War Ministry, out of Vienna. Rogge II, 198-200. 
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Hungarian radicalism in Transylvania by assuring the 
continued hegemony of the aristocracy in much of the 
province. This goal inspired the restoration of 
constitutional administration in the noble counties and 
Szekler districts in 1861, and also the relative moderation 
of the Transylvanian Provisorium (suspension of the 
constitution) by comparison to the Provisorium in Hungary. 
Policymakers were also determined to secure the 
adherence of the Saxons and Romanians to the "February 
Constitution" or Patent of 1861. Therefore the autonomy of 
the Fundus Regius was restored, and under the Provisorium 
Saxons attained an unprecedented degree of influence in 
Vienna, on the provincial level and in local legislation. 
But the alliance with the Saxons was ultimately inadequate 
for Vienna's purposes, and the price of extending it to the 
Romanians was the expansion of the electorate. Debate on 
the electoral reform lasted more than two years. The law's 
enactment in April, 1863 ensured the Hungarians would be in 
the minority in the subsequent diet. This was the actual, 
though not the publicly admitted motivation for the 
Hungarian boycott of the diet in July, 1863. The potential 
collaboration of the Transylvanian Romanians with the 
increasingly independent Romania of Prince Cuza, and even 
with the Hungarian emigres, was an extra incentive for the 
concessions they were granted in 1862-62. 
Bishops and clergymen played a prominent role in the 
electoral and dietal politics of 1863. An examination of 
155 
why this was the case must begin with a profile of the 
common features of the religious communities of 
Transylvania. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CLERICAL CULJ'URE:.L p.Qp_(J_!..~B REJJ~.QJ.Qli! AND §~~_(JJ:.AR]:~~1'1.9!'! 
Introduction 
The involvement of religious sentiment and the clergy 
in Transylvanian politics is much more extensive than a mere 
record of circulars, speeches, and electoral behavior would 
imply. Bishops, clergy and laity pursued institutional 
goals in society, and also intraecclesial objectives that 
could place them in conflict with each other. But where 
does politics stop and religion begin? All religious con-
viction, inasmuch as it brings adherence to an institution 
and social group and to an ethical system, involves social 
relations and activism. This chapter will investigate three 
important aspects of religious identity that are not overtly 
political, although all had political implications: the 
social position of the clergy, the relationship between 
offical and popular religion, and the impact of liberalism 
and the new secular culture. 
Religion forms the third structural element-- after the 
secular administration and the socioeconomic strata-- center 
of this study. The variety of forms that religion takes in 
society point out the necessity for a broad definition of 
the term. Religious identity implies acceptance of symbols, 
which are forms of expression "that stand ambiguously for a 
multiplicity of disparate meanings, evoke sentiments and 
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1 
emotions, and impel men to action." Religion is a system 
of symbols which establishes a transcendent order of 
existence and by vividness compels the individual to accept 
it. It is religion's public ceremonial practices or ritual 
which make vivid and reinforce the conviction of the reality 
2 
of its concepts. The connection of faith and ritual 
provides a partial explanation of the influence of the 
clergy-- the leader of public ceremonies-- in the different 
religious traditions. This definition is less relevant in 
those traditions which accord no prominent place to ritual. 
But generally, the distinctive symbols of the religious 
communities contribute to their confessional and ethnic 
identity, as groups of people who share certain religious 
experiences and attitudes toward existence. 
The six major churches in Transylvania fall into two 
major categories, which Max Weber has labelled ritualistic 
or magical and rationalistic religion. Sacramental prac-
tices are a powerful element in the ritualistic religions, 
while the rationalistic religions consider ritual less es-
sential and emphasize preaching. Mere preaching and theolo-
gy are intellectual activities accessible to the laity, 
1. Abner Cohen, Two-Dimensional Man. An Essay on the 
Anthropology of Power and Symbolism in Complex soCie~ 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), ix, 84. 
2. Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System," in 
Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic 
Books, 1973), 89-90, 109-14. For a general discussion of 
ritual in a contemporary Rorrtanian village of Maramures (not 
historical Transylvania), see Gail Kligman, The Wedding of 
the Dead. Ritual, Poetics, and Popular Culture in 
Transylvania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1988), 9-13 and passim. 
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while the public leadership of ritual is the special domain 
of the clergy. Consequently the "ritualistic" churches 
accord a greater role to their clergy in organization and 
3 
everyday practice. 
Succeeding chapters of my study of the clergy in politics 
will concentrate on the three "ritualistic" churches in 
Transylvania, the Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic (Uniate) 
and Orthodox. These churches explicitly maintain the apos-
tolic succession of the clergy, i.e. its uninterrupted des-
cent from the early church through ordination by competent 
bishops. The clergy celebrated a complex liturgy in a 
foreign (Latin) or archaic vernacular language with strong 
symbolic and aesthetic elements and administered various 
sacraments. The pastor or bishop also had administrative 
responsibility for educational and economic matters in his 
jurisdiction. This multiple authority often made him the 
dominant personality in the local community and the inter-
mediary of the secular administration. The responsibility 
of the Protestant ministers was almost exclusively pastoral, 
and his sacramental role much less. Economic and educa-
tional matters were under the administration of lay elders 
(G. Curator, H. gondnok, R. curator, gociman) 
and presbyteries or councils in the Protestant churches to a 
far greater degree than in the others. 
*** 
3. Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1963); 75, 97, and passim. 
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The Clergy in Society 
The clergy in Transylvania, as conventionally defined, num-
4 
bered 3694 in the Hungarian census of 1869-70. This number 
apparently did not include the roughly equal number of persons 
in subordinate clerical grades such as deacons and associate 
pastors or chaplains (H. kaplanok, segedlelkeszek), or 
parish functionaries such as cantors, sacristans (H. egyhaz-
fiak) and bellringers and, assistant parsons (segedlel-
keszek) and preachers (Prediger). The episcopate and 
parish clergy of the more narrow definition were the more or 
less uncontested elite of the local religious communities, 
endowed with special training and religious authority. De-
spite this basic similarity, the churches; clergy differed 
in terms of their selection, education, status, and finan-
cial means. 
4. ~magyar korona orszagaiban az 1870. ev elejen 
vegrehajtott nepszamlalas eredmenyei ~ hasznos hazi allatok 
kimutatasAval egyutt (Pest: Athenaeum, 1871), 314. An offi-
cial tabulation in 1844 listed 4619 clergymen and 138 semin-
arians and priest candidates (Budapest. MOL. F551. Klerus in 
Siebenburgen im Jahr 1844), while Elek Fenyes indicated for 
1855 about 4006 clergymen plus 102 seminarians, priest can-
didates and novices, citing no data for the Orthodox monks, 
seminarians and novices (Elek Fenyes, Az ausztriai birodalom 
statistikaja es foldrajzi le{rasa, I (Pest: Heckenast, 
1857), 218-27). The tabulation of subordinate grades of 
clergy, the declining population of Transylvania;s thirty-
seven monasteries, and the cession by Transylvania of one-
tenth of its population and area (the Partium) to Hungary in 
may 1861 account for the differing totals. The English term 
"clergy" excludes female members of religious orders but 
includes male ones: Robert C. Broderick, The Catholic 
Encyclopedia (Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor, Inc., 
1976), 119-20. 
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Table 7: Churches and Clergy in Transylvania, 1850 
Religion A % B C D A:D 
Gr. Cath. 648,239 31.4 1367 474.2 1481 437.7 
Orthodox 637,800 30.9 814 783.5 973 655.5 
Reformed 295,723 14.3 694 426 785 376.7 
R. Cath. 219,533 10.6 205 1070.8 361 608 
Unitar. 46,008 2.2 106 434 
Lutheran 198,774 9.6 269 738.9 296 671.5 
A= Members; B= Parishes; C=Average Size; D=Clergymen 5 
The method of selecting the parish clergy and bishops 
differed from the ritualistic to the Protestant churches, 
with the increasing employment of election in the latter 
group. Roman Catholic bishops were nominated by the monarch 
and confirmed by the Vatican, while the Greek Catholic 
synods (periodic assemblies of the leading diocesan clergy) 
nominated three candidates for bishop and the monarch was 
free to choose one of them. Orthodox synods as well as 
those of the Protestants elected the bishops, who were then 
confirmed by the monarch. Local clerical leaders (pastors, 
parsons) were generally nominated by the local congregations, 
except in the Roman Catholic Church. Various forms of 
6 
clerical election was applied in Romanian parishes. Many 
5. Fenyes, Az ausztriai birodalom statistikaja es 
f6ldrajzi leir~sa, II, 22-7 and MOL, F551, "Landesfibersicht 
[Census] vom Jahre 1850." Of the Roman Catholic clergymen, 
221 were diocesan and 140 were members of religious orders; 
the latter were not assigned to individual parishes, and 
subtracting their number from column D the figure for the 
final column is 993. 
6. Retegan informed me of instances in which the Greek 
Catholics of Nasaud and Orthodox of Bran conducted formal 
elections of their pastors. Charles Boner reported in 1865 
that Orthodox pastors were still chosen locally and then 
confirmed by the bishop: Charles Boner, Transylvania; its 
products and its people (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, 
and Dyer, 1865), 370. Seminary education and appointment by 
the bishop were becoming more general in this period, how-
ever. Istvan Imreh notes that in practice church, state and 
local officials in the Szekler region guarded their right to 
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parishes and congregations were economically supported to 
some degree by a patron (a landowner, local or state body 
that built and repaired the school and paid the salary of 
the priest, minister or teacher) who was entitled to name 
the presiding minister. About a quarter of the Roman 
Catholic, and a small percentage of the Greek Catholic, 
parishes were entitled to elect their pastors by right of 
their economic patronage. 
Celibacy was required of the Roman Catholic clergy and 
practiced by a small minority of the Greek Catholic clergy, 
while the parish clergy of all the other churches was mar-
7 
ried. Clerical marriage contributed very often to the 
training, or at least nomination, of the clergy: when 
priests' and ministers' sons succeeded to their fathers' 
social status and position, election or appointment by the 
8 
bishop was only a formality. 
influence the elections there; ~ torvenyhozo szekely falu 
(Bukarest: Kriterion, 1983), 105-7. 
7. Thirty of the 751 pastors in the Archdiocese of 
Blaj were celibate in 1862. Sterca-$ulutiu to Crenneville, 
January 31, 1862: AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG, 1862/47. All but 
two of the fifteen canons of the two Greek Catholic 
Cathedral Chapters in Transylvania, the bishops, and the 
small number of monks in the Romanian churches were also 
celibate. 
8. In 1865 there were at least 34 cases in the Greek 
Catholic Archdiocese of Blaj in which two or more pastors in 
the same deanery shared the same surname, and five cases in 
which the pastor and curate of a parish shared the same 
surname, out of 38 deaneries and 719 parishes-- Siematismulu 
veneratului cleru catholicu de ritu orientale alu Archi-
diecesei Metropolitane ~ AlbeT-JUIIe pre anulu dela nascerea 
lui Christosu 1865 (Blasiu: Tipariulu Seminariului Archi-
diecesanu, 186~ Variations of "Pop" and "Pap" were very 
common Romanian and Hungarian surnames. Two Unitarian 
church districts submitted complaints to the presbytery in 
1859 concerning nepotism in the lay and clerical positions 
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The "inheritance" of parishes was especially true in 
the case of the Romanian clergy, with its more limited 
economic means and educational opportunites. The first 
seminary for the Greek Catholic Romanians of Transylvania 
opened in Blaj in 1754, and a second one in 1760; a third 
one opened in 1859 at the seat of the new diocese of 
9 
Szamosujvar. The course of studies at the Blaj seminary 
after the two there were united in the late eighteenth 
century was three years, increasing in 1832 to four years. 
The seminary did not produce sufficient priests for all the 
parishes, so that many (the so-called "moralists") were 
trained at simple two-year courses at rural schools or half-
year courses in Blaj. As late as the 1850s a large propor-
10 
tion of the new appointments to parishes were "moralists." 
Until 1811 most Orthodox priests were trained at the scat-
tered Orthodox monasteries in Transylvania, at Serbian ones 
or in the Danubian Principalities, or with their fathers. 
In 1811 the first Orthodox seminary courses were established 
in their districts, and it was debated at the assembly the 
next year, but the presbytery took no action. Cluj-Napoca. 
Episcopia unitariana. Egyhazkepviseleti tanacs jegyzokonyve, 
1861/93. 
9. Mircea Pacurariu, Istoria bisericii ortodoxe romane 
(Bucure$ti: Editura Institutului biblic $i de misiune al 
Bisericii Ortodoxe Romane, 1981), 253-4. 
10. Biserica Romana Unita. Doua sute cinci zeci de ani 
de istorie (Madrid: Rivadeneydra;-1952), 111-12; ~magyar­
orszagi romanok egyhazi, iskolai, kozmuvelodesi, kozgazdasagi 
intezmenyeinek es mozgalmainak ismertetese (Budapest: Urania, 
1908), 50. Sulutiu reported in 1858 that his clergy divided 
into two very different groups according to training. He 
stated that more than thirty pastors in any one year were 
unqualified for their positions. $ulutiu to Minister Thun, 
December 3, 1858, in MOL. F258, 203. csomo, 1859/2238. 
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at the seat of the bishop in Hermannstadt, first with a 
length of six months, after 1846 one year, after 1852 two 
ll 
years, and after 1861 three years. No comprehensive 
appraisal of the clergy's educational level has been made. 
That of the Greek Catholics may have been superior to that 
of the Orthodox, but the differential was decreasing. 
The educational level of the other churches' clergy was 
superior, due to longer courses and wealthier, better-
appointed seminaries. The seminary at the seat of the Roman 
Catholic bishopric in Gyulafehervar opened in 1753. In the 
nineteenth century it had a four-year course of studies that 
was required of most candidates for ordination and appoint-
12 
ment to a parish in Transylvania. In the 1860s the 
annual expenditure of the seminary for some forty seminarians 
13 
was over 20,000 fl. Candidates for the office of parson 
(G. Pfarrer, H. lelkesz) in the three Protestant churches 
completed the four-year theological course of studies at one 
of the Protestant secondary schools. The one Unitarian and 
four Reformed "colleges" (F8tanod~k) and two Reformed, two 
Unitarian, and five or six Lutheran high schools (Gymnasien, 
11. Hitchins, The Rumanian National Movement, 142-3; 
Pacurariu, 245-6. The tabulation of those studying for the 
priesthood in 1844, possibly incomplete, was thirty-six 
Greek Catholics, thirty-eight Roman Catholics, with four 
outside the seminary, and sixty Orthodox, all outside the 
seminary. Budapest, MOL. F55l. "Klerus in Siebenb~rgen im 
Jahr 1844." 
12. Antal Beke, Az Erdely egyhazmegyei papnovelde torteneti 
vazlata (Karoly-Fehervar: Nyomtatott a puspoki konyvnyomdaban, 
1870), 25, 84. 
13. Ibid., 77, 111. 
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14 
Kozep-Tanodak) were the wealthiest and most prestigious 
educational institutions in Transylvania. Study at a Central 
European university was a virtual requirement for candidacy 
to the wealthiest congregations. Candidacy to the Lutheran 
and, after mid-century, the Orthodox positions required a 
15 
number of years of previous teaching experience, as well. 
Charles Boner remarked that the Saxon professors and clergy 
were "the best-informed men in the country," required to 
study two or three years at a German university or in Vienna. 
The parsons, having first served as high school professors 
in some scholarly field, were the leading Saxon historians, 
16 
ethnographers, and natural scientists. 
14. Erdely Nagy-Fejedelemseg hivatali tiszti nevtara az 1864-
dik evre, 108-17, Fenyes, 284 lists only the Unitarian and 
three of the Reformed colleges as Protestant theological 
institutes in Transylvania. 
15. Benko Samu, "Beke Samuel elete es halala," A hely-
zettudat valtozasai (Bukarest: Kriterion, 1977), 149-51; 
Richard Schuller, "Der evangelisch-s~chsiche Pfarrer in 
seiner kulturgeschichtlichen Bedeutung," Bilder aus der 
Kulturgeschichte der Siebenburqer Sachsen, I (Hermannstadt: 
Krafft & Drotleff, 1928), 283-88; Friedrich Teutsch, 
Geschichte der evanqelischen Kirche in Siebenburqen, II 
(Hermannstadt: W.Krafft, 1921), 404; Pacurariu, 246. 
16. Boner, 53-6. Boner frequently stayed at Saxon par-
sonages during his travels, and praises them repeatedly. He 
enjoyed the financial support of the Austrian government and 
the assistance of local officials during his visit to 
Transylvania in 1863-64 as a correspondent of the London 
Daily News. Draft of letter from the Transylvanian Court 
Chancellery to Governor Crenneville and General Montenuovo, 
September 17, 1863, in AS Sibiu, Fondul Eugen Friedenfels, 
XIV/202 and ibid., Polizei-Direktion Hermannstadt, Passanten-
Protocol pro 1862-1864: 1863/205 (October 10-19) and 1864/69 
(April 19); Frobel, II, 217. Boner's professed astonish-
ment at the fact that his arrival in a locality was often 
known in advance (eg. 422) may be disingenuous, and his 
sympathy for the Saxon political position and for the cen-
tralist regime is explicit. But contemporary and later 
Hungarian allegations that he was an "Austrian spy" (cf. 
Tibor Frank, The British Image of Hungary 1865/1870 
165 
In all parishes and congregations, the school teachers 
and other employees were supervised by the pastor or parson. 
Conflicts between the two sides were common. Their training 
was very different, and in the case of the Romanians that of 
the teacher was often superior; yet the clergy controlled 
the school curriculum, facilities and salaries. The insis-
tence of the lay intellectuals on educational progress, 
political differences and resentment of "clericalism" also 
17 
played their part. Subordinate clergy were less mobile 
and more dependent on the pursestrings of the pastor, and 
18 
occasionally complained of his miserliness to the bishop. 
Prior to the revolution of 1848 the Catholic clergy of 
(Budapest: Department of English, L.Eotvos University, 
1976), 104, 146, 314) do not reduce the value of his book 
for those aspects of Transylvanian society with which he was 
familiar. 
17. Such disputes naturally multiplied during periods 
of political conflict such as the 1860s, and the archives 
reveal many during this period. The leading Saxon and 
Romanian writers of fiction about village life produced 
portrayals of the teacher's conflict with the clergy or with 
traditional attitudes, for example in Die Dorfschule (1866), 
by Michael Albert, and Impacare (1916), by Ion Agarbiceanu; 
both writers were village clerymen. The Lutheran clergy was 
prominent among the authors and subjects of Saxon village 
fiction; see Michael Markel, "Zuordnungsfragen der 
siebenburgischen Dorfliteratur," Transsylvanica ~ Studien 
zur deutschen Literatur aus Siebenburgen (Cluj-Napoca: 
Dacia, 1982), 9-70. 
18. One such case is in the correspondence of Prediger 
Roth, parson Schullerus and Bishop Binder of September and 
November, 1861, in AS Sibiu. Episcopia Evanghelica C.A., 
Fondul superintendential. 1861/597; see also Boner, 296-7. 
Wealthier and more important congregations had as many as 
six Predigers, while small ones often had none. Jozsef 
Barsi reported that according to the 1869 census there were 
475 Saxon clergymen, of whom almost half were ~_s. 
Barsi, "Az ~gostai hitvallisu evangelicusok egyh~zi ~s is-
kolai ugyei Erdelyben," Statistikai es nemzetgazdasagi 
kozlemenyek 8 (1871), 136-58. 
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both rites enjoyed noble status, hence exemption from taxes. 
Later this distinction no longer obtained. Much more 
important for the economic status of the clergy were its 
sources of income, which varied according to political and 
local conditions as well as the peculiarities of each reli-
gion. A precise picture of clerical income is difficult 
because of this variety, but six types of economic support 
can be distinguished: canonic portions, tithes and tithe 
compensation by the state, patronage, church subsidies, 
emoluments or stola fees, and state subsidies. 
A canonic portion was a generally small parcel of land whose 
income accrued to the pastor. In a general sense, all Roman 
Catholic parishes, all Lutheran in the Fundus Regius, the Greek 
Catholics and Protestants in many of the communites where 
they were the most numerous, and more rarely the Orthodox 
parishes possessed canonic portions. Legislation by the 
diet and Konflux, designed to improve the situation of the 
Romanian clergy, had provided for a canonic portion for 
every priest and minister. The measure was not carried out, 
however. In villages of mixed population the endowment of 
the Romanian parish tended to be much less than that of the 
Hungarian or Saxon one. The granting or expansion of the 
Romanian portion was a common demand by local activists in 
19 
the 1860s. Where Romanian parishes possessed canonic 
19. Hitchins, Orthodoxy and Nationality, 238. The 
Greek Catholic former serfs of Homorodalmas in the district 
of Udvarhely demanded the separation of part of the lands of 
the Unitarian congregation for itself in 1863; Sulutiu and 
Bishop Kriza instructed the rural deans of the clergy to 
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20 
portions, they tended to be smaller. At least one case 
is recorded where the village commons were divided equitably 
between two or more parishes for the support of their 
21 
schools. 
The Romanian churches also fared badly with the tithe 
and the state compensation which was paid after the 
abolition of the tithe in the 1848. According to medieval 
law the Catholic pastor received one tenth of parishioners' 
harvest. The tithe later extended also to the Protestant 
clergy, but was lessened in the counties at the expense of 
the landlord's tithe (nones) and supplanted in the Szekler 
region by a different payment in kind, the kepe (L. 
capetium), and its monetary equivalent, the oszpora. 
Only in the Fundus Regius did the tithe survive in its 
original form, and was paid to the Lutheran clergy by all 
residents regardless of religion. Thus all 262 Lutheran 
parishes enjoyed the tithe, a much smaller fraction of the 
look into the matter-- Cluj-Napoca. Episcopia unitariana. 
Egyh~zk~pviseleti tan~cs jegyz6k6nyve, 1863/126, 165. The 
Romanian dean reported in March, 1863 that most of the 
clergy and parishes in his district were impoverished; AS 
Alba Iulia. MRU, FG, 1863/211. In response to a demand by 
the Orthodox parishes in Hermannstadt, the Saxon magistracy 
awarded 17 Joch [l Joch= 1.42 acres] for a canonic 
portion in 1861, but the Romanians complained that this was 
inadequate-- correspondence of the pastors with $aguna, in 
Sibiu. AMOR 1862/319. 
20. The income of most Greek Catholic canonic portions 
near Bistritz in 1862 was between 32 and 63 fl.; Retegan, 
"$colile sate9ti romaneqti din zona Bistritei la mijlocul 
secolului al XIX-lea," Marisia ll-12 (1981-82), 222. 
21. The urbarial court of Kronstadt ruled in 1861 that 
the 137 Joch of commons (urberi kozseg) in Bodola, 
Haromsz~k district, be divided equally between the Roman 
Catholic, Orthodox, and Reformed schools. Sibiu. AMOR, 
1861/268. 
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Reformed congregations, 39 of the 211 Roman Catholic, only 
seven of the Greek Catholic parishes, and very few of the 
22 
Unitarian and Orthodox ones. By the final compensation 
settlement in the 1860s, each bishopric received bonds whose 
annual payments were as follows: 
Lutheran 390,647 fl. 
Reformed 62,815 
Roman Catholic 47,055 30 kr. 
Greek Catholic 16,582 30 
Unitarians 1,613 
Orthodox 60 30 (23 
The interim payments made prior to the settlement in 1866 
approximated the above proportions. The kepe continued to 
be collected during the 1860s. It was not a percentage of 
the harvest but a set amount that was as much as one-sixth 
of the harvest for the poorest people. This injustice 
prompted some Szeklers to convert to Orthodoxy because the 
less-endowed, itinerant Romanian clergy did not collect the 
24 
kepe. 
Patronage (L. patronatus) was a form of economic sup-
port practiced to some degree in the Roman Catholic and 
Greek Catholic, but especially in the Reformed church, referred 
to earlier. It is reasonable to assume that patrons exercized 
an influence over the conduct of the pastors, though it is 
difficult to show evidence of this influence. Of the 211 
22. Grimm, Das Urbarialwesen in Siebenburgen, 116-21. 
23. Elek Jakab, ~ kiralyfoldi viszonyok ismertetese, I 
(Pest: Heckenast Gusztav, 1871), 154-6. Jakab's work is polemi-
cal in intent (arguing for the end of the autonomy of the Fundus 
Regius) and in citing these figures he ignores the more 
varied sources of income enjoyed by the clergy of the other 
churches. 
24. Imreh, A torvenyhozo szekely falu, 107-8. 
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Roman Catholic parishes, 53 were supported by a patron; only 
2.8% of the Greek Catholic parishes in Transylvania had 
patrons, but a much higher fraction of those in Hungary 
25 
proper. Many of these were in the politically volatile 
territory of the imperial mining authorities of the Muntii 
Apuseni. While Greek Catholic parishes here received an 
annual subsidy of 150-200 fl. from the mining authorities, 
those of the Roman Catholics received as much as double or 
26 
triple this amount. A form of patronage was widespread 
in all the communities of the Szekler region. They recog-
nized the duty to provide not only a canonic portion for the 
parish, but to provide separate land for the pastor and teacher 
27 
and to maintain their homes and the school. 
Another special characteristic of the Catholic churches 
of both rites was that their bishops and cathedral chapters 
were among the greatest landowners of Transylvania. The 
annual income of the Roman Catholic bishopric properties, at 
nearly sixteen thousand fl., was the second highest in Also-
Feher county after that of the royal treasury; the Reformed 
College in Nagyenyed was third, the Archbishopric of Blaj 
was seventh, and the Roman Catholic Cathedral Chapter was 
28 
eleventh. The bishops and canons of the cathedral 
chapters used this income to support the pastors and schools 
25. Draft of letter by Haynald to the Papal Nuncio, [August] 
1863, in Alba Iulia. ERC. 1863/1935 (Cat. l); Pacurariu, 225. 
26. Draft of $ulutiu to Franz Joseph, February 15, 1863, 
in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1863/81. 
27. Imreh, op. cit., 100-3. 
28. Table ''Alscifeh~rmegyei birtokok," 1n Alba Iulia. 
ERC. 1862/3028 (Cat. 37). 
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of the poorer parishes. The Catholic church also enjoyed 
the exclusive use of various endowments for the subsidiza-
tion of parishes, which were, however, under the control of 
the Habsburg authorities. Catholic laity and even the 
bishops periodically agitated for the return of these 
endowments to church control, but without success. The 
Orthodox diocese also possessed several endowments which 
29 
were similarly controlled by the state. 
Deriving much less benefit than the other churches from 
these means of support, the Romanian priests also collected 
a sort of tithe of their own called the lectical and also 
stola fees paid in kind for liturgical services like bap-
tisms, marriages, and funerals. These parishes most often 
lacked tithe compensation or canonic portions, and often 
preferred a priest candidate who possessed land in the 
30 
village or nearby. The most important source of fees was 
funerals; at this and other times, priests and even cantors 
collected knotted sweetbreads and prescura, a half pound of 
the latter from each parishioner per week. Prescura was a 
special bread baked in the form of a cross; in the large 
29. On the Romanian endowments, see Hitchins, 
Orthodoxy and Nationality, 236, and Onisifor Ghibu, 
Viata si organizatia bisericeasca ~ 9colara in Transilvania 
si Ungaria (Bucure9ti: Institutul de arte grafice "Nicolae 
Stroila", 1915), 52-5, 78-9. The summary by Ghibu is mis-
leading because many of the endowments were established 
after 1867. 
30. Retegan, "$colile rom~nesti din zona Bistritei," 
222; Gergely Moldovan, A romansag, II (Nagybecskerek: Pleitz 
Ferencz Pal, 1896), 22-3; Maria I. Negreaunu, Romanii din 
Tg.-Sacuesc si satele invecinate dupa condica Bisericir--
Ortodoxe din Tg.-Sacuesc (Bucure9ti: Institutul de Istorie 
Na~ionala din Bucure9ti, 1943), 19. 
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Romanian parishes of Zlatna in Also-Feher, as many as 25,000 
prescura were collected per year in the late nine-
teenth century. Parishioners sometimes also worked one or 
31 
two days a year on the priest;s land (claca). As 
happened in other countries in the nineteenth century where 
priests were forced to take such measures by economic 
straits, some parishioners accused the clergy of avarice and 
32 
a mingling of material with spiritual motives. 
Hungarians also complained about the collection of fees for 
funerals and weddings by the clergy, but this provided a 
33 
much smaller portion of their churches; income. 
Measured in monetary terms, the Romanian parishes were 
certainly the poorest. The rare foreigner who made contact 
with the Romanian village clergy reported that its educa-
tional level, economic means and social pretentions were 
much more modest than those of its Hungarian and Saxon 
counterparts. The Orthodox clergy survived primarily by its 
liturgical fees, and at times even by physical labor. The 
34 
Greek Catholic clergy was not much better off. The 
31. Moldovan, ~ magyarorszagi romanok (Budapest: sn, 
1913), 551-2. 
32. The poor Romanians of several villages in the 
Carpathians near Bistritz complained to Saguna in July, 1861 
that their pastor had doubled and tripled the charges for 
some services, and even cancelled services when the prescura 
was not forthcoming; Sibiu. AMOR, 1861/752. See also Eugen 
Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen. The Modernization of Rural 
France 1870-1914~anford: Stanford University Press, 
1976), 357-9, and Gregory L. Freeze, The Parish Clergy in 
Nineteenth-Century Russia. Crisis, Reform, Counter-Reform 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 57-65. 
33. Imreh, ~ torvenyhozo szekely falu, 104. 
34. John Paget, Hungary and Transylvania; with some 
remarks on their condition, social, political, and economi-
172 
failings of the clergy were likely greater than a bishop 
would admit publicly, so it is remarkable that Saguna ad-
35 
monished his clergy for careless dress and drunkenness. 
Most Romanian parishes had annual monetary incomes of 
around 50 fl., and only a few urban parishes and regional 
36 
vicariats enjoyed an income of from 200 to 500 fl. By 
contrast, the annual average of the tithe compensation alone 
for Saxon parishes was over 1000 fl., and many Unitarian 
37 
congregations collected an equal amount in land rents. 
One important consequence was in the ability of the churches 
cal (London: John Murray, 1850); D.T. Ansted,~ Short Trip 
to Hungary and Transylvania in the Spring of 1862 (London: 
W.H. Allen, 1862), 101-4; Boner, 366-71; see also Hitchins, 
Orthodoxy and Nationality, 236-7. Boner met individual 
Romanian priests whom he described favorably, but his chief 
source of information appears to have been the Saxons. This 
would account for his rather colorful statements about the 
manipulativeness and ignorance of the Romanian clergy and 
the "notorious" corruption of their bishops. Though Boner 
distinguishes it from bribery, others may have labeled cor-
rupt the Orthodox ordination fee (singhelie), paid by new 
appointments to parishes, which according to Hitchins was 
prescribed by canon law and was one of the few sources of 
income for the bishop. 
35. Nicolau Popea, Archiepiscopul ~ metropolitul 
Andreiu Baron de §aguna (Sibiiu: Tipariul tipografiei archi-
diecesane, 1879), 162-5. Popea cites pastoral letters of 
1846 and 1857; the latter is also in Tulbure, 428-30. 
36. Conspectus parochiarum (Reports by all arch-
diocesan pastors on parish membership, income and schools) 
in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG, 1862/533. 
37. Jakab, lee. cit.; Financial balances of the 
Unitarian congregations in Ro9ia Montana and Abrudbanya for 
1858-59, in Cluj-Napoca. Episcopia unitariana. Egyhazkep-
viseleti tanacs documents, 1861/140. Boner cites the sal-
aries of two Saxon parsons, 1100 and 2200 fl., of which the 
minister paid one-tenth in taxes. In his only remark about 
the Hungarian clergy, he states that they were badly paid, 
receiving as little as 200 to 500 fl. per year; "The 
(Hungarian Reformed) Protestant church will not receive pay 
from the State, as by doing so it is thought its freedom 
might be circumscribed." Boner, 297, 446, 518. 
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and parishes to maintain schools in the national language. 
(See Tables 8, 9 below). The Romanian clergy was therefore 
at strong disadvantage in its political struggle with the 
other nationalities' clergy, let alone with the Hungarian 
aristocracy and Saxon middle class. 
Nationalist ideology was one motive for the Romanian 
bishops' tactical alliance with the Austrian authorities in 
the 1860s; the opportunity for financial aid was another. 
In the 1863 state budget sudsidies to the Romanian churches 
accounted for thwo-thirds of the expenditure of the Transyl-
vanian Court Chancellery for religious and educational pur-
38 
poses. The subsidies subsequently distributed ranged 
from 50 to 100 fl., doubling the parish income in many 
39 
cases. Yet there is no direct evidence to support the 
contemporary Hungarian claim that the Austrians paid Saguna 
80,000 fl. for distribution among the clergy so that it 
40 
would "seduce the people" to support the regime." 
38. Reports by the Finance Ministry on the budget proposals 
(Staatsvoranschlag) for 1862 and 1863, in MOL D228, 
1862/153, 1863/23. 
39. In granting 24,000 fl. for the support of the Orthodox 
clergy in 1861, the state specified that the grants for 
individual priests be no less than 50 fl., or more than 100 fl. 
each-- Saguna's circular number 480 of May 28 (o.s.), in 
Tulbure, 442. The subsidy of 18,000 fl. to the Archdiocese 
of Blaj in 1863 was distributed to 212 different priests in 
amounts from 20 fl. to 100 fl., averaging 85 fl.; the list 
of the 212 grants is in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, CM, 784. 
40. The charge was raised by a szolgabiro in Also-
Feher, Mihaly Kolonte, on July 23, 1863. Kolonte's goal, 
according to the Orthodox pastor roan Benna, was to create 
fear among the people that the subsidies were only a means 
toward absolutist oppression. On August 20 Governor Crenne-
ville ordered an interrogation of Kolonte and the Romanian 
eyewitnesses, and nothing more was heard of the matter. 
MOL. F263. 1863/4887. In November, 1861, Kolonte had 
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Given the electoral law of these years, the Romanian voters 
were at any rate the wealthiest components of Romanian 
villages and unlikely to be "bribed" by such small sums. 
The Roman Catholic bishopric was itself the recipient of a 
subsidy of 20,000 fl. for its clergy in October, 1863 and it 
is instructive to contrast the mode of its distribution: not 
in small grants to a large number of parishes, but in grants 
41 
of 2000 to 4000 fl. to several parishes. The subsidy 
served not for general support, but for a few long-term 
construction projects. 
Naturally, the imperial subsidies to the Romanians did 
influence the attitudes of their clergy and laity indir-
ectly, particularly since many activists had a strong faith 
in the efficacy of education in improving the future of the 
nation. Bishop Haynald hoped to keep the dependence of his 
church on state subsidies to a minimum, but he worried that 
if he made public his opposition to the abolition of the 
kepe and the assumption of its redemption by the state this 
would be unpopular among the poorer Szeklers. In view of 
these political ramifications he sought to coordinate his 
42 
position with that of the Reformed Church. 
accused the Romanians of collecting weapons in preparation 
for an insurrection; AS Alba Iulia, Prefectura judetului 
Alba de jos 1861/1417. Without any indication of his source, 
Zoltan Szasz cites rumors that the Romanian clergy received 
the fantastic sum of 800,000 fl. to influence the voters--
Szasz, "Az abszolutizmus kora Erdelyben," 1494. 
41. Alba Iulia. ERC 1863/2350 (Cat. 4). 
42. Correspondence of Haynald and Ferenc Kemeny (former 
Court Chancellor and Head Elder of the Reformed Church), 
October 10 and 15, 1863, in Alba Iulia. ERC 1863/2367 Cat. 
37. 
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The size of the parishes reflected their available 
income and the distribution of the population (see Table 
7 above). A Roman Catholic pastor, since celibate, could live 
better on the same income. Due to their more elaborate 
liturgical practices, the eastern rite parishes also had to 
maintain (at least partially) personnel that were not 
generally included in calculations of the clergy. Gregory 
L. Freeze has argued in the case of the Russian church that 
Orthodoxy faced more formidable obstacles to economic 
rationalization in the nineteenth century than other 
churches because of the abundance of essential liturgical 
43 
practices and married functionaries. Throughout Europe 
in the nineteenth century the parishioner-clergy ratios 
rose, but for most of the respective religious groups the 
ratios in Transylvania were considerably lower than in 
44 
either western Europe or Russia during the same period. 
Thanks to their varied, generally superior economic support 
the churches in Transylvania could maintain more parish 
clergy than those elsewhere in Europe. 
The clergy was well provided for partly because it had 
useful services to provide the state: supplying birth records 
to the military and warning the people against social dis-
order and draft evasion, publicizing health regulations and 
43. Freeze, 64-5, 459. 
44. The ratio for the Catholic clergy in France was 752 
in 1848; for the Protestant clergy of northern Europe 
between 1847 and 1861 it ranged between 1054 and 3164; the 
ratio for Russian Orthodox parish priests (not including 
monks, who were very numerous) in 1860 was 1371. Comparative 
tables in Ibid., 64, 99. 
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45 
praying for the Emperor. The "recovery" of the Empress 
(her return from one of her periodic estrangements from the 
Emperor) in 1862 presented an opportunity for both Sulutiu 
and Haynald to demonstrate their loyalty to the Emperor by 
46 
ordering high masses. The annual Catholic high masses 
and Protestant services in honor of Franz Joseph's birthday 
on August 18 were political as well as religious rituals, 
which is evident from the controversies which surrounded 
47 
them in the 1860s. The function of liturgy 
for the state was another consequence of the clergy's status 
as civil servants. 
*** 
Official Religion and Popular Religion 
Civil duties aside, each pastor sought to inculcate the 
"official religion" or religious doctrine of his church. 
45. The Unitarian dean in Rimetea, Antal Koronka, 
responding to official complaints about the uncooperative-
ness of his clergy in providing birth records in April, 
1863, claimed that the military was disrespectful in its 
dealings with them; the local (Torda county) officials 
and the presbytery took the side of the clergy. Cluj-Napoca. 
Episcopia unitarianA, Egyh~zk~pviseleti tan~cs jegyz6k6nyve, 
1863/113. Responding to an official appeal for the clergy 
to assist the military recruitment, $ulutiu repeated it in 
his pastoral letter of May 13, 1862-- in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, 
FG 1862/371. A year later, he announced an imperial amnesty 
for draft resisters who had taken refuge in the Romanian 
Principalities-- in AS Alba Iulia. MRU, CM 782. Most 
fugitives came from the southern regions, where the Orthodox 
predominated. $aguna's circular of June 6 (o.s.), 1863 on 
the matter was an even stronger appeal to the resisters to 
return home; Sibiu. ABAOR, FS. 1845, 1849, 1869-70. 
46. Alba Iulia. ERC 1862/2182 (Cat. 2), and declaration 
of the Cathedral Chapter of Blaj, in Budapest. MOL, D228. 
1862/450. 
47. Imreh, ~ tory§n~hO~Q szekely falu, 103; See Chapter 
VIII. 
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"Popular religion" encompassed behavior patterns which 
48 
people developed out of "official religion." If the 
forms of popular religion do not offend official religion or 
clerical authority, the church may grant them its support. 
Hence the relationship between official and popular religion 
is generally a dynamic one, as each is nourished by the 
49 
other. The strict separation of the two categories is 
also difficult. On the other hand, truly excrescent forms of 
popular religion, called folk beliefs, may be strongly reli-
gious expressions which meet with clerical condemnation. 
The six Christian churches in Transylvania shared a 
basic religious culture founded on the Bible. Beyond the 
Bible, theological and political traditions in the churches 
provided differing answers to key questions which people 
were facing: nationalism and internationalism, lay and clerical 
influence, absolutism and liberty, conservatism and moderni-
ty. Roman Catholicism had a unique tradition of interna-
tionalism, Orthodoxy of conservation, and Unitarianism of 
liberal tendencies. The Protestant churches were prototypes 
for lay influence and for national identity, both tendencies 
on the rise everywhere in the nineteenth century. 
Local conditions and political tradition, more than 
doctrine, lent clarity to the attributes or "meanings" of 
the churches in Transylvania. All these churches existed 
48. G.J.F. Bouritius, "Popular and Official Religion in 
Christianity: Three Cases in Nineteenth-Century Europe," in 
Official and Popular Religion. Analysis of ~ Theme for 
Religious Studies (The Hague: Mouton, 1979), 118-20. 
49. This is the thesis of Bouritius, 117-65. 
178 
outside Transylvania as well. Their local emergence con-
firms the observation that in multiethnic or stratified 
societies, theological formulations can provide legitimacy 
and a pervasive identifying ethos for different social 
groups. The Protestant Konfessionsbildung in sixteenth-
century Transylvania, by neatly separating the Hungarians 
50 
and Saxons, fulfilled the same function. All six 
Christian churches in Transylvania were nearly homogeneous 
with rerspect to ethnicity: a fact of great significance in 
the nineteenth century, when nationality politics were of 
51 
great import. 
Transylvanian Unitarianism inspired political liber-
alism in such members as Sandor Boloni Farkas and Elek Jakab 
by its emphasis on religious toleration and "salvation by 
character," its adversarial relationship with the Habsburg 
Catholic Restoration, and its ties with the liberal 
Unitarians of Great Britain and the United States. An 
English Unitarian missionary to Transylvania in 1859 also 
50. L. Ferenc Lendvai, "Etnikurn es vallas," in 
Vilagossag 24 (1983), 467-76; John A. Armstrong, Nations 
before Nationalism (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1982), 201-40; Walter Daugsch, "Gegenrefor-
mation und protestanische Konfessionsbildung in Siebenburgen 
zur Zeit Stephan Bathorys (1571-1584)," in Luther und 
Siebenburgen. Ausstrahlungen von Reformation und Humanismus 
nach Sudosteuropa (Koln: Bohlau, 1985), 215-27. 
51. One of the earliest statistical analyses of the 
nationalities within the churches used the 1890 census. It 
showed that in each of the six churches within Transylvania 
one nationality comprised 89% or more of the total: Lutheran 
Germans, Hungarian Roman Catholics, Reformed and Unitarians, 
and Romanian Greek Catholics and Orthodox. Pal Balogh, A 
nepfajok Magyarorszagon (Budapest: Magyar kiralyi Vallas= es 
Kozoktatasi Miniszterium, 1902), 1072-73. 
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served as an emissary of the Kossuth emigration there, and 
in 1861 the Unitarian College in Kolozsvar was the first 
52 
school in Transylvania to teach English, in 1861. The 
experience of the Counterreformation also conditioned con-
siderable anti-Habsburg sentiment and liberal activism among 
the Hungarian Reformed, prompting some Hungarian Catholic 
courtiers to argue after 1849 that the Revolution had essen-
tially been the work of the Protestants. Many Reformed 
believed that the struggle for religious rights was one of 
the Protestant work ethic against ultramontane reaction. 
But it must be noted that Hungarian Reformed doctrine expli-
citly favored aristocratic control of the church through the 
presbyterial supervision and the patronage of congrega-
53 
tions. The Lutheran church comprised almost all of the 
52. Gy6rgy Szabad, "A lev~lt~ros ~s tbrt~netirci Jakab 
Elek p~lyak~p~hez," Lev~lt&ri k6zlem~nyek 44-5 (1976), 552; 
Tibor F. Fabiny, "Accounts and Images of English Unitarians 
on Transylvania. Three Visits: 1859-1879," in Acta 
Litteraria Academiae Scientarum Hungaricae 21 (1979), 132-5; 
Gyemant and Teodor, "Clujul in timpul revolutiei de la 1848-
1849 9i a regimului absolutist 9i liberal," in Pascu, ed., 
Istoria Clujului, 280-1. The episcopal presbytery praised 
the missionary extravagantly and urged the clergy to give 
him "all necessary assistance"; Cluj-Napoca. Episcopia 
unitariana, Egyh~zk~pviseleti tanacs jegyzokonyve 1859/168, 
200, 204. 
53. Friedrich Walter, "Die Beteiligung der magyarischen 
Protestanten in der Revolution 1848/49," in Gedenkschrift 
fur Harald Steinacker (1875-1965) (Munchen: Oldenbourg, 
1966), 267-76; Friedrich Teutsch, Die kirchlichen 
Verhaltnisse Siebenblirgens (Halle: Verlag von Eugen Strien, 
1906), 14-18. Mer Ballagi, the editor of the Protestans 
Eqyhazi es Iskolai Lapok of Budapest, was the leading 
spokesman in the 1860s of Reformed liberalism and the author 
of Die Protestantenfrage in Ungarn und die Politik Oster-
reichs (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1860) and A Protest-
antizmus harca az ultramontanizmus ellen (Pest: Osterlamm 
Karoly, 1867). ~he writer Lajos Tolnai, after serving as 
Reformed minister in Marosvasarhely from 1868 to 1884, wrote 
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Saxons. While it, too, had suffered from the Counterrefor-
mation, its strong German identity assured its political 
loyalty to the Viennese court. The establishment of a 
Transylvanian branch of the German Gustav Adolph Verein 
in 1861 to support the church there symbolized the fraternal 
54 
bond with Greater Germany. 
The political tradition, doctrine and practice of the 
three ritualistic churches contrasted in important ways 
with those of the Protestants. Succeeding chapters will 
show that all had a more or less comfortable relationship 
with the Habsburg authorities; in the case of the Orthodox, 
relations improved decidedly as the result of the Edict of 
Toleration of Joseph II in 1781. The most striking doc-
trinal commonality of these three churches, which contrasts 
with the Protestants, is in their interpretation of the 
"communion of saints" mentioned in the Apostles' Creed. 
While Protestants tend to limit the "saints" to those living 
in the Church, in the older interpretation the Church Mili-
tant (the living) appeals to the Church Triumphant (the 
saints in heaven) on behalf of the Church Suffering (in 
purgatory), while the Church Triumphant intercedes on behalf 
55 
of the other two. Intercessional prayer has tremendous 
a bitingly satirical memoir about the church oligarchy 
there, A sotet vilag (1894). 
54. Werner Conze, "Luthertum und Nationalismus--
Deutsch-Protestantismus," in Luther und Siebenbiirgen, 137-
53; Teutsch, Geschichte der evangelischen Kirche in Sieben-
burgen II, 408-11. 
55. Victor and Edith Turner, Image and Pilgrimage in 
Christian Culture. Anthropological Perspectives (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1978), 158-70, 204-6. 
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implications for iconography, popular piety, and pilgrimage 
practice. 
Doctrinal differences between these three churches 
concern papal primacy, the filiogue clause in the credal 
definition of the Trinity (rejected by the Orthodox), and 
veneration of statuary (only in Roman Catholicism) versus 
that of icons. Theologians have also contrasted the greater 
emphasis in Roman Catholicism on the Passion and suffering 
56 
and the Orthodox themes of resurrection and future glory. 
Aside from papal primacy, these distinctions have no overt 
political significance, but function on the popular level as 
ambiguous group syrnbols. The similarities in religious 
practice are more evident. 
Liturgical practice strongly divides the two groups of 
churches, but the ritualistic churches, to a lesser degree, 
as well. All celebrated the liturgy in the vernacular 
except for the Roman Catholics, who celebrated it in 
57 
Latin. Ritual was minimal among the Unitarians and 
Reformed, but relatively greater among the Lutherans. The 
eastern rite liturgies (matins, vespers, Eucharist, and a 
vast number of festival ceremonies and common blessings) 
required some twenty different liturgical books for prayers, 
scriptural readings and chants. These were published in 
56. Timothy Ware, The Orthodox Church (New York: 
Penguin, 1984), 38-42~18-23, 230-2, 238-9. 
57. The vernacular replaced Slavonic in the Romanian 
dioceses since at least the early eighteenth century, but 
became a subject of controversy among the Greek Catholics a 
century later; see Chapter VIII. 
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Romanian beginning in the seventeenth century, and old 
copies have been found in very many of the Transylvanian 
58 
Romanian parishes. The Romanian Greek Catholic and 
Orthodox liturgies differed in only minor details of wording 
59 
and music. The eastern rite, and to a lesser extent the 
Roman Catholics, practiced a far greater number of ritual 
blessings of food, animals, and buildings than is common 
today. These in turn gave rise to theologically dubious lay 
practices using holy water and foods, in which the ritual-
tic churches more closely resembled each other than they did 
60 
the Protestants. 
Linguistic and ecclesiastic influences led to religious 
syncretism among the Greek Catholics in particular. Contem-
poraries referred to the intrusion of Roman Catholic 
practices after the Church Union. These practices included 
58. It has been estimated that 2113 titles (in Slavic 
and Romanian language), mostly liturgical, were published in 
Transylvania, Wallachia and Moldavia between 1508 and 1830, 
comprising as many as two million copies; 508 have been 
found on the current territory of Alba county-- Doina Lupan, 
"Circulatia c~rtii vechi rom~ne~ti in jude~ul Alba," in 
Episcopia Ortodoxa romana de Alba Iulia, Indrumator pastoral 
2 (1978), 127-30. Andras Cserbak argues that the lack of 
Hungarian translations for ritual blessings accounts for the 
dying out of many popular religious practices, and hence the 
ethnic distinctiveness, of the Hungarian Greek Catholics, 
because the religious basis of these practices became 
obscure; "A magyar gbrog katolikus nepi vallasossag muvelodesi 
h~ttere," in Gabor Ttisk~s, ed., "Mert ezt Isten hagyta ... " 
Tanulmanyok ~ nepi vallasossag kor~bol~udapest: Magveto, 
1986), 300-2. Yet similar Roman Catholic practices survived 
and resisted "rationalization" despite the Latin language of 
ritual texts. 
59. Ghibu, 71. Ghibu noted that in his time the Greek 
Catholic priests delivered "incomparably more" sermons than 
the Orthodox ones; Ibid., 74. 
60. Elek Bartha, "A bizanci liturgia nyomai a 
n~phagyomanyban," in Tuskes, ed., 314-25. 
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the neglect of the veneration of oriental saints, crosses, 
icons and gospel books, and the gradual adoption of Roman 
Catholic saints, statuary, side altars, pews and collection 
boxes in the churches, and of rosary and other prayer forms, 
Marian veneration and feast days, catechisms, and forms of 
61 
address. Such syncretism was less widespread 
in Transylvania than among the Slavs and Romanians of 
northeastern Hungary, but all the more controversial because 
of the unstable numerical equilibrium between the Greek 
Catholics and Orthodox and the identification of "Latinism" 
with Hungarian influence there. 
Church buildings were the physical and symbolic center 
of parish life, or, in the metaphor of Mircea Eliade, "the 
center of the world." In ancient religions and in Christian 
practice the church was the center of the religious communi-
ty in this world, a cosmogenic symbol and an opening or gate 
into paradise. The eastern rite church opens the "imperial 
door" or Door of Paradise before the altar during the entire 
Easter week to express the Easter reading, "Christ rose from 
the grave and opened the doors of Paradise unto us." As 
"copy of the cosmos," the Byzantine church incarnates and at 
62 
the same time sanctifies the world. The iconostasis in 
an eastern rite church is a window into heaven, or a 
61. Cserbak, 284-93; Kligman, Wedding of the Dead, 61-
73. 
62. Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane. The 
Nature of Religion (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1959), 36-47, 61-2. 
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63 
"meeting place of heaven and earth." 
Many Transylvanian Romanian churches in 1860 were 
small, wooden structures, dark but often crowded with fres-
coes and icons illuminated eerily by flickering candles. 
The majority were built in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, as the Church Union expanded into new regions, 
but especially after many Orthodox churches and monasteries 
were destroyed by Austrian cannon during the religious 
revolt in Transylvania in 1756-61 and in the aftermath of 
64 
the peasant revolt of 1784-85. Parishes were generally 
too poor to employ prestigious foreign painters for their 
decoration. Icons and frescoes during this period were 
typically painted by local artists, like the Grecu brothers 
in the area around Hermannstadt. Between 1800 and 1818, the 
Grecu brothers painted frescoes in many village churches. 
Perhaps the most remarkable frescoes are those in which 
Christ is tortured by the same methods as was the leader of 
the peasant revolt of 1514, in which a man carrying Christ~s 
cross wears Romanian peasant garb, and in which the Roman 
63. Ware, 276-8. 
64. Of the 757 churches in the Archdiocese of Blaj in 
1900, 415 were of wood; Sematismul veneratului cler al 
Arhidiecezei mitropolitane greco-catolice romane de Alba-
Iulia ~ Fagara9 ~ anul 1906 (Blaj: Tipografia seminariului 
arhidiecezana, 1906), 329. On the destruction of Orthodox 
churches and monasteries see Silviu Dragomir, Istoria 
Desrobirei Religioase ~ Romanilor din Ardeal in secolul 
XVIII, II (Sibiu: Editura $i tiparul Tipografiei 
arhidiecezane, 1930), 234-42. A good brief description is 
Gabor Szinte, "Az erdelyi roman fatemplomok" [1913], 
republished in Peter Sas, , ed., Odon Erdely. ,. 
Muvelodestorteneti tanulmanyok, II (Budapest: Magveto, 
1986), 429-44. 
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soldiers wear the costume of Hungarian noblemen. 
Different regions of Transylvania had their own icon 
workshops and characteristic styles, of which that in Nicula 
near the Greek Catholic episcopal see of Szamosujvar was the 
most important. Even more "popular'' in form than the fres-
coes and icons on wood were the Transylvanian glass icons, 
not produced in any other land inhabited by Romanians. The 
artist portrayed religious scenes in a naive style on ordi-
nary panes of glass, and sold the icons at markets or on the 
feast day for the patron saint of a church. 
The relationship between of Romanian popular piety and 
folk art was especially vivid in the life of Picu Patrut 
(1818-72), an Orthodox sacristan, poet and miniaturist who 
lived in Saliste in southern Transylvania almost his entire 
life. He became a monk in the small monastery of Cheia in 
Moldavia in 1849 and returned to Saliste, living an ascetic 
life according to the rule of the Moldavian monastery of 
Neamt, teaching and serving the parish. In his lifetime he 
65. loan Fulea, "Biserici-monumente istorice, pictate de 
fratii Grecu," in Arhiepiscopia Si.!? .. :!:.~Jui= PMi:.!!i de j,_§torj,_§ 
(Sibiu: Tiparul tipografiei eparhiale, 1981), 211-26 (with 
six illustrations); Pacurariu, 315-20. A similar crucifixion 
scene was painted in 1809 in the wooden church at Sarta~ by 
an artist from Abrudbanya, the birthplace of ~ulutiu, in the 
Muntii Apuseni; I visited it in June, 1984. Secular influ-
ences may have caused a decline in church painting, at least 
among the Orthodox; Ghibu wrote, referring to these, 
"Aproape nici o biserica din cele cari s'au facut intre 1830 
qi 190 0 nu e pictatiL Opere de arta avem absolut putine." 
Ghibu confirmed the scarcity of old churches, but stated 
that the majority of churches were small, simple and devoid 
of art. He was probably less familiar with the Greek 
Catholic churches, which were far north of his south 
Transylvanian home.-- Ghibu, p. 29. 
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wrote roughly 500 verses, odes and ballads and produced some 
34,000 miniatures, drawing chiefly on biblical stories, 
inspired by his personal piety and by Romanian animal hus-
bandry and village life. None of his works were published 
during his lifetime, but his verses and religious plays were 
widely copied and performed, entering Romanian oral tradi-
tion anonymously. Only after his death did some of the most 
famous plays appear in print and his authorship of them 
66 
become known. 
Hungarian and Saxon churches, like the world of which 
they were "the center," presented a very different appearance. 
Many were the architectural monuments of Transylvanian 
Romanesque, Gothic, and Baroque that were visited and care-
67 
fully described by all the nineteenth-century travellers. 
Just as the smoky, mystical wooden churches were at the 
center of the Romanian community, we must consider the 
fortified churches of the Saxons, Hungarians and Szeklers 
and the Catholic Baroque the most important symbols for the 
dominant nationalities. Almost all of the Saxon churches 
were of medieval origin and surrounded by their own walls 
and towers, while ten to fourteen fortified Szekler churches 
66. Picu Patrut. Miniaturi ~ poezie (Bucure9ti: 
Asociatia Romania, 1985), with original verses and color 
miniatures by Patrut, and studies by other authors. 
67. Bal~zs Orb~n described how Bishop Haynald "tricked" 
the Szekler parisioners of Csikmenasag into taking better care 
of their sixteenth-century winged altar by suggesting that he 
would remove it to Gyulafehervar for safekeeping; today it is 
in the Hungarian National Museum in Budapest. ~ Szekelyfold 
le{rasa, II (Pest: Rath Mor, 1869), 41; see also Virgil 
Bierbauer, "A Szekelyfold templomairol," [1942], in Sas, 
ed., II, 403-28. 
187 
existed during our period. The greatest period of the 
fortified churches' construction was the fifteenth and six-
teenth centuries. At that time the Saxon settlements were 
regularly threatened by Turkish incursions; the inhabitants 
took refuge within the walls, which were equipped with 
granaries and apartments, for months at a time. The Saxons 
in the nineteenth century were conscious of the symbolic 
importance of the fortified churches; despite the general 
tendency to destroy "useless" walls elsewhere in Europe, 
this happened very rarely among the Saxons. In medium-sized 
towns like Biertan (the seat of the Lutheran bishop), 
Cristian and Cisnadie, they symbolized the colonizing and 
military past and Saxon self-sufficiency and conservatism. 
The stark Lutheran interiors allowed only the medieval altar 
pieces, Turkish rugs that were preserved as another military 
reminder, Latin and German inscriptions and the ubiquitous 
organs which made their appearance in the eighteenth 
68 
century. 
The restoration of Catholicism in the eighteenth 
century brought the expropriation of many Protestant churches 
for the revitalized Catholic parishes, but more importantly 
a major building program and the restyling of other churches' 
interiors. Pietas austriaca was the spiritual theme of the 
68. Hermann and Alida Fabini, Kirchenburgen in 
Siebenburgen. Abbildung und Selbstdarstellung siebenburgisch-
sachsischer Dorfgemeinschaften (Koln: Hermann Bohlaus 
Nachf., 1986), 8-10, 192-203; Alfred Prox, "Szekler Kirchen-
burgen," in Zeitschrift fur Siebenblirgische Landeskunde 9 
(1986), 26-30. 
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Habsburg resurgence throughout the empire: the expansion of 
education by the teaching orders, the veneration of 
"Austrian" saints like St. John Nepomuk but most of all the 
propagation of Baroque art. Architecture, statuary, and 
painting, like the Habsburg military and officialdom, 
brought with them a powerful impression of the alliance 
69 
between the dynasty and the universal church. The 
Transylvanian capital city of Kolozsvar, which surrendered 
this status periodically to Hermannstadt in the eighteenth 
century and then again in 1863-65, became the chief point of 
radiation for the Transylvanian Baroque. Many Roman 
Catholic, and even many Protestant, churches erected in the 
major cities of the province imitated the Jesuit, Franciscan 
and Minorite churches in Kolozsvar as did the Greek Catholic 
cathedral in Blaj. The Greek Catholic and Orthodox churches 
in Kolozsvar combined traditional Romanian and Baroque ele-
ments and also found imitators as the Romanians gained the 
right to reside in and erect churches in other major cities 
70 
in this period. The Catholic pretension to a special 
relationship with the empire was confirmed by the Concordat 
in 1855, but, as we will see, this relationship had contra-
dictory implications for Bishop Haynald. 
Due to wealth or age, Saxon and Hungarian churches 
69. Historians have drawn a connection between Baroque 
art and the concept of social hierarchy of that age; see 
Otto Weiss, "Der Ultramontanismus. Grundlagen--Vorgeschichte--
Struktur," Zeitschrift fur bayerische Landesgeschichte 
41 (1978), 844-5. 
70. Mircea ~oca, Clujul baroc (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 
1983), 116-25. 
189 
could afford European, hence less popular or local, artistic 
decoration. Like the painters of Romanian glass icons, 
local artists or merchants also sold parishioners such arti-
cles of home devotion as statuary (among the Catholics) and 
pictures. In comparison to the Romanian material, there has 
been little research on the religious folk art of the 
Hungarians and Saxons of Transylvania. 
A pilgrimage shrine could have an influence on the 
popular religion of an entire region or catchment area, 
71 
known by anthropologists as a Sakrallandschaft. 
Pilgrimages were among the most striking points of contact 
between official and popular religion in the ritualistic 
churches. Hungarian pilgrimage places came about as the 
result of a pledge of regular visitation and prayer by 
individual lay people after they were saved from a disaster 
72 
like an epidemic or invasion or experienced a vision. 
Church authorities, initially wary of claims about a vision 
or miraculous picture, came to accept the pilgrimage as a 
proper form of intercessional prayer directed toward a 
saint. Yet the pilgrimage is a distinctive form of pious 
activity in that it is initiated by individual lay persons 
and does not require the participation of the clergy in most 
of its stages. The pilgrimage is a temporary withdrawal or 
escape from the tensions and divisions of the local communi-
71. The term originated with Georg Schreiber; cited by 
Elek Bartha, ~ hitelet ne~rajzi vizsgalata ~ zempleni 
faluban (Debrecen: KLTE Neprajzi tanszeke, 1980), 21. 
72. S~ndor Balint, "Adatok a magyar bcics6j~ras neprajz~­
hoz," Ethnographia 50 (1939), 193. 
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ty to a larger community represented by fellow believers 
73 
from other localities. Each shrine has its principal 
festival dates, customs and historical themes. Pilgrims are 
bombarded with historical symbols and associations. It is 
important for us to examine the history of several Hungarian 
and Transylvanian pilgrimages for what they tell us about 
the self-perception of the Orthodox and Roman and Greek 
Catholic communities. 
Like elsewhere in the world, the pilgrimages of Hungary 
and Transylvania in the mid-nineteenth century can be placed 
into four main categories: international, national, regional, 
and intervillage. Those with the widest geographical appeal 
attracted more pilgrims from the wealthiest classes, while 
those at the opposite end of the scale were pilgrimages of 
74 
the local peasantry. 
The principal shrines in Hungary and Transylvania, like 
most modern pilgrimages in other countries, were Marian 
shrines. Since the Council of Ephesus in the fifth century, 
Mary has been considered the leading saint and supreme 
75 
intercessor with God. Hungary and Poland were the only 
countries in nineteenth-century Central Europe for which the 
73. Turner, 7-9; the authors state that " ... there is 
something inveterately populist, anarchical, even anticleri-
cal, about pilgrimages in their very essence."--31-2. 
74. Turner, 238-9. Their model is based on Catholic 
shrines of Western Europe and North America, but corresponds 
to a similar scheme for Hindu shrines in India. 
75. Ibid., 148-52. The increase in Marian devotion and 
in the membership of female religious orders in nineteenth-
century Transylvania, like elsewhere in Europe, accompanied 
the relative feminization of lay piety and religious personnel. 
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Virgin Mary held the status of patron saint. St. Stephen 
ascribed his victory to Mary, the "Great Lady of Hungary" 
and Maria Theresa gave Hungary the title Regnum Marianum in 
the eighteenth century. Most Hungarian coins struck between 
1458 and 1848 carried the portrait of Mary with child on one 
76 
side and the inscription Patrona Hungariae. 
The most revered shrine of Austrian and Hungarian 
Catholics in the nineteenth century was Mariazell in Styria. 
The Hungarian King Lajos had dedicated a chapel to Our Lady 
of Hungary there in 1363 following a victory over the 
77 
Turks. I noted in Chapter I the political significance 
of the pilgrimage there led by Scitovszky in 1857. 
Two pilgrimage shrines of the Transylvanians belonged 
to the second category because of their broad geographical 
catchment area, social prestige and national symbolism: 
csiksomlyo and Mariapocs. cs1ksomlyo will be discussed in 
76. Arnold Ipolyi, Magyar mythologia (Budapest: Zajti Ferencz, 
1929), vol. 1, 80-1; Kernel Fux and Zsuzsanna Holgyene Angeletti, 
Magyar penzermek es pa~irpenzek (Budapest: Tankonyvkiado, 1981), 
48-73; Emil Unger, "Szuz Maria alakja a magyar penzeken," 
Vigilia 1987/5, 328-32. Turner notes that while Mary is the 
most universal saint, she "has in practice become, in each 
of her numerous images, exclusive patroness of a given 
community, region, city or nation. Wherever she has become 
such a symbol of xenophobic localism, political structure 
has subverted commmunitas."--171. 
77. Rudolf Kriss, Wallfahrtsorte Europas (Munchen: Hornung-
Verlag, 1950), 81-5; Helene Grun et al., Via Sacra. Das 
Wallfahrtsmuseum in Kleinmariazell (Wien: Im Selbstverlag 
des Osterreichischen Museums fur Volkskunde, 1977). 
Hungarian ethnographers have conducted extensive studies of 
the Hungarian pilgrimages, especially the late Balint 
Sandor, whose papers include material on 29 different pil-
grimages-- Gabor Tuskes, "A nepi vallasossag kutatasa 
Magyarorszagon. Tudomanyt6rteneti attekintes," in Tuskes, 
ed. , 58. 
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Chapter VI. The church in Mariapocs, a village now located 
in Szabolcs county of present-day Hungary, became a shrine 
after tears were reported on its painting of Mary in 1696 
and 1715. Catholic Church and Habsburg officials confirmed 
the reports, and the church drew increasing numbers of 
pilgrims. In 1731 a Greek Catholic church was built there 
in Baroque style, and 25 years later a monastery for the 
Greek Catholic monks who played a major part in the adminis-
tration of the pilgrimage. The veneration at Mariapocs was 
Austrian Baroque in origin, and it attracted Hungarian, 
Ruthenian and Romanian Catholics of both rites. All three 
peoples contributed their own customs to the ethnography of 
the pilgrimage, but their common worship was a major factor 
in the religious syncretism and Magyarization of the Greek 
78 
Catholics in the surrounding area. 
Mariapocs was the chief shrine for the more 
Hungarophile Romanian Greek Catholics of the diocese of 
Nagyvarad and bordering areas of Transylvania. At the be-
ginning of the twentieth century there were several annual 
feasts attracting different social and ethnic categories of 
pilgrims, for an estimated total of 400,000 per year. Like at 
other Hungarian pilgrimages, pilgrims to Mariapocs brought--
or bought-- locally-made wax offertory figurines. Such 
large gatherings of people with time took on the character 
78. Cserbak, 304-5. The aesthetic aspect of monastery 
liturgies is important for their role as shrines, especially in 
the eastern rite. Outstanding icons and music heightened 
the religious experience. 
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of a modern carnival, with not only hymnsinging and prayers 
79 
but also a heavy commerce in holy pictures and souvenirs. 
There is little written record of the regional pil-
grimages in Transylvania. Very little has been written 
about the pilgrimages frequented chiefly by Romanians. The 
attendance of many Hungarians of the wealthier classes at 
the national pilgrimages in Austria and Hungary attracted 
the attention of the secular, urban intellectuals. There 
were few wealthy Romanians, and they may have attended 
Hungarian shrines with an eye to their own prestige. 
Orthodox pilgrimage tradition generally centered around 
monasteries, yet most of the monasteries in Transylvania 
were destroyed in the eighteenth century. There are reports 
of two Greek Catholic Marian shrines which were regional 
pilgrimage centers for the Transylvanian Romanians, Bikszad 
in Maramaros county and Nicula, the site of the glass icon 
workshop near Szamosujvar. Each was the location of a 
80 
medieval monastery predating the church union. 
The history of the Hungarian regional pilgrimage on 
Szent-Anna-t6 (Lake St. Anne) in the mountains between Cs1k 
and Haromszek merits examination because it illustrates 
several aspects of the relationship between folk belief, 
popular religion and the official church at a pilgrimage. 
79. B~lint, 193-8; Cserb~k, 305; Peter H~rsfalvi, "A 
magyar Lourdes: Mariapcics," Hist6ria 5, 5-6 (1983), 55-8. . 
The article by Harsfalvi, and the report on Mariapocs by Oszkar 
Jaszi in 1910 on which it is partly based, are ironic and 
anticlerical in tone. 
80. Cserbak, 304. on Bikszad and Nicula, see Chapter 
VIII. 
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Some people believed that the Szeklers had built an altar to 
a pre-Christian god by the side of the lake. After the 
Christianization of the country the altar was destroyed, and 
a chapel dedicated to St. Anne built in its place. Another 
local legend explained the origin of the lake and the chapel 
differently. It stated that a local maiden, Anne, called 
down a curse on an oppressive landlord and his castle. 
Because the curse was justified, God destroyed the castle 
and created the lake in its place. As a result Anne built a 
chapel by the side of the lake and lived a holy life there-
after. The semiannual pilgrimages attracted twenty thousand 
people during some years in the nineteenth century. The 
officers corps of the Szekler border regiment participated 
in the pilgrimage procession, music and dances. The cele-
brations became increasingly disorderly, and finally the 
81 
pilgrimage was banned. In 1860 a respected local seer 
(mondo ember) announced that the saint had appeared to him 
and declared that life in the Szekler region and the politi-
cal situation in Hungary would not improve until the pil-
grimage was revived. No clergymen responded to his an-
nouncement, but many people followed his call to assemble 
there on St. Anne~s day. He appealed to Haynald for the 
82 
reestablishment of the pilgrimage, but without success. 
81. Similarly, the Apostolic Visitor to the Csango 
region of Moldavia reported that one village pilgrimage 
there gave rise to disgraceful drunkenness and parodies of 
the Orthodox clergy. Giuseppe Tomassi to Cardinal Barnabo, 
December 10, 1858, in DSSS, 383-4. 
82. Orban, III (1869), 73-5. One version of the legend 
cited by Orban appeared in the 1861 issue of the Haromszek 
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The Catholic pilgrimage to Borszek at the end of the 
resort season there on St. Stephen's day, August 20, was 
apparently less objectionable to the church authorities. 
Orb~n remarks that "half the Gyergyci region" regularly at-
83 
tended. 
Small-scale, intervillage pilgrimages, like the "valley 
shrines" of Spain, may relate most directly to the pilgrim's 
everyday life. The association with a lake or holy fountain 
84 
and its pre-Christian tradition is common at shrines. 
Records of local pilgrimages are extremely rare, but it is 
known that the feast days of churches' patron saints fre-
quently attracted visitors from outside the immediate parish. 
The sites of former Romanian monasteries that had been 
destroyed in the eighteenth century fall into this category; 
parish priests would appear there on such feast days to 
minister to the pilgrims. Such appears to have been the 
case with the Orthodox monastery church at Rimeti in an 
isolated gorge in the Muntii Apuseni. The monastery was 
destroyed twice in the eighteenth century, when its monks 
rallied the people during the religious revolt of 1756-61, 
then again after the peasant revolt in 1785. The church was 
yearbook. Ipolyi, II, 254, noted the pilgrimage in passing. 
Johann Michael Salzer, a professor at the Gymnasium in 
Mediasch, visited the lake between 1855 and 1857. He wrote 
that the chapel was a ruin, but pilgrims still came there 
every year on St. Anne's day carrying crosses and wreaths of 
roses-- Salzer, Reisebilder aus Siebenburgen (Hermannstadt: 
Theodor Steinhaussen, 1860), 125. 
83. Orban, II, 121. 
84. Turner, 239; William A. Christian, Jr., Person and 
God in ~ Spanish Valley (New York: 9eminar Press, 1972-)-,-61-
78; Ipolyi, II, 248; Salzer, 124; Balint, 196. 
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dedicated to the Spring of Healing or Spring of the Mother 
of God, the only Orthodox Marian feast during the week of 
Easter. On this day, people came to receive water from the 
fountain under the church that had been blessed by the local 
85 
priest. The Roman Catholics near Toplita, in Torda 
county on the border of Csik, gathered during the nineteenth 
century at a newly built chapel near some old ruins on the 
feast of SS. Peter and Paul. The Szeklers believed that the 
ruins marked the site of a Hungarian monastery, but more 
likely they were the remains of a destroyed Orthodox 
86 
monastery. The Romanians of several villages north of 
Reghin maintained the oral tradition of a medieval Orthodox 
monastery there, and annually assembled at its ruins on 
87 
Pentecost. 
A peculiarity of Transylvanian Orthodox piety was the 
85. Emilian [Birda9, Orthodox] Episcop de Alba Iulia, 
"Manastirea Rime,t.i, vatra de spiritualitate ortodoxa," in 
Episcopia Ortodoxa Romana de Alba Iulia, Indrumator 
pastoral 5 (1981), 116-36. When I visited the monastery 
(rebuilt in 1941) during the feast on April 27, 1984, 
several hundred local people from nearly villages came with 
containers to collect water from the fountain. On the feast 
day, see The Year of Grace of the Lord. A Scriptural and 
Liturgical Commentary on the Calendar of the Orthodox Church 
(Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1980), 
181. 
86. Orban, II, 137. The latter conclusion was reached 
by the historian Laszlo Kovary. Laszlo Szekely lists eleven 
other intervillage shrines in csik and Gyergyo, with their 
pilgrimage dates: "A csiki szekelyek aszk4zise," Vigilia 
42,3 (1977), 164. 
87. Nicolae Feier, "Manistirea "Ruga" de la Gledin. 
Legenda sau istorie?," in Arhiepiscopia Ortodoxa Rom&na a 
Vadului, Feleacului 9i Clujului, Indrumator bisericesc, 
misionar ~patriotic 8 (1985), 85-7. No such ruins could 
be identified by the author, but he cites three folk songs 
about the monastery's founding. 
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veneration of shrines in the Romanian Principalities. 
Several monasteries and bishoprics in the valleys on the far 
slope of the Carpathians long exerted an influence in 
Transylvania, and were commonly visited by transhumant 
shepherds. The ballad of Master Manole, dealing with the 
medieval founding of the Arge9 Monastery, was popular in 
88 
Transylvania as well as Wallachia. The hermitage in the 
Ialomita gorge across the border from Kronstadt attracted 
many visitors from Transylvania, who ascribed healing powers 
to the monks there. In cases of incurable disease, wrote 
Salzer, the Ialomita hermitage was the last resort. He knew 
of a Romanian from near Mediasch who sold his livestock in 
1856 to finance a pilgrimage to Ialomita with his ill 
89 
son. 
Transylvanian shrines were often also the sites of 
gatherings not strictly religious in nature, but that were 
important social events and interconfessional: health resorts 
and matchmaking fairs. Shrines often developed around 
springs, and in the case of Borszek the resort (of nineteenth-
century provenance) and the shrine coincided. The most 
88. Mircea Eliade discusses Romanian and Balkan 
variants of the ballad and its controversial relationship 
with the Hungarian construction myth about the citadel of 
Deva in Hunyad county; "Master Manole and the Monastery of 
Arges," in Eliade, Zalmoxis, the Vanishing God. Comparative 
Studies in the Religions and Folklore of Dacia and Eastern 
Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 164-90. 
Chapter IX will discuss the Transcarpathian bishoprics and 
transhumance in greater detail. 
89. Salzer, 183-4. Boner apparently visited the same 
hermitage (Boner, 281-2), but took a more lugubrious view of 
its inhabitants and their lifestyle. 
198 
important resort in nineteenth-century Transylvania, 
Elopatak in Haromszek, was not in itself a religious shrine. 
The cream of Transylvanian society congregated there each 
summer, including several bishops, and aristocrats and 
royalty from neighboring countries as well. The Romanian 
bishops would meet each other and their colleagues and other 
90 
political leaders from south of the Carpathians. Prince 
Milos Obrenovic of Serbia spent much of his exile there and 
built an Orthodox church before his return to the throne in 
1858. On the opposite end of the social scale, the match-
making fair (leanyvasar, tirgul de fete) was a basic 
institution for both Hungarians and Romanians. It was the 
chief means for young peasants to meet marriageable counter-
parts from other villages. Two of the most important mating 
fairs were at the Greek Catholic pilgrimage to Mariapocs on 
the feast of the prophet Elijah, July 20, and in the Gaina 
range of the Muntii Apuseni near the watershed of three 
rivers. Priests performed the betrothal ceremonies, which 
were accompanied by traditional dances and dramatic perfor-
mances. Not only Hungarian Catholics, but Reformed as well 
91 
often frequented the matchmaking fairs at nearby shrines. 
The celebration of church feasts was a community event 
in ordinary villages as well as at the major shrines. The 
major church seasons and feasts-- Advent and Christmas, New 
Years and Epiphany, Lent and Easter, and Pentecost-- fea-
90. On the connection of 9aguna and $ulutiu with 
Elopatak, see VIII-IX. 
91. Balint, 198. 
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tured many popular customs, of which the most colorful were 
the dramatic presentations. Among the best-known were the 
nativity plays (bethlehemes jatekok) performed by groups of 
ten Roman Catholic villagers in the Szekler region during 
92 
the Christmas season. Somewhat similar were the Romanian 
Christmas plays, called Irozii (Kings or Magi). Picu Patrut 
composed several between 1837 and 1841, which were widely 
performed thereafter. The Roman Catholic tradition of pas-
sian plays was unknown among the Romanians, but Patrut wrote 
a Romanian passion play in 1852. It became known throughout 
93 
the Sali9te area and as far away as Blaj and Kronstadt. 
Despite ethnic and local variations too numerous to mention, 
it is fair to emphasize the basic similarity of the reli-
gious themes. This was true especially in Transylvania, 
where the nationalities shared many customs that were un-
94 
known in Hungary proper. The clergy led public 
liturgical processions on the most important feast days, but 
92. The performers were welcome in neighboring vil-
lages, including many Protestant ones, during Christmas 
week. In the Szekler Bethlehem play cited by Orban (II, 
151-6), the dialogue of the five shepherds includes many 
Romanian passages. Orban explains this fact by the desire 
for a more realistic portrayal, since most shepherds in the 
region were Romanians. It is plausible that some of the 
players were partially Magyarized Greek Catholics; see 
Chapter VII. 
93. Octavian Ghibu and Cri9an Mircioiu, "Repere privind 
viata si opera lui Picu Patrut," in Picu P~trut, 39. 
94. Geza Roheim, Magyar nephit es-nepszokasok (Budapest: 
Athenaeum, 1925), 334-9; Tekla Domotor, Naptari unnepek--
nepi sz{njatszas (Budapest: Akademiai kiado, 1979), 95. The 
Pentecost dances of the Lutheran Csangos south of Kronstadt 
(Roheim, 205-13) were unlike those of any other Hungarians, 
but similar to the Romanian calu2 practiced in both 
Transylvania and south of the Carpathians. 
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other public processions of modern or older origin were also 
common. For instance, the young men of the town of Gyergyo-
szentmiklos would mark the beginning of Lent by conducting 
the pastor from the rectory to church for the Ash Wednesday 
mass while singing the Rak6czi March, while every Easter the 
people of Szekler villages would conduct a procession around 
their crops and pray for a good harvest. These customs were 
most common among Roman Catholics, but also practiced by 
other communities. It is often difficult to determine 
whether they developed from pre-Christian practices or from 
Christian liturgies that the other religious groups later 
95 
abandoned. Many holiday customs transcended ethnic 
differences, and in the case of the dramatic ones the 
dividing line was most often between the ritualistic 
churches and the Protestants. 
From the fifteenth century on the Hungarians, regard-
less of religion, commonly used names for the months based 
on the church feasts. They were still common in Hungarian 
correspondence in the 1860s: 
95. Balint, "H~sv~ti vall~sos n~pszok~saink," 
Ethnographia 48 (1937), 54-61; Dom6t6r, Naptari unnepek, 
202-6. Orban (vol. 2, 105) noted the custom in Gyergy6-
szentmiklos. The Rakoczi March reinforced national identi-
ty, since Rakoczi had fought against the Habsburgs in the 
early eighteenth century. 
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Boldogasszony hava 
Bojtelo hava 
Bojtmas hava 
Szent Gyorgy hava 
Plinkosd hava 
Szent Ivan hava 
Szent Jakab hava 
Kisasszony hava 
Szent Mihaly hava 
Mindszent hava 
Szent Andras hava 
Karacsony hava 
Month of the Blessed Virgin 
First Month of Lent 
Second Month of Lent 
Month of St. George 
Month of Pentecost 
Month of St. John 
Month of St. James 
Month of the Assumption 
Month of St. Michael 
Month of All Souls 
Month of St. Andrew 
Month of Christmas 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December (96 
Most churches used the Gregorian calendar, but the Greek 
Catholics and Orthodox used the Julian calendar, which was 
twelve days later, for their liturgical cycle. This and 
other pecularities of the liturgical calendar meant that the 
dates of religious feast days, the chief community celebra-
tions, were different for the Romanians. Since baptism, 
confirmation, and as a rule weddings, Christening relations 
(Godparents) and elementary schools were separated according 
to religion, this meant that the Romanians shared almost no 
social events with the other nationalities. The disjuncture 
of calendars grows in significance if one considers that 
calendar customs are generally oriented toward large groups, 
hence community-building. The life-cycle customs, more 
strictly controlled by the churches, do not build community 
in the same way because they are performed for individuals, 
97 
hence atomizing. 
96. Domotor, Naptari unnepek, 52. 
97. Victor Turner, The Ritual Process (Chicago: Aldine, 
1969), cited by Kligma~Calu9. Symbolic Transformation in 
Romanian Ritual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1981), 134. Katherine Verdery points out the segregation of 
community life between Romanians and Germans in a southern 
Transylvanian village for religious and economic reasons: 
Transylvanian Vilagers. Three Centuries of Political, 
202 
Differences in the church calendar also affected work 
practices, since the churches discouraged physical work on 
feast days and fasting often reduced the capacity to work. 
The eastern church had forty feast days in addition to 
Sundays when work was discouraged, and fast days, much more 
strict than even those of the Roman Catholics, comprised one 
98 
third to over half of the year. Baritiu charged that 
the large number of holidays in the Romanian churches was an 
obstacle to economic and cultural progress. He appealed to 
the priests: "Dear fathers, let us not keep the people in 
blindness, let us not force them to observe the church 
99 
holidays." County officials complained in 1862 that the 
Romanian clergy was encouraging people to believe that natural 
disasters could be prevented by abstaining from work on not 
only the established holy days, but others as well. 9ulutiu 
denounced such a view as "superstition" and assured his 
flock that diligence was the chief source of material well-
Economic, and Ethnic Change (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1983), 243-5. 
98. Ware, 304-7. Kligman cites a figure of 200 days 
(The Wedding of the Dead, 62); Boner, one-half (p. 426); 
Aurel Radutiu's historical study yields a far lower figure 
for state-approved holidays: "Timp de lucru ~i zile de 
sarbatoare in Transilvania (sec. XVII-XVIII)," in 
Civilizatie medievala si moderna romaneasca. Studii 
istorice (Cluj-Napoca:~ditura Dacia, 1985), 215-33. Boner 
cited a contemporary writer's view that the harshness of 
Orthodox fasting led to a greater number of murders during 
Lent, and suggested that fasting "may also have something to 
do with the indolence of the people." 
99. Articles in Calindarul pentru poporul romanesc, 3-4 
(1854-5), cited by Gh.E. Marica, "George Baritiu, editor ~i 
redactor al "Calindarului pentru poporul rom&nesc," (1852-
1865)," in Marica, Studii de istoria 2i sociologia culturii 
romane ardelene din secolur-al XIX-lea, II (Cluj-Napoca: 
Dacia, 1978), 46-.-- --
203 
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being. 
Such clerical admonitions against popular outgrowths of 
traditional Christian practices had become rare by the nine-
teenth century. Protestant ministers during the Reformation 
railed against identifiably Catholic or nonscriptural prac-
tices such as the dramatic presentations and the blessing of 
101 
crops and buildings. Their sanctions were mostly sue-
cessful, while the non-Protestant clergy was less disturbed 
by these practices and they survived in their communities. 
An ironic consequence was that Protestant villagers were 
sometimes not only attracted to the Catholic dramatic 
presentations for entertainment, but would resort to the 
services of the Catholic clergy for the blessing of crops, 
animals and buildings. Rituals for special circumstances 
appealed to the peasants' sense of magic, and they might go 
to churches other than their own if it did not offer satis-
fying rituals. For this reason many Hungarians and Saxons 
regarded masses or curses said by Romanian priests to be 
especially effective, and would request them in cases of 
102 
great need or enmity. 
100. Also-Feher county to Crenneville, May 9, 1862; 
Crenneville to $ulutiu, May 10, 1862; pastoral letter of 
$ulutiu, July 28, 1862-- AS Alba Iulia. MRU, FG. 1862/565. 
101. D6mot6r, Naptari unne~ek, 153-6. 
102. Olga Nagy, "Vallasos elet Havadon. A n~pi vall~sos­
sag mint integr~lci er6," in Trisk~s, ed., 502-3. A Hungarian 
ethnographer reported that Szeklers sometimes had an 
Orthodox mass said at the time of their Catholic wedding in 
order to "fix" it. Lajos Bal~zs, "Adatok a Cs{kszentdomo-
kosi lakodalom egykori hiedelemvilag~hoz," in Acta 
Hargitensia I (Miercurea-Ciuc, 1980), 248. The practice 
may derive from the former religious adherence of the people 
involved, as the village earlier had a large number of 
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Many beliefs concerning curses, spirits and death were 
prevalent in rural society. Transylvanians of all nation-
alities and religions, for instance, continued during the 
1860s to bury the dead with articles that would assist them 
on their journey to heaven: bread, candles, and money. 
Boner wrote that many Saxons and Szeklers believed in 
witches, while an Orthodox priest asserted that "the bad 
harvest was owing to the number of witches in the land, and 
103 
it would not be better until they were exterminated.'' 
Urban intellectuals viewed such customs scornfully, as sup-
erstitions. The case of the exhumation of a person believed 
to be a strigoi (witch) in August, 1862 is instructive. 
Members of the Romanian village of Pe9teana in Hunyad county, 
which was suffering from a cattle plague, sought to right 
their misfortune by digging up the suspected person and 
impaling him. The prefect complained indignantly to 
Governor Crenneville about the incident, and he called on 
$ulutiu to impress upon his clergy and people the shameful-
ness of the practice. $ulutiu delivered the requested ad-
monishment, after a delay of two months, in his circular of 
November 22. Describing the practice in detail, he concluded: 
Magyarized Greek Catholics; see Chapter VII. 
103. Roheim, 163-78; Boner, 368. Referring to the 
Romanian spells relating to the weather, the Saxon Friedrich 
Muller wrote in 1854 (Beitrage zur §es~hich!~ deE He~e~~ 
glaubens unq ges Bex~Q~~9~~§SeE iQ §iebenEurgen) that 
Romanian priests were experts in the prevention of hail; 
cited by Ovidiu Birlea, ~§!Oria folcloristicii romane$ti 
(Bucure9ti: Editura enciclopedica romana, 1974), 113. 
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Therefore we remind you and demand, as we have repeat-
edly in the past, to unceasingly ensure that such 
abuses, harmful to religion and compromising to our 
nation itself, not happen again. ( 104 
Whether or not Romanian clergymen of the type described by 
Boner were common, ?ulutiu considered such incidents harmful 
to national prestige. 
Church records of the period are not as informative 
about popular religion and folk beliefs as later ethnographic 
studies would lead one to hope. Higher education predis-
posed many clergymen to be unsympathetic to popular prac-
tices despite their rural origins. Popular dances, songs, 
and legends were often suspect because of the pre-Christian 
105 
beliefs which underlay many of them. Hence the periodic 
church regulations against dancing and singing did not arise 
solely from moral Puritanism. Despite the vividness of 
Roman Catholic popular religion, it is interesting that 
Roman Catholic clergymen were less helpful to pioneer ethno-
106 
graphers than their colleagues in the other churches. 
104. Letter of Crenneville to $ulutiu, September 18, 
1862, and circular of $ulutiu, November 22. AS Alba Iulia. 
MRU, FG. 1862/962. There is no evidence here of further 
correspondence on the matter. 
105. Ipolyi, a Catholic pastor in Pozsony county in 
Hungary, stated in his 1854 work that folk beliefs supplied 
the "basic text" of legends, ballads and fairy tales, and 
the sources for these tales subscribed to the beliefs even 
if they were ashamed to admit it. (I, 25). Olga Nagy found 
that the legends of saints' lives survived only in Catholic 
villages, since belief in them was a precondition for their 
maintenance in oral tradition (Nagy, 503). 
106. Thus Ipolyi complained that his written requests to 
acquaintances for folk material received a very modest 
response. One correspondent wrote that "my nearly thirty 
letters on this matter had no success, [my] good friends 
even declined to reply to such requests ... "--1, 31. J~nos 
Kriza and his friends had little luck in their attempts to 
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A minority of clergymen did investigate ballads and 
superstitions and became the first ethnographers of their 
respective nations. Bishop $aguna appealed to his clergy 
and teachers in an 1859 pastoral letter to send popular 
tales and songs to the ethnographer Marienescu. It is 
unclear how much assistance they provided him, since most of 
107 
his data predated 1859. The typical method of col-
lection was for the clergy and teachers to have students in 
the church schools collect material from their own villages. 
The interest in the spiritual world of uneducated common 
people was atypical for the intelligentsia in general, and 
several clerical pioneer ethnographers of the 1860s stood 
out also for their moderately liberal political views. 
Three of the most important were Janos Kriza, loan Micu 
Moldovan and Franz Obert. 
The aristocratic establishment in the Erdelyi Muzeum-
Egylet scornfully rejected the Unitarian minister Janos 
Kriza's lecture in 1860 on popular Szekler ballads, and some 
complained about anti-aristocratic elements in the ballads 
he published in 1863. Yet in 1861, in what was considered a 
stunning upset, he was elected Unitarian Bishop. Most of 
his material came from Unitarian ministers and school-
teachers. The presbytery disliked his preoccupation with 
collect Szekler ballads through the Catholic clergy between 
1862 and 1866, and as a result cs{k and Gyergyo are not 
represented in his publications. Janos Farago, "Janos Kriza 
es a Vadrozs~k," in Antal ~rp~d et al., Kriza Janos 
(Kolozsvar: Dacia, 1971), 105-7. 
107. Birlea, 138; Tulbure, 226-7. 
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folk tales and sought to undermine it by giving him other 
108 
things to do. 
Franz Obert, a veteran of the revolution of 1848 in 
Leipzig and author of radical poetry, collected Romanian 
folk tales while serving as professor at the Lutheran 
Gymnasium in Mediasch and before becoming a village parson in 
1860. Later he was elected to the Transylvanian diet and 
the Reichsrat, where he joined the liberal opposition and 
109 
incurred the wrath of the Saxon establishment. loan Micu 
Moldovan was a Greek Catholic professor and later canon in 
Blaj who collected folk ballads beginning in 1862; he was 
also a supporter of the movement for lay participation in 
Greek Catholic church synods, and editor of the protocolls 
110 
of the synod of Blaj in 1868. Their intellectual 
preoccupations were symptomatic of their social and poli-
tical attitudes. 
A special case in the history of clerical ethnographers 
was the Moldavian Csango Catholic priest, Incze Janos 
108. Farago, 100-105, 137-41. On Kriza's election: 
Kelemen Gal, "Kriza J~nos p~spokk~ v~laszt~sa," Kereszt~ny 
Magveto 89 (1983), 163-70. It should be noted that the 
important mainstream Protestant intellectuals Imre Miko and 
P~l Gyulai fully supported his work. A contemporary wrote 
concerning his deficient church leadership: "Igen ritka, 
becsuletes, derek ember, de veghetetlen gyenge, erelytelen 
puspok volt, aki a gyuleseken sokszor azt sem tudta, hogy 
mir6l foly a tan~cskoz~s." (Gal, 169). 
109. Anca Gotia, "Preocupari ale carturarilor germani 
din Banat 9i Transilvania pentru folclorul romanesc in 
secolul al XIX-lea," in Studii de istorie a nationalitatii 
germane £i ~ infratirii ei cu natiunea romana, II 
(Bucure$ti: Editura politic~, 1981), 271-5; Carl G6llner, 
"Franz Obert. Leben und Wirken," Forschungen zur Volks- und 
Landeskunde 17 (1974), 5-40. 
110. Birlea, 198-200. 
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Petras. Petras (1813-86) studied in Eger, where he became a 
Minorite monk and was ordained in 1836. He returned to the 
Csango villages as a missionary, and served in a parish 
there from 1838 until his death. Corning into contact with 
the scholar Dobrentei from Pest, he sent many reports to the 
Hungarian Academy concerning Csango religious life, especially 
texts of hymns. Dobrentei published Petras' answers to his 
questionaire on Csango life and fifty-two of his song texts 
111 
in 1842. After 1868, Petras was in regular contact with 
112 
the Szent-Laszlo Tarsulat in Pest , and published many 
additional song texts. 
Church social functions extended beyond liturgical or 
pious practices. All churches were a pillar of the social 
order in the traditional Transylvanian community. One exam-
ple of this was the strict regulation of seating arrange-
rnents in most of the church buildings during liturgies. Men 
and women were segregated, and church functionaries, people 
of higher birth and other prestigious families enjoyed 
places of honor that could be inherited or purchased. Poor 
members of the community were seated in the rear or not at 
all. In a ritual context, this practice reflected and 
served to legitimate the stratified nature of the village or 
town, and therefore the civil authorities insisted on its 
observance. Greek Catholic churches in Transylvania also 
111. Republished in Pal Peter Dornokos, " ... edes Hazarnnak 
akartarn szolqalni ... " (Budapest: Szent Istvan Tarsulat, 
1979), 1321-51, 1358-80. 
112. On this society, see Chapter IX. 
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had pews with prescribed seating arrangements, but Orthodox 
churches were as a rule without pews. As the result of the 
peasant emancipation and increasing social mobility in the 
nineteenth century, many villages adopted seating by family 
rather than social category, while others were content to 
113 
observe only the segregation of the sexes. 
The churches sought to ensure the practice of baptism, 
church marriage and attendance at services by their members, 
but also acted in conjunction with the civil authorities to 
identify and punish adultery, theft, drunkenness, and the 
disturbance of the Sunday rest by dancing or rowdiness. The 
114 
parish court (H. megyeszek) was very often the court of 
first instance, particularly in the religiously homogenous 
villages of the Szekler region. The civil authorities, for 
their part, considered the observance of religious norms a 
component of responsible citizenship. Those rare indivi-
duals who defied community censure by not attending church 
regularly or cohabited without church marriage were con-
sidered socially dangerous. In the military frontier, the 
authorities required attendance at matins, sermon, mass and 
113. Erne Tarkany Szucs, Magyar ~ nepszakasok 
(Budapest: Gondolat, 1981), 100-3; Marton Tarisznyas, 
Gyergyo torteneti neprajza (Bukarest: Kriterion, 1982), 236-
7; Imreh, 118; Hans-Achim Schubert, Nachbarschaft und 
Modernisierung. Eine historische Soziologie traditionaler 
Lokalgruppen am Beispiel Siebenburgens (Koln: Bohlau, 1980), 
163; Fabini, 54; Boner, 64; Ware, 275-6. The presence of 
pews, very unusual in the Orthodox world, can be observed 
today in many old Transylvanian churches that were formerly 
Greek Catholic, like the Lipoveni church in Gyulafehervar 
referred to in Chapter VIII. 
114. The word megye, used elsewhere to denote county, 
often meant parish in the Szekler region. 
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vespers every Sunday, at Sunday school by the children, and 
confession at Eastertime. Attendance was also important 
because official announcements were often read after the 
service. The ringing of church bells at dawn, noon and 
115 
sundown punctuated daily life in all communities. Many 
rural Romanian churches had not a bell but a wooden 
sounding board called a toaca. 
The coherence of the church and village community was 
especially well-developed in the Fundus Regius through the 
system of Nachbarschaft. Each locality and parish con-
tained several of these, which heightened religious, economic, 
and administrative cooperation on the most local level. The 
statute of each Nachbarschaft specified penalties for 
unethical and disorderly behavior in and outside the church. 
The Nachbarvater called all members to a Versohnabend 
four times each year, where feuds and ill feelings were put 
aside in a quasiliturgical ceremony of Christian reconcilia-
116 
tion. A German contemporary stated that the 
Nachbarschaft, which was common among the Romanians as well 
as the Saxons of the Fundus Regius, led to an admirable 
absence of criminality and begging, and to good cooperation 
115. Imreh, ~ torvenyhozo Szekely falu, 99, 103-4, 108-
16; Ibid., "Stramo9i $i moravuri in scaunul filial Cristur," 
in Viata cotidiana la Secui, 42-7; Tarisznyas, 240-1. The 
bell-ringer collected special fees when ringing to announce 
the death of a community member. In a poetic passage of his 
memoirs, Franz Obert recalled that the churchbells, near and 
far, of neighboring churches and villages often rang one 
after another, creating a peculiar sense of communion; 
"Lebenserinnerungen," ms. pp. 21-3, in AS Sibiu, Fondul 
Franz Obert. 
116. Schubert, 156-62. 
211 
between the clergy, elders and officials. While not con-
testing this picture, foreigners were struck by the vil-
lagers' uniformity of thought, collective spirit, and lack 
117 
of individual spontaneity, particularly among the Saxons. 
There was no counterpart to the Nachbarschaft in the 
counties. 
The punitive authority of the churches declined with 
time, but each parish and congregation still exercized a 
strong influence on the moral behavior of the villagers. 
This was especially true in the case of the Protestant 
churches, where liturgical practices played a relatively 
minor role. Presbytery records show that Reformed congrega-
tions exacted fines, public censure or, in the most grievous 
cases, the denial of the sacraments and virtual exclusion 
from the community. Lutheran parishes practiced public 
censure with the use of a "stone of shame" hung around the 
neck of the offender. In contrast to the relative weakness 
of ritual practices, the Reformed Church very successfully 
inculcated the Calvinist ethic of sobriety and diligence. 
The punishment of public penance, or eklezsiakovetes, was 
still not uncommon in the mid-nineteenth century and very 
powerful and feared in the Reformed congregations. Similar 
practices were more rarely recorded in Roman Catholic 
118 
parishes. 
117. Joseph A. von Grimm, Die politische Verwaltung in 
Siebenburgen, II (Hermannstadt: Theodor Steinhaussen, 1856), 
78-9; Fabini, 53-6; Boner, 473-4. 
118. Imreh, ~ torven~hoz6 szekely falu, 11~-12; Bo~er, . 
373; Olga Nagy, "A vallasos elet Havadon (A nepi vallasoss~g 
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A more extreme form of sanction, anathema, was oc-
casionally practiced in the ritualistic churches. Anathema 
or excommunication were rare in the Roman Catholic Church by 
the nineteenth century. But well-informed churchmen could 
hardly be ignorant of Pope Pius IX~s writ of excommunication 
in 1860 against Italians who accepted civil office in the 
territories formerly ruled by the Pope: 
••. they have been excommunicated and fallen sub-
ject to the various other punishments of the Church ••. 
and we state the excommunication against them 
anew, as well as that in punishment they shall be 
deprived of every privilege, grace and favor they 
had been accorded by us or our predecessors, the 
Roman Popes... 119 
Some sources unfriendly to the Romanian clergy charged that 
they practiced anathema or a curse against disobedient par-
ishioners. Boner and tirmossy wrote that the pastors con-
trolled the voting in the electoral campaign of 1863 by the 
threefold solemn invocation of afurisenie (anathema) in 
church. Offenders were threatened with various forms of 
120 
personal and family disaster including final damnation. 
mint integr~l6 erd)," in Tfisk~s, ed., 504-15. 
119. Cited in J6zsef Fessler, Az egyhazi atok es kovet-
kezmenyei. A m~sodik bov1tett kiadas utan magyar1totta s 
kiadta nehany P~zmany-intezeti novendek. (Bees: Schweiger 
Antal nyomdajaban, 1860), 44-5. The Hungarian text first 
appeared in Pest in the daily Idok Tanuja. 
120. " ••• a ki ez ellen mereszelt volna tenni: megnyom-
orekodik, megsantul, siketul, vakul, gyermekeiben szeren-
csetlen lesz, marhaj~bol, vagyonabol kipusztul s a csapasok 
minden kigondolhato nemei utolerik harmad1zig; es vegre a 
pokolban t~zes Gstben szarvas 6rd6gok f6zik meg."-- Lajos 
Urmossy, Tizenhet ev Erdely tortenetebol, II (Temesvar: 
Nyomtatott a Csanad-egyhazmegyei konyvsajton, 1894.) Boner, 
369, is less poetic: "~Not only you, but your children will 
be cursed, if you vote for the Count~-- words of the pope at 
B--, to those who voted at the elections for a well-known 
Hungarian nobleman, a man of great nobility. Those who did 
213 
Boner reported that in one sermon a Romanian priest 
told his hearers that a stone had fallen from 
heaven, and in it was a letter to Bishop Schaguna, 
in which God ordered him to tell the people, that 
if they did not fast and pray more regularly, and 
lead a better life, He would send an army of 
grasshoppers into the land ... and they would 
destroy their harvests, and would afterwards at-
tack them, and the people would not be able to 
shake them off. 
Chided by the Lutheran parson for his exaggeration, the ~ 
replied: 
"It is all very well for you to laugh, but your 
people are more sensible; mine are stupid; and 
when I set to work with them, I am forced to give 
hard blows ... I must startle and frighten them. 
Were I to talk as you do, it would have no effect 
whatever."l21 
Such stories were denied by the Romanian press, and 
certainly fail to explain the Romanian electoral success in 
1863. However, in view of oriental liturgical practices and 
the poverty of the Romanian flock they are plausible. No 
accounts have come down to us of politically motivated 
anathema by the Hungarian or Saxon clergy during this period. 
On the other hand "secular anathema," or the public ostra-
cism of collaborators or political dissidents, was common. 
Schmerling's Hungarian allies became socially "impossible" 
122 
in Hungary after 1867. 
so were interdicted from entering the church." Moldovan, 
547-8, also cites the practice, stating that "a babon~val 
osszekevert vallasi fogalmakat a balk~ni gorogseg es szlav-
sag 6nt6tte a nep lelkebe, a tisztultabb gondolkozast a 
Rom~val valo uni6 ind{totta meg." 
121. Boner, 368-9. Boner compared the "blind obedience" 
of the "grossly ignorant" clergy to that of the Catholic 
priests in Ireland. 
122. A prime example is the Transylvanian journalist 
L~szlo Kovary, who became very unpopular after publicly 
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The ability of the clergy to enforce its authority in 
society depended upon the recognized legitimacy of that 
authority. In one sense this was a formal legal dis-
tinction. The Transylvanian state provided its assistance 
in the enforcement of canon law in traditional society. The 
exclusivity of Catholic canon law was abandoned in the 
sixteenth century, and the parallelism of other churches' 
canon law gradually recognized over the next three cen-
turies, but all ecclesiastic jurisdiction in civil affairs 
123 
was finally abolished only in 1895. Religious belief 
allowed considerable power to a curse, anathema or moral 
sanction. If a person feared the efficacy of such measures 
by the clergy or religious community, their power over him 
124 
was real. Religious feeling in many ways enhanced the 
ability of the clergy to engage in nationalist politics. It 
remains to be seen how politics, and even religious feeling, 
worked during this time to undermine clerical authority. 
*** 
Secularization 
Secularization was a central phenomenon in both western 
and central Europe, including Hungary, during the generation 
advocating the Hungarians' participation in the diet of 
1863-4. J6zsef Balint, introductory study to Kovary, 
Tajkepek utazasi rajzokban (Bukarest: Kriterion, 1984), 
47. 
123. Alexandru Herlea, "Procesul laicizirii dreptului in 
Transilvania," in Studii de istorie ~ dreptului. Organizarea 
de stat (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1983, 285-9. 
124. Kligman documented the capacity of belief in spirits 
to cause illness, trances and healing during an archaic 
dance festival in southern Romania in the 1970s: Calu§, 66-
83. 
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following 1848. Its meaning broadened beyond the origi-
nal sense of state expropriation of church lands to encom-
pass the areas of politics and culture. The term was very 
often polemical: for liberals it meant the liberation from 
church tutelage and obscurantism, while conservatives de-
plored it as de-Christianization and the renunciation of a 
fundamental cultural tradition. A useful definition is that 
of Peter L. Berger: "By secularization we mean the process 
by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the 
domination of religious institutions and symbols." In terms 
of mentality, "an increasing number of individuals ... look 
upon the world or their own lives without the benefit of 
religious interpretations." There is a third component of 
secularization that does not figure in this definition: 
beyond the loosening of institutional bonds and the change 
in personal outlook, theological and structural impulses, 
the "secularization of religion," transformed the churches 
126 
themselves. The areas of education, the press, 
and politics offer evidence concerning secularization in 
125. Owen Chadwick, The Secularization of the European 
Mind in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1975), 17-18; Laszlo Kosa, "A vallasi 
k6z6ny6ss~g n6veked~se Magyarorszagon a 19. sz~zad k6zep~n," 
Nepi kultura-- Nepi tarsadalom 13 (1983), 211. 
126. Martin Heckel, Korollarien zur Sakularisierung 
(Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitatsverlag, 1981), passim. 
(an exploration of the various meanings of the term since 
its appearance in Germany in 1646; Peter L. Berger, The 
Social Reality of Religion (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), 
106-8 [title of the American edition: The Sacred Canopy]; 
Paul Michael Zulehner, Sakularisierung von Gesellschaft, 
Person und Religion. Religion und Kirche in Osterreich 
(Wien: Herder, 1973), 56-62. 
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Transylvania. 
Hungarian religious writers of the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, both Protestant and Catholic, complained of declining 
attendance in church, hostility toward the clergy, a 
refusal to pay clerical tithes and salaries, and a neglect 
of religious education and prayer in the family. Bishop 
Bodola wrote in hisa circular of April 23, 1863 that 
"religious fervor-- not everywhere, and in everything, but 
generally-- has degenerated into Phariseeism, lukewarmness, 
or even icecoldness." He designated this problem as the 
chief concern of the Des synod of the following June. 
Saxon and, more rarely, Romanian writers reported similar 
127 
cases. 
Education had an enormous influence on religious atti-
tudes, since almost all schools were church-run. Even the 
state Gymnasium in Hermannstadt was still essentially a 
Catholic institution. Instructors were either clergymen or 
else closely supervized by the church. Where students at 
secondary schools came from various religious backgrounds, 
the local churches commonly provided instructors in religion 
for their coreligionists who were excused from instruction 
128 
in the religion which controlled the school. 
127. Kosa, 213-25; ~g,§ der_ Ve!"~ang.§Dhe_;Lt und Gegenwart des 
ls§Ei:S.lich_§n frei,.§!l ~.§~]5tes Agnetheln (Hermannstadt: W. Krafft, 
1900), 219; Samuel Bodola, "Kepviselet, successio, es mas teendok 
Anyaszentegyhazunkban," Erdelyi B..§form~_!g..§. ~.!:l~_?zentegy_baz!.!l.§9..Y~i­
Nevkonyv 1862, 20. Bodola's printed circular is preserved 
in AS Cluj-Napoca. Colegiul reformat din Cluj, No. 450. 
128. Documents concerning the 75 Orthodox pupils in the 
Roman Catholic and Lutheran schools in Kronstadt in 1860-61, 
in Sibiu, AMOR 1861/645. 
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Table 8: Elementary School Enrollment, 1860-65 
Gr. Catholic 
Orthodox 
Rom. Catholic 
Reformed 
Unitarian 
Lutheran 
Schools 
767 
704 
Teachers 
736 
729 
750 
Pupils 
34,577 
15,563 
24,731 
4,170 
29,803 
Population:Pupil 
18.4:1 
16.4:1 
12.8:1 
12.3:1 
6.8:1 (129 
The very incomplete, only very roughly comparable corn-
parable data for elementary school attendance permit the 
conclusion that the Lutherans were by far the most 
successful in enrolling the youth in elementary schools, the 
Reformed and Unitarians less so, and the three ritualistic 
churches least of all. This conclusion is confirmed by 
Karoly Keleti, who had access to unpublished data for 1869. 
He calculated that the percentage of Transylvanian school-
age children who actually enrolled was 84% for the 
Lutherans, 48% for the Unitarians, 42% for the Reformed, 41% 
for the Roman Catholic, 35% for the Greek Catholic, and 31% 
for the Orthodox; according to nationality, 80% for Germans, 
130 
42% for Hungarians, and 33% for Romanians. The funda-
129. ~erban Polverejan, "Contributii privind ~colile 
rornane~ti din Transilvania in a doua jurnatate a secolului al 
XIX-lea," in Curnidava 2 (1968), 207-8; $aguna to 
Crenneville, January 23, 1862, in Sibiu, AMOR 1862/6; 
Haynald's school circular of July 28, 1862, in Racul-Ciuc, 
Parohia rornano-catolica; Erdelyi Reforrnatus An¥aegyhazrnegye 
Nevkonyve, 1861, 98; Az Erdelyi Nagyfejedelernseg tiszti 
n~vtara 1864; "Statistische Obersicht der evangelischen 
Volks-Lehrer und Schuler-Zahl A.B. in dern Grossfurstenthurn 
Siebenbfirgen ... vorn Verwaltungsjahr 1862," in AS Sibiu. 
Episcopia evanghelica C.A., Fondul Superintendential 
1862/208. Population figures were selected for the closest 
year available. 
130. Keleti, 373. The figures calculated by the Austrian 
authorities before 1848 were considerably higher, but except 
218 
mental explanation is the system of economic support for the 
131 
schools referred to earlier. The geographic distribution 
of the population was also important. The urban concentra-
tion of the Hungarian Protestants and especially the 
Lutherans was greater, and this led to larger and wealthier 
congregations to support the schools. 
Table 9: Secondary School Enrollment, 1857 
Schools Pupils Orth GC RC Ref Unit Luth 
Orth. 1 90 85 5 
G.C. 1 435 33 400 
R.C. 9 1214 124 291 773 15 1 3 
Ref. 6 1035 2 8 56 937 9 15 
Unit. 3 284 1 14 22 239 6 
Luth. 6 1008 139 46 73 31 3 710 
Total 26 4066 383 751 1921 1005 252 986 
Population:Pupils 1693 738 119 26 3 187 209 
( 13 2) 
The profile of secondary school attendance presents a 
hierarchy that differs in interesting ways from that for 
elementary school enrollment. In all cases the percentage 
of elementary school pupils who advanced to secondary school 
was low, but Greek Catholics were more than twice as likely 
for those of the Unitarian schools (80-84% enrollment) the 
hierarchy was similar to that presented by Keleti. See 
Miskolczy, "Erdely a reformkorban (1830-1848)," 1259. 
131. According to Miskolczy, contemporaries blamed poverty 
for poor school attendance for a different reason: the poor 
peasants needed their children's labor. Ibid., 1260. This 
in turn helps to account for the reluctance of the poor 
population to provide comparable material support for the 
schools, but also the limited capacity of poor villages to 
supply their schools even if they desired to do so. The two 
explanations are closely interrelated. 
132. Gustav Adolph Schimmer, "Statistik der Lehranstalten 
des osterreichischen Kaiserstaates fur die Studienjahre 
1851-57," Mitteilungen_?~.§. §em §ebiete der Sta_tis_:tik 7, 4 
(1858), 44-7. 
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as Orthodox to attend secondary schools, while a far higher 
percentage of Roman Catholic youth attended secondary 
schools than in the case of the Protestants. In these cases 
the tremendous concentrated wealth of the Catholic bishop-
rics and schools, and the availability of the monastic 
clergy of the Latin rite as a teaching force, came into 
play. The consequence was that, in contrast to the general 
educational level of their population, Catholics constituted 
a disproportionately large segment of the educated elite 
among both the Romanians and Hungarians; in terms of educa-
tion the Catholic community was polarized. Higher education 
brought exposure to religiously corrosive modern ideas, and 
it is reasonable to suppose that these proportions had 
133 
implications for the degree of secularization. 
Yet it is important to distinguish the nature of secu-
larization among Catholics and Protestants. The Reformation 
served to "disenchant" the world, barring "mystery, miracle, 
and magic." Consequently, Berger writes, while "the 
Catholic lives in a world in which the sacred is mediated to 
him through a variety of channels ... Protestantism served as 
a historically decisive prelude to secularization." Fur-
thermore, those intellectual movements which hastened secu-
133. Michael Silber has found similar polarization among 
the Jews of nineteenth-century Hungary; "Assimilation and 
Acculturation of Hungarians and Jews in the Nineteenth 
Century," paper presented at Indiana University, November 
12, 1987. On the other hand, in Hungary proper the rate of 
Catholic secondary school attendance in 1859 paralleled that 
for the primary schools. Samuel Szeremlei, Vallas-erkolcsi 
es tarsadalmi elet 1848 ota Magyarorszagon (Budapest: 1874), 
40, cited by Kosa, 217. ---
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larization in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, indi-
vidualism, rationalism and liberalism, were much stronger in 
134 
Protestant than in Catholic theology. But the high sec-
ondary school enrollment in the Greek Catholic and Roman 
Catholic churches in Transylvania helped to close the gap 
between them and the Protestant intellectuals and was an 
important element in the conflict between religious conser-
vatism and liberalism which succeeding chapters will discuss. 
Our information about literacy in Transylvania confirms 
the picture presented by school enrollment. Literacy is a 
broader category than school enrollment because it is not 
strictly dependent on school attendance, and reflects the 
entire population rather than school-age children in a par-
ticular year. Evidence from before 1848 indicates that the 
more free the social and legal status of the population, the 
135 
more likely it was to be literate. Keleti calculated a 
literacy rate (reading and writing) ln Transylvania of 21.3% 
in 1869, as compared to 49.0% in Hungary proper. The urban 
population of Transylvania was far more literate (41.3%) 
than the rural (14.7%). Keleti did not calculate literacy 
according to religion, nationality or administrative region, 
but the percentages he publishes for the counties and dis-
tricts confirm the relationship between social status and 
literacy: 
134. Berger, 111-13, 156-7. 
135. Ambrus Miskolczy, "Az {rni tudas es a tarsadalmi 
retegz6des Erdelyben az 1820-30-as evekben," ~ Raday gy~jte­
meny evkonyve 2 (1981), 121-37. 
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Table 10: Illiteracy (No Reading, no Writing), 1869 
Noble Counties and Districts Fundus Reg ius 
Hunyad 94.5% Torda 87.0% Broos 83.7% 
Doboka 93.2 Felso-Feher 83.7 Reussmarkt 81.0 
Bels6-Szolnok 89.7 Kukullo 82.2 Muhlbach 79.9 
Also-Feher 89.6 Nasaud 81.7 Leschkirch 68.7 
Fagaras 87.7 Kolozs 80.9 Hermannstadt 59.2 
Szekler Region Mediasch 51.0 
csl.k 79.3 Grossschenk 50.2 
Aranyos 75.6 Kronstadt 49.9 
Maros 72.6 Reps 48.7 
Haromszek 69.9 Bistritz 46.3 
Udvarhely 59.8 Schassburg 44.7 
Six Saxon districts were in the medium range for Hungary and 
Transylvania combined, the Szekler region followed, while 
the ten noble counties and districts were among the eighteen 
jurisdictions with the highest illiteracy rate in all 
136 
Hungary and Transylvania. Bearing in mind the distribu-
tion of nationalities and religions, it is evident that 
illiteracy was highest among the Romanian former serfs, 
lowest among the Saxons, in the intermediate range among the 
Hungarians but among these highest among the Roman Catholics, 
who predominated in Cs{k. The official figures from 
1881 confirm this: 62.3% of the Germans in Transylvania 
could read and write, 31.4% of the Hungarians, and 8.9% of 
137 
the Romanians. 
What was the relationship of literacy and education to 
secularization? Contemporary Protestant clergymen and 
136. Keleti, 358-65. 
137. "A magyar korona orsz~gaiban az 1881. ~v elej~n 
vegrehajtott nepszamlal~s eredmenyei megyek es kozsegek 
reszletezve," Mag~ar .Statisztikai Kozlemenyek vol. 61, cited 
by Sz~sz, "Gazdasag ~s t~rsadalom a kapitalista Atalakul~s 
kor~ban," Erd~ly tort~nete III, 1510. 
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church writers seeking to hinder secularization tended to 
argue that the alienation from religion arose from a low 
cultural level and a superficial, hence vulnerable, under-
standing of the faith. Catholic clergy also recommended 
improved education to fight weak religious feeling ("indif-
ference"), but with a special emphasis on the harmful lib-
eral ideas that the schools must combat. The liberal 
Catholic Eotvos, on the other hand, blamed the alienation of 
lay Catholics on clericalism and the exclusion of the laity 
138 
from church leadership. 
In contrast to the tendency to see culture and educa-
tion as the prime instruments against irreligion, some 
Protestants and Catholics pointed out that the devotion to 
religious belief and customs was greatest in various 
mountainous, isolated areas which also had a high rate of 
illiteracy. Coldness toward religion, observable in all 
geographic settings, was most common in the towns. It was 
even fashionable in many circles to consider scorn for the 
139 
church "a sign of culture and refinement." Many 
historians and sociologists of other societies have observed 
that industry and market-oriented economic activity were the 
social locus of secularization. Hence men were more af-
fected than women, middle-aged than young and old, urban 
than rural, industrial workers than traditional occupations, 
140 
and Protestants and Jews than Catholics. 
138. Kosa, 225-9. See Chapter v. 
139. Ibid., 214-15. 
140. Berger, 108 and 205, note 7. Gabriel LeBras, Etudes 
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The dissatisfaction with religious education and the 
demand for its improvement were not without basis. The 
rationalist trend was dominant in Protestant theology, and 
hence in the preparation of the Protestant clergy. Biblical 
criticism and historical theology raised the scholarly stan-
dards of theology, but seemed to many to open the door to 
relativism. Church history became the core of religious 
instruction in general education as well. Social relations 
and improvement became a principal rationale for church and 
pastoral activity. Contemporaries reported a declining 
level of piety and increasing worldliness of the clergy 
itself, not only among Protestants but also, more rarely, 
among Catholics as well. But the orientation of scholarship 
and religious practice favored by the Catholic church lead-
141 
ership was much more conservative. 
The differing attitude of the Protestant clergy on the 
one hand and the Catholic clergy and Austrian authorities on 
the other toward modern ideas also emerged, paradoxically, 
in respect to the connection between literacy and the Bible. 
Surely the spreading of the Word could only reinforce reli-
gion. The Reformation's call for the more general availa-
bility of the Bible was by the nineteenth century finally 
being put into effect, facilitated by mass literacy and 
improved printing and transportation. The Protestant 
de sociologie religieuse (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1955), is the most important study in this regard. 
141. Kosa, 218, 223, 226; on Catholicism in the mid-
nineteenth century, see Chapter V. 
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churches in Hungary published many new editions of the 
Bible, and welcomed the assistance in printing and distribu-
tion offered by the British and Foreign Bible Society 
(B.F.B.S.) But Habsburg authorities confiscated a shipment 
into Hungary by the B.F.B.S. in 1814, dissolved the newly 
founded Hungarian Bible Institute a few years later, and 
prohibited the importation of scriptures into Hungary in 
1822. The Catholic clergy opposed the activity of the 
B.F.B.S., and the agents of the latter, with their stocks, 
were banished from the country between 1852 and 1867. Even 
in 1900, the B.F.B.S. reported concerning Hungary that "the 
Roman Catholic population were hostile, and little could be 
142 
done among them." Pope Gregory XVI condemned Bible 
societies and warned against vernacular translations in his 
143 
Encyclical Inter Praecipuas of 1844. 
Churchmen were more uniformly open to the possibilities 
of religious influence offered by other printed media. The 
Lutheran head elder was traditionally also president of the 
premiere learned association of Transylvania, the Verein fur 
Siebenburgische Landeskunde, founded in 1840. The Reformed 
elder, Count Imre Miko, headed the Hungarian counterpart of 
the Saxon group, the Erdelyi Muzeum-Egylet, established in 
142. Comp. T.H. Darlow and H.F. Moule, Historical 
Catalogue of the Printed Editions of Holy Scripture in the 
Library of the British and Foreign Bible Society, II, pt. 2 
(London: The Bible House, 1911), 768-70; British and Foreign 
Bible Society, 96th Report for the Year Ending 1900 (London: 
The Bible House, 1900), 53, 61-2. 
143. The Papal Encyclicals 1740-1878, Claudia Carlin, 
IHM, ed. (S.l.: McGrath Publishing Company, 1981), 267-71. 
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1859. Religious involvement was even greater in the Aso-
ciatiunea Transilvana pentru Literatura Romana ~ Cultura 
Poporului Roman (ASTRA, founded in 1861); its founding co-
presidents and active leaders were Bishop $aguna and Greek 
Catholic Canon Timotei Cipariu. During the absolutist 1850s 
many educated Transylvanians directed their efforts toward 
the study of their nation's past. Major historical syn-
theses appeared in print, including some that remain im-
portant resources for the scholars of today. Church history 
was prominent,especially source publication. Most histor-
ians were also politicians of a liberal persuasion. Their 
works served not only to strengthen national consciousness 
on the eve of the 1860s, but also to legitimize the demands 
of the reformist elements in both secular and religious 
144 
pol tics. 
Historical research could have either a conservative or 
a reformist impact, and the same was true of journalism. 
Church-affiliated newspapers were established to present 
church affairs and combat irreligion, such as the Catholic 
144. Works of lasting significance by important figures 
in the 1860s included several by Georg Daniel Teutsch: 
Geschichte der Siebenburger Sachsen fur das Sachsiche Volk 
(1854 ff.), Das Zehntrecht der evangelischen Landeskirche 
A.B. in Siebenburgen (1858), and Urkundenbuch der evangel-
ISChen-Landeskirche in Siebenburgen (1862 ff.); Laszlo 
Kovary, Erdely tortenelme (1859-66) and Erdely tortenete 
1848-49-ben (1861); Karoly Veszely, Erdelyi egyhaztortenelmi 
adatok (1860 ff.); Andrei $aguna, Elementele dreptului 
canonic (1854) and Istoria bisericeasca (1860); and 
Alexandru Sterca-Sulutiu, Istoria Horii si ~ poporului 
romanesc din Muntii Apuseni ai Ardealului (1856). Attempts 
to publish the last work were unsuccessful, and it 
circulated only in manuscript form; see Chapter VIII. 
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Religio and Idok Tanuja (Budapest), the Romanian orthodox 
Telegraful Roman (Hermannstadt, established 1853), and the 
Reformed Protestans Egyhazi es Iskolai Lap (Budapest, rees-
tablished in 1858 after a ten-year interlude). The first 
three were not only confessional but conservative, while the 
latter represented a liberal standpoint on both secular and 
church affairs. One symptom of the politicization of reli-
gion in the 1860s was the proliferation of church periodi-
cals, like the Lutheran Saxon dailies Schul- und Kirchenzei-
tung and Kirche und Schule (Hermannstadt, 1862) and the 
Romanian Greek Catholic daily Aurora Romana (Vienna, 1863), 
as well as the yearbooks Kereszteny Magveto (Unitarian, 
1861), Erdelyi Reformatus Anyaszentegyhazmegye Nevkonvye 
(Reformed, 1861) and Gyulafehervari Fuzetek (Roman Catholic, 
1861). Most of the new publications were at least moderate-
ly liberal, devoting attention to such issues as popular 
education and administrative and electoral reform. Franz 
Obert's Kirche und Schule was militantly reformist, polemi-
cizing with the secular press and its rival Lutheran paper 
until the latter was discontinued after an existence of only 
a few weeks. 
The press was a major force in social change elsewhere 
in Europe at mid-century. Newspaper accounts created the 
possibility of vicarious, if not actual, political partici-
pation for the increasing reading public. If formerly the 
church had been the principal institution providing social 
identity, the press could now constitute a rival. Hence 
227 
contemporaries, including Pope Pius IX, felt that the press 
itself served to undermine religion. Even though the 
churches sought to use the press for their own ends, alter-
native, lay viewpoints came to dominate the press as a 
whole. Professional lay writers were writing about church 
matters from a non-clerical perspective, and often taking a 
145 
critical attitude toward the institution. 
It was also in our period that the terms clericalism 
and anticlericalism came into use in Western Europe. Anti-
clericalism, which sought to combat all clerical influence 
in society, was strongest in those predominantly Catholic 
countries, especially Italy, France, and Spain, where the 
Catholic clergy was a powerful ally of the politically 
146 
embattled conservative aristocracy. Anticlericalism was 
rare in Transylvania, although here the share of the clergy 
in the entire intelligentsia, 21.9%, was far higher than 
147 
anywhere in Hungary proper. Anticlericalism occurred 
most often in areas where lay intellectuals or the nobility 
148 
constituted a rival elite. Elsewhere, the laity sought 
145. Chadwick, 37-43. 
146. For a theoretical treatment of the problem of 
anticlericalism as well as a consideration of individual 
countries, see the articles in the special issue on anti-
clericalism of European Studies Review 13, 2 (1983). , 
147. The percentages for 1869 were calculated by Janos 
Maszu in "A hazai ~rtelmis~g fejldd~s~nek n~h~ny saj~tossAga 
a m~lt sz~zad derek~t k6vetd ~vtizedekben," Magyar t6rt~neti 
tanulmanyok 17 (1984), 38. Note that his definition of the 
intelligentsia is broader than the Western concept, which is 
limited chiefly to free professionals. It also includes 
professional (i.e. full-time) public and commercial officials. 
148. The Romanian radical leader Simion Barnutiu and some of 
his allies expressed resentment at the conservative attitude 
of the higher clergy during the early phase of the revolu-
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to share in social leadership but could not deny the vital 
contribution of the clergy to ethnic solidarity. 
The desire to share in the leadership of the churches 
and schools, which generally stopped short of anticleri-
calism, can be observed in all churches in Transylvania. 
Formidable movements for electoral reform and organizational 
statutes existed in both the Lutheran and Reformed church 
districts. In these cases the lively press and synodal 
debates contributed to the general liberal tendency in secu-
lar politics, as well. Similar electoral and statutory 
demands arose, as we will see, in the three ritualistic 
churches. 
There were three chief sources for the church reformist 
movements: spiritually inspired criticism of the existing 
church, the broader liberal movement, and liberalism. 
Pietist, Gallican and Eastern Orthodox attitudes toward lay 
participation in church leadership had a largely complemen-
tary impact in Transylvania, where the pattern of secondary 
school attendance assured that students of varying ethnic 
and religious backgrounds would be exposed to these ideas. 
Later, the Christian radicalism Of Lamennais had considera-
149 
ble appeal among Vormarz Hungarians and Romanians. 
After being interrupted in the decade of absolutism, these 
traditions revived during the 1860s. Their religious ori-
tion of 1848; see Chereste9iu, A balazsfalvi nemzeti gyules, 
479; George Em. Marica et al., Ideologia generatiei rom&ne 
de la 1848 din Transilvania, 254-5. 
-- I49~e-riter chapters for more detailed treatment of 
these ideas. 
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gins lent them intraecclesial legitimacy, but liberalism and 
nationalism were more important driving forces in the sub-
stantial achievement of reformist goals during the decade. 
The European liberal tradition unquestionably also 
influenced these movements. The conventional identification 
of Enlightenment thought with protoliberalism should not 
obscure the fact that the liberal movement emerged in op-
position to the petrified Josephinian state of the early 
nineteenth century; both of these were in their own way 
heirs of the Enlightenment. The Catholic Enlightenment in 
Austria inspired a Febronian and church constitutional ten-
dency with a certain social conscience, but not opposed to 
princely absolutism; but also a romantic individualism that 
150 
resisted state tutelage of the church and of society. 
The intellectuals frequently sought to restrict the 
influence of the clergy, but recognized the churches as a 
positive national force. The perpetuation of the national 
role of the churches took place at the same time as the 
secularization process continued. The role of the clergy in 
the intelligentsia of each nationality continued to decline, 
as did their role in politics. Between the 1840s and 1860s, 
the clergy declined from 31.3% to 14.4% of the intelli-
151 
gentsia in the Hungarian lands. 
Meanwhile, lay involvement in education and in eccles-
150. Karl Eder, Der Liberalismus 
9~i-E>!-~§hc:tl!-~Il.9J PoJJ11~~--~D.C1I<uTtur 
40-1, 63-9. 
151. Mazsu, op.cit., 36. 
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in Altosterreich. 
-- --(Wien: Herold, 1955), 
iastical adrr1inistration led to increasing emphasis on secu-
lar criteria of effectiveness within each church. Clergymen 
increasingly conceived their function as much in terms of 
152 
social betterment as in the salvation of their people. 
Religious values were often transferred to, and identified 
with, nationality. An extreme example is this statement in 
the organ of a Polish Roman Catholic bishop in 1861: 
The chief duty of the clergy is to struggle for 
the reestablishment of the external and internal 
unity of Poland, and to use the power granted by 
faith and the Church, so that this power may be a 
certain path toward the victory of national 
freedom. (153 
Surveying his parish archives for the turbulent nineteenth 
century during the interwar period, the Roman Catholic 
pastor of Sibiu lamented that politics were decisive in the 
cases of religious conversions. Churches became identified 
in the popular consciousness with the nation they repre-
sented, and spirituality was less important than nationalism 
154 
for religious identification. 
*** 
Ritual is one of the most important determinants of 
religious experience. The churches in Transylvania with a 
152. E.g. see Friedrich Teutsch, Geschichte der 
Siebenburger Sachsen fur das sachsische Volk, III, 386-7. 
153. Paraphrased from Tygodnik katolicki, organ of the 
Archbishop of Gdynia-Poznan, in Reinhard Wittram, 
Nationalismus und Sakularisation. Beitrage zur Geschichte 
und Problematik des Nationalgeistes (Luneburg: Heliand-
Verlag, 1949), 35. 
154. Adolf Vorbuchner, Historia Domus, II, 159, ms. in 
Sibiu, Parohia romano-catolica. Vorbuchner, who later 
became Bishop of Transylvania, was the author of the only 
popular history of the diocese: Az erdelyi puspokseg 
(Brasso: Az Erdelyi Tudosito kiadasa, 1925). 
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strong emphasis on ceremony and aesthetic experience, 
referred to by Max Weber as ritualistic churches, are the 
chief focus of the following chapters: the Roman Catholics, 
Greek Catholics, and Orthodox. Ritual and doctrine provided 
for a far greater role of the clergy than was the case among 
the Protestants. 
The clergy of the six Christian churches of the 
province can be distinguished according to its method of 
selection, training, and particularly economic support. The 
complex system of economic support included tithes, land 
allotments, church subsidies, emoluments, and state 
subsidies. The number of ecclesiastic personnel, the 
practice or non-practice of celibacy, and local 
peculiarities make a comparison difficult, but in general it 
may be said that the Saxon Lutheran clergy was the best 
educated and best provided for, and the Romanian Greek 
Catholic and Orthodox clergy the least well provided for. 
The religious culture of the people may be 
characterized in terms of official and popular religion. 
Official religion consists of officially propagated doctrine 
and practices. The political tradition of the churches, 
which was largely determined by their relationship with the 
state, social position, and identity with one of the three 
principal ethnic groups of Transylvania, can also be 
considered part of official religion. Popular religion 
consists of practices evolving from official religion but 
not necessarily condoned by it. Formal art and architecture 
232 
were official sources of religious folk art. Popular 
religion was a source of commonalities among the ritualistic 
churches, especially through pilgrimage and dramatic 
customs. Many clergymen viewed popular religion with 
antagonism, but others with more democratic inclinations 
were among its pioneer observers. 
The capacity of religion and the clergy to provide 
social and moral discipline declined with the process of 
secularization. Education and the press, albeit often 
sponsored by the churches, helped to undermine religiosity 
or respect for clerical prerogative. A comparison of 
religious, ethnic and geographic communities shows an 
approximate correlation between literacy, economic 
advancement, and lay activism. Secularization was at the 
root of much of the internal conflict in the ritualistic 
churches portrayed in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CATHOLICISM BETWEEN ULTRAMONTANISM AND LIBERALISM 
The striking confluence of nationalism and religious 
identity in the late nineteenth century was not typical in 
the earlier history of the Catholic Church, even in Hungary. 
The church was a decidedly hierarchical and international 
organization. The clergy closely supervized the moral life 
of believers through regular confession, preaching and the 
educational system. A bull of Pope Gregory XVI (1831-46) 
condemned all lay activism as akin to Protestantism. It was 
the role of the clergy to lead, the Pope declared, and of 
the believers to serve. The parish clergy, in turn, must be 
l 
the obedient servant of the diocesan bishop and the Pope. 
In the Roman Catholic liturgy as it was celebrated in 
the nineteenth century, the prescribed role of the laity was 
passe. The earlier idea of the Mass as a communal act, 
which has revived in our day, received little emphasis in 
the nineteenth century. Contemporaries remarked that the 
liturgy was viewed from afar, as an act of state symbolizing 
church authority, which the priest conducted in Latin with 
his back to the people. Those present at a festive high 
mass consisted of three distinct groups: the celebrating 
priests, the performing choir, and the attending believers 
who were often preoccupied with prayers for their own pri-
l. Encyclical Mirari Vos (1832), in The Papal 
E!!1SY~.!J:cal_E_ 1740-1878;"235-41. 
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vate intentions. In some cases diocesan prayer books actu-
ally prescribed the forms of these "Mass devotions" for 
2 
individual use. 
It appears that the ritual reinforcement of the cler-
gy's authority failed to stifle the religious autonomy of 
the believers. Piety could not be passive and remain mean-
ingful. Hence religious practice moved into areas which, 
while encouraged by the official church, were more indivi-
dualistic and less dependent upon clerical supervision than 
the Mass. Such practices included Eucharistic and Marian 
veneration and especially pilgrimages. In 1854 the Pope 
affirmed the-- long debated-- dogma of the Immaculate 
Conception of Mary; the contemporary international revival 
of pilgrimages received its strongest impulse in the Lourdes 
apparition in 1858. In 1856 the Pope proclaimed the feast 
of the Sacred Heart of Jesus. This veneration, also prac-
ticed earlier, similarly attained the proportions of an 
international movement. The practice of public processions 
3 
also revived. 
The revival of traditional religious practices was an 
2. Anton L. Mayer, Die Liturgie in der europaischen 
Geistesgeschichte. Gesammelte Aufsatze (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1978), 367-9. 
3. Mayer, 301, 360-2; Turner, 214-30; Roger Aubert, The 
Church in the Age of Liberalism (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 
218-9; Friedrich Heyer, The Catholic Church from 1648 to 
1870 (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1969), 177-83. The 
Heart of Jesus cult, which had strong legitimist political 
associations in France in the 1860s, was present also among 
the Szekler Catholics, especially toward the end of the 
century; Aubert, 224; L~szl6 Sz~kely, "A csiki sz~kelyek 
aszk~zise," Vigilia 42,3 (1977), 161, 166. 
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important component of ultramontanism, a new phenomenon in 
4 
the nineteenth-century church. In the popular percep-
tion, the term signified a rejection of liberalism and of 
state interference in church affairs, and a closer link of 
each diocese to the Vatican. It was symbolized before all 
by the Pope's Syllabus of Errors in 1864 and the proclama-
tion of papal infallibility at the Vatican Council in 1871. 
The attacks on the secular power of the Papal States unques-
tionably played a role in the increasingly fanatical condem-
nation of liberal ideas and political movements by Pope Pius 
IX (1846-78) after 1849. He sympathized with the patriotic 
anti-Austrian tendencies of the early stages of the Italian 
revolution in 1848, but when the republican forces in Rome 
began to threaten his own position he moved his court to 
Gaeta in the Kingdom of Naples in November, 1848. By the 
time he returned to Rome eighteen months later, he had 
become a determined adversary of modern liberalism and of 
its ally, the Italian movement for national unification. 
The successes of this movement in succeeding years placed 
the Papal States on the political defensive and reinforced 
5 
the Pope's defiance of modern political thought. 
It would be mistaken to suppose that Pius' experiences 
and embittered anti-liberalism were the chief cause and 
4. 11 The transformation of Catholicism by the ultramontane 
movement: that is the content of the history of the Catholic 
Church in the nineteenth century ... -- Heyer, 151. 
5. Aubert, 248-55; Lajos Lukacs, A Vatikan es Magyaror-
sz~g 1846-1878. A Becsi apostoli nunciusok jelentesei es level-
ezese Magyarorszagrol (Budapest: Akademiai, 1981), 25-41. 
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content of ultramontanism. This movement actually emerged 
in the first half of the nineteenth century in Catholic 
countries, especially France, in reaction against ideas of 
the Enlightenment and Gallicanism on the civil utility of 
religion and the control of the episcopacy by the state. 
The call for emancipation from state control through a 
closer link with the Holy See could be justified in anti-
Gallican but socially inclusive terms, as it was in the 
6 
early works of Lamennais. Lamennais' later works, 
which developed his original views beyond the limits of 
Papal tolerance, were popular among liberal Christians of 
7 
Transylvania on the eve of 1848. The rejection of 
Gallicanism also involved the resurrection of older 
devotional practices, such as those we have referred to, 
which Gallicanism had sought to suppress on utilitarian 
grounds. 
Pius IX favored ultramontanism, his chief biographer 
has written, because it seemed "the requisite for a reju-
8 
venation of Catholic life." Unlike his predecessor, 
Pius was a pastoral priest rather than a scholar. He took 
an active interest in the pastoral concerns of individual 
bishoprics. He restored the diocesan bishops' former prac-
6. In his early phase, before he was condemned by 
Mirari Vos in 1832, Lamennais was "ultramontane and 
liberal at the same time."-- Heyer, 135-8; see also Aubert, 
5. 
7. Hitchins, The Rumanian National Movement, 160-1; 
Samu Benko, "Beke Samuel elete es halala," in Benko, A 
helyzettudat valtozasai (Bukarest: Kriterion, 1977), l49-
97. 
8. Aubert, 85. 
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tice of visits ad limina, and through his renowned charm he 
was largely successful in cultivating their personal loyalty 
to himself. Cardinal Manning of England remarked: "No pon-
tiff from the beginning, in all the previous succession of 
two hundred and fifty-six popes, has ever so united the 
9 
bishops with himself." During his pontificate Pius not 
only greatly increased his personal authority, that of the 
Apostolic Nunciatures and of the Papal Curia, but also 
improved the standards of clerical training and generally 
10 
intensified religious life. 
The less positive side of Pius' pontificate is more 
generally recognized by historians. Long-term liberal 
trends within the church, both in the area of lay activism 
and in the opening toward modern and Protestant theology, 
were suppressed. Clerical primacy and the theological sys-
tern of Thomas Aquinas were reaffirmed. Religious orders 
enjoyed increased influence, especially the Jesuits, whose 
9. Heyer, 185-6~ Marvin O'Connell, "Ultramontanism and 
Dupanloup: The Compromise of 1865," Church History 53,2 
(1984), 200-17. According to O'Connell the ad limina 
visits typically took place every five years. These were in 
addition to the extraordinary synods which Pius convened: 
206 bishops visited Rome on the occasion of the Marian 
definition in 1854, 265 for the commemoration of Japanese 
martyrs in 1862, and 500 for the l800th anniversary of the 
martyrdom of St. Peter in 1867-- Heyer, 185. The Romanian 
Greek Catholic bishops did not make ad limina visits, and 
when 9ulutiu and Alexi received invitations to Rome in 1862, 
they declined them-- correspondence of de Luca, 9ulutiu and 
Alexi, March 21-April 9, 1862, in AS Alba Iulia, MRU,FG 
1862/217, 409. 
10. Aubert, 86-9~ Otto Weiss, "Der Ultramontanismus. 
Grundlagen- Vorgeschichte - Struktur," Zeitschrift 
fur bayerische Landesgeschichte 41 (1978), 821-77 is 
insightful on the general problem of ultramontanism, though 
it deals chiefly with southern Germany. 
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well-written newspaper Civilta cattolica (1850-) became the 
ll 
official organ of Catholic conservatism. The new piety 
turned against rationalistic emphases of the Enlightenment. 
Its chief traits were more frequent reception of the sacra-
ments, veneration of Mary and the saints, visions, and 
12 
pilgrimages. 
The papal offensive against liberal Catholicism reached 
a new stage in the early 1860s. The military successes of 
Garibaldi in 1860-l accentuated the Vatican's defensive 
posture. Support for the secular power of the Pope was a 
criterion of international Catholic solidarity. In Hungary, 
for instance, the conservative priest and theologian of 
Transylvanian origin Tivadar Zerich published a work in 
defense of the Papal States which diocesan bishops recom-
mended to their clergy. Bishop Haynald, like most bishops, 
issued a circular urging the faithful to pray for the wel-
13 
fare of the Papal States. Bishop Dupanloup of Orleans, 
one of the most liberal members of the French episcopate, 
attained European prominence through his defense of the 
Pope's temporal power. The Munich church historian Ignaz 
von Dollinger, on the other hand, aroused the displeasure of 
ll. Aubert, 283. J.C.H. Aveling, The Jesuits (New York: 
Stein and Day, 1982), 27, 316-18, notes the original liberal 
and conciliatory emphasis of the paper, which only became 
undeniably conservative by the mid-l860s. 
12. Aubert, 218-28. 
13. Zerich's work was ~ Papai fejedelemseg es birtok, 
1860; Fulop Jako Imecs, Erdely puspokmegye Kronikaja ~XIX. 
szazadban IV, 176 in Alba Iulia, Biblioteca Batthyaneurn, ms. 
719, cota IX-227. The printed circular of Haynald of 
February 22, 1860, in German, is in Budapest, OSzK, Fol.Lat. 
3952, f. 195. 
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the Holy See by his sympathetic treatment of the assault on 
the Papal States in a lecture series he delivered in 
14 
1861. 
One of Dupanloup's colleagues in France issued a circu-
lar in 1860 condemning the "errors of liberalism." The 
letter helped to inspire the Holy See's first draft of the 
Syllabus of Errors in June, 1861, which it secretly pre-
sented to the bishops assembled at the extraordinary synod a 
year later. A group of bishops, including Dupanloup and 
probably Haynald, convinced the Pope to delay the publica-
tion of the document as politically inopportune. Dupanloup's 
ally, the layman Montalembert, created a sensation at the 
Catholic Congress in Malines in August, 1863 by his liberal 
address "Catholicism and Freedom." The address helped con-
15 
vince the Pope of the need for action. Another 
stimulus was the liberal tendency in German theology, led by 
Dollinger. In September, 1863 the congress in Munich of 
German Catholic theologians of Germany, Austria and 
Switzerland openly challenged the conservative line favored 
by the Vatican. Pius strongly condemned the congress in a 
16 
letter to the Archbishop of Munich on December 21. 
Dupanloup spent most of the winter of 1863-64 in Rome 
defending the liberal cause and seeking to delay the pro-
posed Syllabus. He was ultimately unsuccessful: in 
14. Aubert, 244-5, 286. 
15. The speech was published in several languages, 
including Hungarian: Szabad egyhaz szabad allamban (Pest: 
Emich Gusztav, 1864). 
16. O'Connell, 208-9~ Heyer, 162-3~ Aubert, 245-6. 
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December, 1864 the Holy See issued the encyclical Quanta 
Cura condemning rationalism, statism, socialism and 
nationalism, with the more extreme and better-known 
Syllabus appended to it. The hostile reaction of the 
European liberal press was immmediate. Dupanloup published 
a pamphlet in response to the liberal attacks a month later. 
Partly by minimizing the doctrinal significance of the 
Syllabus, partly by demonstrating the extremism and 
hypothetical nature of the theses being condemned, he had 
considerable success in blunting the damage to the Catholic 
image. This damage was so considerable that not only 630 
bishops, but the Pope himself thanked Dupanloup for his 
17 
"clarification." 
Ultramontanism, in the sense of a rejection of 
liberalism, reached its high point at this time and began 
its decline. The equally famous proclamation of papal 
infallibility at the Vatican Council five years later did 
18 
not challenge the secular order as did the Syllabus. 
Thanks to the public revelations concerning the Council by 
Dollinger and his lay ally, Lord Acton, and the demonstra-
tive opposition of most bishops of Austria-Hungary and the 
United States, the strength within the hierarchy of the 
17. O'Connell, 209-17; Heyer, 164-5; Aubert, 297-9. 
Aubert attributes greater success to Dupanloup's pamphlet 
than Heyer, but the latter credits it for "salvaging a great 
deal for the Church." It is reasonable to suppose that 
Dupanloup also expressed his views on the Haynald affair 
(See Chapter VI) while in Rome. 
18. This is the thesis of O'Connell, 200. 
241 
19 
"liberal" element became known. The Council's formula-
tion on infallibility was in fact a compromise solution. 
Infallibility was defined much more narrowly than the Pope 
20 
himself had desired. 
The Pope's more extreme formulations and the tactical 
alliances of his opponents should not obscure the essential 
difference between Catholic liberalism and secular liber-
alism. Dupanloup and Montalembert, and the somewhat analo-
gous pair of Haynald and Eotvos in Hungary, were far more 
moderate on social and constitutional questions than the 
liberals who genuinely threatened the position of the 
21 
church. 
*** 
Pius IX and the Eastern Rite 
Another aspect of Ultramontanism involved very dif-
ferent ideological concerns, namely the quest to attract 
eastern-rite Christians to the Holy See. Sizable numbers of 
various nationalities practicing eastern rites were in union 
with Rome in the mid-nineteenth century, mostly in Europe 
but also in the Near East: primarily Ruthenians, Romanians, 
Armenians, and Arabs. Most Greek Catholic prelates were in 
the Near East, but the vast majority of the faithful were 
19. Friedrich Engel-Janosi, "Liberaler Katholizismus und 
die Minoritit im Vatikanischen Konzil," Mitteilungen des 
Osterreichischen Staatsarchivs 8 (1955), 223-35. 
20. Heyer, 192-4. 
21. Aubert, 286, 298; "Toward the end, Pius IX, who 
almost daily condemned liberalism as the "error of the 
century," was no longer able to see the radical difference 
between Catholic liberalism and liberalism as such."(298) 
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Ruthenians and Romanians. The four Ruthenian and Romanian 
bishops attending the Vatican Council ruled dioceses 
of more than two million souls, while the others repre-
22 
sented less than a half million Greek Catholics. Most 
Greek Catholics were descendants of Orthodox believers whose 
bishops had accepted the church union. 
Greek Catholic bishops, but especially minor clergy and 
the faithful generally resented the expansion of the narrow 
definition of church union by overzealous Roman Catholic 
missionaries and by Latin-rite clergymen of different 
nationality; such actions stimulated a countervailing move-
ment of return to Orthodoxy. Pope Benedict XIV had partici-
pated as curial delegate in the Ruthenian council of Zamosc 
in 1720. Thirty years later he demonstrated his concern for 
the eastern rite in two encyclicals, one in 1755 and the 
other in 1756, instructing the clergy on the respect 
of the eastern rite and seeking to reassure Greek Catholics. 
The first of these, Allatae Sunt, concluded: 
The Church does not require schismatics to abandon 
their rites when they return to Catholic unity, 
but only that they forswear and detest heresy. 
Its great desire is for the preservation, not the 
destruction, of different peoples-- in short, that 
all may be Catholic rather than all become Latin.(23 
22. Constantin G. Patelos, Vatican! et les eveques 
uniates. Une etape eclairante d~ la politique romaine ~ 
1 egard des orientaux (1867-1870) (Louvain: Editions 
Nauwelaerts, 1981), 376-77. Only half the eight Greek 
Catholic bishops of the monarchy were in attendance. There 
were 3.7 million Greek Catholics in the empire in 1846--
Fenyes, Az ausztriai birodalom statisztikaja es 
foldrajzi leirasa, I, 46. 
23. Allatae Sunt and the following encyclical, Ex Quo 
Primum, are in The Papal Encyclicals 1740-1878, 51-102. 
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Defenders of the eastern rite in the nineteenth century 
would appeal to these encyclicals against the perceived 
threat of "Latinization." 
Roman interest in the East increased considerably in 
the nineteenth century. The first stimulus was the creation 
in 1815 of the Holy Alliance of a Catholic, Orthodox and a 
Lutheran monarch. The idea of European Christian unity 
attracted many thinkers in Russia and the rest of Europe, 
especially among the followers of a small group of Russian 
converts to Catholicism in Russia and the West. The 
response of the Holy See was a call for reunion with Rome, 
and not ecumenism in the modern sense. This was the essence 
of the encyclical In suprema Petri Apostoli Sede of 1848. 
It had very minor success, and its tone drew an indignant 
24 
response from the Orthodox patriarchs. 
The attraction to Rome drew more impetus from the 
emergence of the diplomatic Eastern Question than from the 
rather restricted spiritual movement. The decline of the 
Ottoman Empire was accompanied by the increased activity of 
Orthodox, Protestant and Catholic missionaries in competi-
tion with each other. Under European pressure the Porte 
conceded increased autonomy to the Christians in its decrees 
of 1839 and 1856, which in turn gave more freedom to the 
missionaries. The most promising Catholic union movements 
in succeeding years were among the Bulgarians in the Balkans 
24. Patelos, 29-43. 
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and the Armenians of Asia Minor. Polish agents played on 
the old Bulgarian Orthodox resentment of Phanariot influence 
to spark the Bulgarian movement. After Pius IX consecrated 
the leader of the movement as Greek Catholic archibishop in 
April, 1861, the number of converts reached 60,000 in a 
short time. The new archbishop was lured aboard a Russian 
ship and abducted only two months later. Subsequently the 
number of Bulgarian Greek Catholics to dwindle. On the the 
other hand, the more steady growth among the Armenians led 
to the creation of six new bishoprics in 1850 and a rapid 
25 
increase in the number of churches and schools. 
The Ottoman Hatti-Humayun (decree) of 1856 provided 
for increased lay involvement of in elections and the ad-
ministration of church property. The striving of Greek 
Catholics to assert their autonomy in this way involved them 
in a conflict with the Holy See concerning questions of 
canon law. In the Habsburg Empire, the Concordat and direct 
Roman influence increased the sensitivity of the Greek 
Catholics to Latinizing tendencies. In response to these 
developments, Pius IX sent the Benedictine Cardinal Pitra to 
Russia in 1859-60 to make a systematic study of eastern 
canon law. A further encouraging sign for those demanding a 
complete respect for the eastern rite was the creation of a 
section within the Congregatio de propaganda fidei for the 
25. Patelos, 10-12, 25-8; Aubert, 167-8, 171; Ivan 
Sofranov, Histoire du Mouvement Bulgar vers l~Eglise 
Catholigue au XIXe Siecle, I (Roma: Desclee & Cie., 1960), 
71-138. 
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eastern rites in January, 1862. The encyclical declaring 
this action denounced accucations of Latinization, insisting 
that the diversity of rites "greatly enhances the dignity of 
the church itself." The declared purpose of the new commis-
sion was the furtherence of the church union and the "pro-
tection of the integrity" of the individual rites through 
the careful review of regular reports concerning their spe-
cial problems to be submitted by the bishops. Each cardinal 
in the commission had expertise in a different oriental 
26 
rite. 
The greater pluralism and tolerance apparently presaged 
by the establishment of the commission did not come about. 
Some contemporaries remarked that the personality and views 
of the prefect of the commission, Cardinal Barnabo, were 
partly to blame. But as in the dispute over liberalism, the 
pope~s impatience with local innovations was decisive. As 
we will see, the Romanians of Transylvania were responsible 
for many of these innovations. The memorandum of the 
Armenian Patriarch Hassun at the end of 1866 provided the 
occasion for an overt change of policy. The bull 
Reversurus of July, 1867 formally concerned only the 
Armenians. But it made a blanket declaration that the 
deplorable schism in the East was the consequence of ignor-
ance, decadence, and lax discipline which must be corrected 
26. Aubert, 157; Patelos, 90. The encyclical of April 8, 
1862, Amantissimus, is in The Papal Encyclicals, 363-7. 
It does not appear that any of the Romanian bishops attended 
the subsequent meeting to which it expressly invited them. 
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by regeneration along the lines dictated by Rome. The 
policy of the oriental commission in the preparations and 
deliberation of the succeeding Vatican Council was in the 
27 
same spirit. Pius IX did not seek to alter liturgical 
rites, but he differed from many eastern prelates in his 
insistence that the integrity of rites did not also apply to 
discipline. Matters of church discipline-- organization, 
celibacy, relations with the Orthodox, fasting and calen-
dars--remained controversial. 
*** 
Catholicism and the Habsburg Monarchy 
The internal situation of the Roman Catholic Church in 
the Habsburg Monarchy reflected most of the broader features 
already referred to, but also local historical traditons. 
To an even greater extent than elsewhere in Catholic Europe, 
the church in Austria and especially Hungary was closely 
28 
tied to princely power already in the late Middle Ages. 
This connection became a virtual identity of interests in 
the hereditary provinces and the Habsburg-controlled part of 
Hungary during the Reformation and Thirty Years' War. The 
Counterreformation allied with Habsburg absolutism, while 
the provincial noble estates which opposed the latter were 
generally Protestant. The Thirty Years' War provided the 
pretext for the forceful suppression of Protestant estate 
27. Patelos, 55-62, 91-3, 541-6. 
28. Waltraud Heindl, "Die Wiener Nuntiatur und die 
Bischofsernennungen und Bischofsenthebungen in Ungarn 1848-
1850," Mitteilungen des Osterreichischen Staatsarchivs 24 
(1971), 400-2. 
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power in Austria and Bohemia. In those parts of the 
Hungarian lands beyond the reach of Habsburg armies, the 
Hungarian patriotic tradition ascribed a prime leadership 
role to the Reformed aristocracy. The Austro-Hungarian 
conflict of the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries was 
fought among the indigenous population between labanc 
(pro-Habsburg and Catholic) and kuruc (anti-Habsburg and 
often Reformed) guerilla forces. Their antithesis estab-
lished an important sociocultural tradition in Hungarian 
society. 
The Habsburg liberation of Hungary and Transylvania 
from the Turks at the end of the seventeenth century bore 
many of the marks of a hostile occupation; the feudal con-
stitution was violated by the new overlords in many details. 
But this occupation also facilitated the victory of a sig-
nificant, soon irrevocably powerful Catholic resurgence. 
According to Central European tradition and contemporary 
practice, the coexistence of several churches in a society 
implied partisan conflict. This was especially true for 
Transylvania. Describing the situation there at the begin-
ning of the eighteenth century, Friedrich Teutsch wrote: 
The Hungarian noble party, which was contiguous 
with the Calvinist party, was dominant; for here, 
like elsewhere, the religions were also political 
parties. 29 
29. Teutsch, Geschichte der evangelischen Kirche in 
Siebenburgen, II, 4. A striking example of this concept 
from the eighteenth century is in the pioneer work of the 
comparative history of religions, Geschichte der Religions-
parteyen by Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten, in which "Religions-
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The Catholic "party" was numerically weak in eastern Hungary 
and especially in Transylvania. It was strengthened by the 
settlement of Catholic peasants, craftsmen, civil servants 
and soldiers, by various church unions, and by 
administrative measures which expressly favored the Catholic 
Church and the recatholicization of Protestants. 
The Habsburgs settled numerous Catholic peoples in 
Hungary in the eighteenth century, but relatively few in 
Transylvania proper. Many of the new settlers in Transylvania 
30 
were Orthodox Romanians. The church unions of the later 
seventeenth century (of the Ruthenians in 1649-89, the 
Armenians in 1684, and the Romanians in 1699-1701) at least 
temporarily decreased the number of Orthodox in Hungary and 
Transylvania by roughly one-half. In Transylvania, the 
Romanian church union increased several times the number of 
Catholic believers and their privileged clergy. The Austrian 
parteyen" are defined as "Gesellschaften, die sich uber den 
gottesdienstlichen Lehrbegriff widersprechen." The 1766 
edition of the work (Halle: bey Johann Justinus Gebauer) is 
in the Sibiu library of the Romanian ASTRA. 
30. Concerning the research on eighteenth-century popu-
lation changes see the introductory study by Gyorgy Litvan 
in Oszkar Jaszi, A nemzeti allamok kialakulasa es a nemzeti-
segi kerdes. Valogatas (Budapest: Gondolat, 1986),-25-7. 
The mass Catholic (Schwaben) settlement was chiefly in the 
Banat and Maramaros regions. Government-sponsored settle-
ment in Transylvania totalled less than 10,000, and most of 
these were Protestants. Zsolt Tr6csanyi, rejecting the 
thesis that the Romanians were in the majority earlier, as 
well, has calculated there was an influx in the eighteenth 
century of roughly 350,000 Orthodox Romanians. Due to the 
migration of Hungarians westward, he concludes, the Romanian 
percentage of the population increased from one third to 
three fifths between 1712 and 1760. Tr6csanyi, "6j etnikai 
kep, ~j uralmi rendszer (1711-1770)," in Erd~ly tbrtenete II 
(Budapest: Akademiai, 1986), 975-81. 
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authorities facilitated the Catholic expropriation of many 
Protestant church buildings and schools. The dimensions of 
recatholicization, more than those of the church union, are 
difficult to estimate. A significant minority of Protestant 
noblemen converted, enjoying political benefits thereby, and 
the Protestant serfs on their estates more or less automati-
cally converted with them. 
The political motive was prominent in all of the church 
unions of East Central Europe in the sixteenth through 
31 
eighteenth centuries. The greater or lesser degree of 
military coercion involved in the acts of union does not 
alter the fact that they arose essentially from the cultural 
reorientation of small nations' ruling clergy under the 
press of changing geopolitics. The rising power of Catholic 
Poland and Austria presented these clergies with the oppor-
tunity to exchange the domination of local Orthodox or 
Reformed aristocracies for that of a more distant hierarchy 
and state that promised social advantages. In the Ruthenian 
and Romanian unions, Hungarian princes and estates resisting 
Habsburg domination openly favored the Orthodox defense of 
tradition and were supported by the churchmen of the 
Danubian Principalities for this reason. They resented the 
union as a scheme by the Habsburgs to withdraw their 
Romanian serfs from religious and political subjection. The 
31. For a good survey of the church unions, marred by 
some errors of detail, see Helmut Rumpler, "Politik und 
Kirchenunion in der Habsburgermonarchie," bsterreichische 
Osthefte 6 (1964), 302-20. 
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church union virtually dissolved in the course of the anti-
Habsburg Rakoczi rebellion in 1703-11, when Rak6czi spon-
32 
sored the election of a new Romanian Orthodox Archbishop. 
The clergy united with Rome because it was promised 
release from serfdom and enjoyment of the same privileges as 
the Roman Catholic clergy. Active Austrian support was 
needed for the survival of the union because of the con-
siderable influence of Russian-supported Serbian Orthodox 
agitators among the commoners. The church union vastly 
increased Romanian opportunities for higher education, with 
decisive results for the development of a national ideology 
33 
and western-educated intelligentsia. It is tempting to 
censure the Ruthenian and Romanian clergy who concluded the 
unions because they placed their own social advancement 
above the popular adherance to Orthodoxy. Yet one should 
recall that religious and social elites everywhere pursued 
34 
their interests with little regard for the popular will. 
The Catholic nobility of Transylvania, settlers, in-
digenous and newly converted, enjoyed the energetic support 
of the court. By mid-century it had secured most of the 
32. Paul Cernovodeanu, "A roman fejedelemsegek es a 
magyar szabadsagharc," in Kalman Benda, ed., Europa es a 
Rakoczi Szabadsagharc (Budapest: Akademiai, 1980), 65-70, 
and other articles in the same volume. 
33. See Makkai, 130-55; Emanuel Turczynski Konfession 
und Nation. Zur Fruhgeschichte der serbischen und rumani-
schen Nationsbildung (Dusseldorf: Padogogischer Verlag 
Schwann, 1976), 116-34. 
34. Octavian Barlea presents a well-documented argument 
that the Romanian church union was the consequence of a 
genuine religious conversion; Barlea, appendix to Wilhelm de 
Vries et al., Rom und die Patriarchate des Ostens (Freiburg: 
Verlag Karl Alber,-r96~ 223-35. ---
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governorships and a majority in the Gubernium. The person-
nel of the court Chancellery became exclusively Catholic and 
Catholic representation in the diet also greatly increased. 
35 
The former laws against Catholics were abolished. 
In 1713 the Roman Catholic diocese received its first 
resident bishop after nearly two centuries, when there were 
only 30,000 Roman Catholics in Transylvania, or one-tenth 
36 
the number of Greek Catholics The revival of religious 
orders and Catholic secondary education in succeeding years 
helped to dramatically change the religious makeup of 
Transylvania. 
The Catholic revival came at the price of unprecedented 
state interference in church affairs. An organ of the 
Gubernium, the Catholica Commissio, supervized conversions, 
the foundation of parishes, and the schools in general, from 
37 
1767 on. State interference in Catholic affairs, was a 
general feature of Habsburg rule in the century following 
the ascension of Maria Theresa in 1740. The policy was 
accentuated under her son, Joseph II, after whom it has been 
called Josephinism. Roman Catholicism remained the dominant 
church, but imperial regulations "rationalized" liturgical 
practices, dissolved many monasteries, centralized seminary 
education, and restricted bishops' contact with the Holy 
35. Trocsanyi, op. cit., 1006-8. 
36. Barlea, Ostkirchliche Tradition und westlicher 
Katholizismus. Die rumanische Kirche zwiSChen 1713-1727 
(Monachii: [sn]~966) (=Societas Academica Dacoromana, Acta 
Historica, vol. 6), 13, citing a document in the Vatican 
Archives from 1714. 
37. Trocsanyi, op. cit., 1087-8. 
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See. The placetum regium, right of the Habsburg ruler to 
prevent the publication by diocesan bishops of papal edicts, 
was more strictly enforced than previously, and the visita-
tion of bishoprics by the Papal Nuncio forbidden. The 
ideology of Josephinism bore much in common with that of 
Gallicanism. Its ideal cleric was the ~stor bonus, who was 
simultaneously guardian of public morality, educator in such 
matters as health and animal husbandry, and servant of the 
state. A decree of the Hungarian State Chancellery in 1792 
referred to the priest as "a state official within the 
38 
church." The ideal, by encouraging a more secular and 
individualist clergy, made it more susceptible to liber-
39 
alism. 
The Pope fought against state interference and the 
rationalist and utilitarian tenets of Josephinism just as he 
had fought against those of Gallicanism. Often the Holy See 
and the Habsburg authorities failed to agree on the appoint-
ments to vacant bishoprics. The continued vacancy of sees 
was actually advantageous to state finances: in such cases 
the financial authorities could and legally did claim the 
income from the respective diocese. In 1800 seven bishop-
rics in Hungary, representing half the Roman Catholics in 
the country, were vacant. The Primacy of Esztergom was 
38. Cited by Imre Revesz in f§j~~~tek ~ Bach-korszak 
§gyhazpolitikajabol (Budapest: Akademiai, 1957), 11. 
39. John W. Boyer, R2litis_::.§-.l gadicalism in Late Imperial 
.Yi-~_!!n_9.~ Orjg_i-_!!§_ 2J .tl:l§ S::!"l!i:§_ti:.?:!l §o_gi:.§-1 Me>.Yement 1848-1897 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 123-6. 
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40 
itself vacant for fifty-two years. 
Josephinian church policy aroused a challenge in the 
form of an ideologically allied movement, Febronianism. The 
theology of the eighteenth-century Febronius (Nikolaus 
Johann von Hontheim) derived the right of diocesan adminis-
tration from the Catholic monarch rather than the Pope. 
Expanding the church~s doctrine of canonica disciplina, 
Febronius also placed a strong emphasis on the regular 
convocation of diocesan synods to monitor and improve the 
spiritual and material condition of the clergy. He even 
argued for the participation of the laity in the synods. 
Such synods could further the Josephinian ideal of the 
pastor bonus, but could also facilitate clerical solidarity 
in the face of the state. 
A handful of Hungarian bishops in the early nineteenth 
century were Josephinians, subservient to the state but 
advocates of increased synodal activity. Sandor Rudnay, 
Bishop of Transylvania 1816-19 and Primate 1819-31, justi-
fied the long-delayed convocation of diocesan synods 
throughout the Hungarian lands in 1822 in Febronian terms. 
His successor in Transylvania, Ignac Szepessy (1820-28), was 
the most strongly Josephinian Hungarian bishop. In 1822 he 
promulgated a code of diocesan canon law on the eve of the 
convocation of the Transylvanian synod. It prescribed par-
liamentary procedure for the synod with majority voting, and 
40. Egyed Hermann, ~ katolikus egxhaz tortenete 
Magyarorszagon 1914-ig (Munchen: Aurora, 1973), 378; Lukacs, 
A Vatikan es Magyarorszag, 44-5, 56-7. 
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entitled the canons and deans to hold the bishop responsible 
for statutory violations. Both provisions were departures 
from previous practice. Szepessy used his synod, and his 
appearance at the subsequent national synod, to restate his 
principles. The Habsburg court approved of his ideas, but 
denounced the unauthorized publication of his law code. The 
Holy See strongly disapproved of the synod's decrees, and 
41 
forced Szepessy to invalidate them. The diocesan and 
national synods also revealed considerable dissatisfaction 
with the level of material support enjoyed by the clergy and 
proposed specific remedies. The Transylvanian synod voted 
significant reforms. The civil authorities simply ignored 
these acts, however, and allowed no further synods until 
42 
1848. 
The decade of the national synod was also that of a 
modest ecumenical movement in Hungary, led among the 
Catholics by the theologian and Benedictine monk Izidor 
Guzmics. The movement had a nationalist element: in the 
national revival, many politicians and writers denounced 
confessional disunity as shameful and even dangerous in a 
43 
time of national struggle. Liberal theological tenden-
41. Antal Meszlenyi, ~magyar hercegprimasok arckep-
sorozata (1707-1945) (Budapest: Szent Istvan Tarsulat, 
1970), 188-95. 
42. Hermann, 401-5; Bertalan Bagossy, "A jozefinizmus 
hatasa s az erdelyi egyhazmegyek kuzdelme ezek ellenere 
(1790-1847)," in Az erdelyi katholicizmus multja es jelene 
(Dicsoszentmarton:-Erzsebet Konyvnyomda Reszvenytarsasag, 
1925), 184-5. 
43. Hermann, 416; Kelemen Kiraly, A Katolikus-protes-
tans egysegtorekves tortenete Magyarorszagon (Brunswick, NJ: 
Standard Press, 1965), 29-66. 
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cies among the Protestants were a strong potential stimulus 
for Hungarian Catholics, especially in Transylvania. Most 
of the liberal leaders there were Protestants, and the 
Reformed Church itself served briefly as a rallying point 
44 
for the liberal opposition. 
Hungarian Reformed and Romanian Orthodox politics al-
lied intermittently, for the last time, in the years before 
1848. In the Transylvanian diet and counties the Hungarian 
opposition spoke out against the ongoing wave of Catholici-
zation among the Romanian Orthodox. The Habsburg royal 
commissioner wrote to Vienna that the elevation of the 
Orthodox to "received" status would deprive the opposition 
45 
of a fertile pretext for agitation. The growth of 
Romanian nationalism led to the willingness of the Greek 
Catholic and Orthdox bishops to cooperate in pursuit of 
national goals. Their petitions of 1791 (Supplex Libellus 
Valachorum) and 1834 that the Romanians be recognized as 
fourth constitutional nation failed due to overwhelming 
Hungarian opposition. They then sought to exploit Hungarian 
sympathy for the Orthodox to at least assuage some of this 
group's grievances. In 1837-8, and then again in 1842-3, 
they submitted petitions to the diet on behalf of the reli-
gious and political emancipation of the Orthodox in the 
44. Ambrus Miskolczy, "Erdely a reformkorban (1830-
1848)," in Erdely t6rtenete, III, 127?-~· , , 
45. Miskolczy, "Tarsadalom, nemzet1seg es ellenzek-
iseg kerdesei az erdelyi magyar reformmozgalomban (1830-
1843)," Sz~zadok 117 (1983), 1067; Ibid., "Erdely a 
reformkorban," 1272, 1309. 
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Fundus Regius. These, too, were unsuccessful, as the 
Hungarian opposition chose, for a change, to side with the 
conservative Saxon establishment. They united in the face 
46 
of the long-term threat of Romanian emancipation. 
Josephinian views among the Austrian and Hungarian 
clergy, though declining by the mid-nineteenth century, 
47 
created a latent susceptibility to liberalism. In 1848, 
the episcopate sought its liberation from Josephinian state 
supervision. Under the newly established free press and 
parliaments, the political influence of the churches decreased 
considerably. The laity was less likely to look to the 
bishops and synods for the representation of their interests. 
The liberals' demand for freedom of religion and the reduction 
of Catholic influence on education and marriages put the clergy 
on the defensive. Liberal anticlericalism during the revolution 
was strongest in Vienna, where the Archbishop's residence 
was the target of protest demonstrations by his opponents." 
Such attacks were rare in Hungary and Transylvania, but the 
abolition of various Catholic Church privileges prompted 
countermeasures by the lower clergy and episcopate. 
The revival of the synodal movement in 1848, and its 
occasional sanction by the episcopate, must be seen in the 
46. Ladislau Gyemant, Mi$carea nationala a romanilor din 
Transilvania 1790-1848 (Bucure~ti: Editura 9tiintifica 9i 
enciclopedica, 1986), 129-46. 
47. Peter Leisching, "Die r6misch-katholische Kirche in 
Cisleithanien," in Die Habsburger Monarchie 1848-1918, IV 
Die Konfessionen, (Wien: Verlag der Osterreichischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1985), 90-2. 
48. R. John Rath, The Viennese Revolution of 1848 (New 
York: Greenwood Press~969), 166-72, 232-4. 
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48 
light of this defensive posture. A minority of the clergy 
in Vienna followed the liberal theology of Anton Gunther 
which grew out of the Josephinian tradition of synodalism 
and increasing the rights of the lower clergy. But most 
priests sought only "to defend themselves against street 
corner anticlericalism and to enhance their pastoral effect-
iveness in the chaos of the revolution." Even so, 
Archbishop Milde flatly rejected the reforms they pro-
49 
posed. 
The threat to the church in the Hungarian lands was of 
a more coherent, material nature, and consequently a greater 
degree of agreement existed between the episcopate and the 
lower clergy concerning the response. Unlike in Austria, 
there was a large Protestant population, which sought to 
achieve civil rights and material support equal to those 
enjoyed by the Roman Catholics. The Protestants hoped for 
support from the state-managed Religionsfonds, which the 
50 
Catholic bishops claimed was theirs alone. Several 
bishops sought the support of the laity as well as the lower 
clergy in their struggle by granting them a considerable 
voice in the synods they convened. Some of the clergy, for 
instance in the diocese of Vac, made such radical demands as 
49. Boyer, 132-3, from which this quotation is taken; 
on Gunther's movement, see Thomas W. Simons, Jr., "Vienna's 
First Catholic Political Movement: The Glintherians, 1848-
1857," Catholic Historical Review 40 (1969-70), 173-94, 377-
93, 610-26. 
50. The fund had been created by Joseph II for the 
support of the Roman Catholic clergy from the property of 
the monasteries he had dissolved. 
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the translation of the liturgy into Hungarian and the aboli-
51 
tion of priestly celibacy. The situation was similar in 
Transylvania, except that there the Romanian demand at the 
assembly in Blaj in May, 1848 for annual national synods was 
an added impulse for the Roman Catholics to make similar 
52 
demands. 
The proposed reforms took the name in Hungary of 
Catholic Autonomy. The goal of the Hungarian Catholic 
Autonomy movement has been defined as "the attainment of 
self-administration for the Hungarian Catholic Church simi-
lar to that enjoyed by the Protestant denominations on the 
basis of the principle of religious equality declared by Law 
53 
XX of 1848." Historians of the movement date its origin 
to the March 20, 1848 conference of the the Hungarian epis-
copate. As the participant Bishop Mihaly Fogarasy recorded, 
the diet~s legislation for an independent Hungarian govern-
ment and religious equality created a radically new situa-
tion for the church. "They understood the warning of pol-
itical developments: that henceforth, faced with a freer 
constitution, the church must take a more independent posi-
tion vis a vis the state." The church itself should take 
over the patronage rights enjoyed previously by the Catholic 
51. Moritz Cs~ky, "Die r6misch-katholische Kirche in 
Ungarn," in Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918 IV, Die 
Konfessionen, 253-62. 
52. Karoly Rass, "Az 1848-iki atalakul~s," Az erdelyi 
katholicizmus multja es jelene, 219-20. 
53. Jeno Torok, A katolikus autonomia-mozgalom 1848-
1871. Adalekok ~magyar liberalis-katolicizmus tortenetehez 
(Budapest: Stephaneum, 1941), 11. 
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monarch: "It is impossible that we would desire that the 
ministerial government enjoy the same power over the 
Catholic Church ••• therefore the Catholic Church wishes to 
exercize the same rights conceded elsewhere by the freer 
constitutional institutions." Later he added that the 
church "is deprived of princely protection ••• and must 
54 
resort to the protection of its own faithful." 
The April Laws caught the Catholics unprepared, while 
the liberal government for its part was suspicious of Roman 
influence on the church and proposed to eliminate state 
subsidies. Many attributed the slow Catholic response to 
inadequate popular interest and proposed more frequent dio-
cesan synods as one remedy. In May Father Janos Danielik 
used Religio to propagate the organization of a national 
"Catholic Institute", on the model of the English body of 
the same name. The Institute would be a network of deanery, 
diocesan and national councils with functions analogous to 
those of the Protestant synods. Several diocesan synods 
took up the same idea, but made little progress before the 
radicalization of the revolution and the deterioration of 
relations with the hierarchy and the Holy See undermined the 
possibility of Vatican approval. The revolution did estab-
lish the range of conceptions later associated with Catholic 
Autonomy: a means for the hierarchy to n1aintain the legal 
control of its property, in religious terms an antidote to 
54. [Fogarasy], Emlekirat az 1847/8. orszaggyules alatt 
Pozsonyban tartott puspoki tanacskozmanyokr61. §gy reszvevo-
t61 (Pest: 1848), 33, 65 cited by Torok, 18, 35. 
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popular indifference and passivity, or finally the means 
toward general democratization and the supercession of such 
"archaic" institutions as priestly celibacy, monastic orders 
55 
and the Latin Mass. 
The revolutionary government in Hungary named politic-
ally congenial bishops to four vacant sees in 1848. Due to 
their political behavior during the revolution, these four 
and several others were removed from their sees after the 
defeat of the Revolution. The Holy See did not oppose the 
dismissal of those appointed in 1848, whose confirmation 
it had withheld, but insisted on the "voluntary" abdication 
56 
of four who had already been consecrated. 
*** 
The Concordat and Hungary 
The previous chapter noted the dim view contemporaries 
took of the state of religiosity in Hungary. Due to his 
prominence in politics and culture it is of special interest 
that Jozsef Eotvos shared this view with respect to the 
Catholic Church. He charged the clergy in particular with 
apathy and indifference, and claimed the quality of Catholic 
schools was possibly the worst in Europe. In sum, 
55. Torok, 31-48. It is true, as Lukacs points out, 
that the bishops' initial support for synodalist claims was 
only a tactical move. This does not justify the author's 
doctrinaire assertion that synodality was therefore retro-
grade. It clearly represented an outgrowth of the liberal 
tendency in Hungarian society. See Lukacs, A Vatikan es 
Magyarorszag, 57-9. -
56. Heindl, 404-32. These abdications established the 
procedure to be followed with Haynald in 1863. Alexander 
Bach strongly advocated the procedure in 1849-50 as a com-
promise solution. 
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Our church conditions are extrordinarily sad, 
and a Catholic spirit is hardly observable at any 
other time, than in opposition to other denomina-
tions ... In moments of great agitation there is 
nothing more dangerous than religious indifference, 
and I believe there is hardly another country in 
Europe where this property is so universal among 
the Catholics as here. (57 
Eotvos wrote to Montalembert at the conclusion of the 
Austro-Prussian War in 1866 that the only way to overcome 
the religious apathy of the Hungarian Catholics was to 
establish for them the same self-administration and lay 
58 
participation already enjoyed by the Protestants. He 
emphasized the importance of this concept in his later 
letters to Montalembert and to the Hungarian bishops. His 
conception considerably predated this period. As Jeno Torok 
has shown, he had laid down his ideas already in his master-
piece of political philosophy first published in 1851-4, The 
Influence of the Ruling Ideas of the Nineteenth Century upon 
59 
the State. 
The "ruling ideas" of Eotvos' treatise were liberty, 
equality and nationality. Since all three were characteris-
tics of individuals, the chief task of the state was the 
guarantee of the liberty of the individual, and by means of 
the establishment of local autonomy. Religious autonomy 
superceded all other autonomies in importance, since it was 
at the most basic level of the individual's conscience. 
57. Eotvos to Montalembert, September 4, 1867, in 
Eotvos, Levelek ([Budapest]: Magyar Helikon, 1976), 505. 
58. Eotvos to Montalembert, July 27, 1866, in ibid., 
467. 
59. Hungarian title: A XIX. szazad uralkodo eszmeinek 
befolyasa az allodalomra~ 
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Eotvos believed, like the French liberal Catholics, that the 
ethics of Christianity made it the "religion of freedom," 
which should possess the means to protect the state and 
society from revolution, despotism, excessive nationalism 
and anarchy. Hence the strengthening of religious feeling 
was in the general interest. This was even more evident 
with Catholicism in the Habsburg monarchy, since beyond its 
ethical value it was the religion of most Slavs and a coun-
terweight to the perceived threat of Russian Pan-Slavism. 
Eotvos recommended Autonomy in the double sense (self-ad-
ministration and lay participation) to overcome what he 
60 
argued was the poor state of Hungarian Catholicism. 
Despite the ambivalent behavior of numerous bishops and 
clergy during the Revolution, the postrevolutionary Austrian 
regime viewed the Catholic Church as an important base of 
support. Catholic Hungarian aristocrats at the court sought to 
encourage this view, arguing that "Hungarian Protestanism 
is more dangerous to the unitary Austrian Monarchy than 
61 
Magyar ism." In the new situation the court sought the 
sincere and active support of the Roman Catholic bishops, 
60. This summary of Eotvos' relevant ideas closely 
follows Jeno Torok, 54-66; for his critique of nationalism, 
see Paul Body, Joseph Eotvos and the Modernization of 
Hungary, 1840-1870. ~ Study of Ideas of Individuality and 
Social Pluralism in Modern Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press,-r985), 66-74. Unlike most Hungarians, 
Eotvos believed the national minorities' churches should be 
strengthened, and hence he defended Romanian Orthodox church 
autonomy as an extension of his general conception of auto-
nomy; see Body, 118. 
61. From the memorandum of Count Gyorgy Apponyi of 
January, 1849, cited by Friedrich Walter, "Die Beteiligung 
der magyarischen Protestanten an der Revolution 1848/49," 272. 
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hence it rapidly granted their request for conferences at 
which they could discuss their problems and formulate policy 
proposals. The Cisleithanian bishops convened in Vienna at 
the end of April, 1849 and the Hungarian bishops under the 
leadership of the newly named Primate of Esztergom, Janos 
Scitovszky, in August, 1850. The two conferences agreed on 
their basic demands, which clearly aimed at the weakening of 
62 
Josephinian church policy. 
Imperial legislation favorable to the church soon followed. 
The placetum was abolished and theological instruction returned 
to direct supervision by the bishops already in 1850, and two 
years later the law on Religionsstorung reinforced the civil 
63 
authority of the lower clergy. Vienna still expected 
clergymen to inculcate loyalty to civil authority, but 
entrusted resolution of complaints in this regard to 
commissions composed of equal numbers of diocesan and 
64 
Habsburg officials. 
Negotiations began on a comprehensive treaty between 
Austria and the Vatican, the Concordat. It was was finally 
62. Revesz, 14-15; Lukacs, ~ Vatikan es Magyarorszag, 
90-l; Gabriel Adrianyi, Die Stellung der ungarischen Kirche 
zum osterreichischen Konkordat von 1855 (Roma: [s.n. ], 
1963), 57-68. -------
63. Revesz, 15-16; Leisching, 47. Ten years later the 
Transylvanian Hungarian opponents of Schmerling~s policy, 
who generally rejected all "absolutist" legislation, used 
this law to prosecute the Romanian nationalist Axente Sever 
when he became embroiled in a dispute with a Magyarophile 
priest. See Chapter VIII. 
64. Circular of the Governor of Transylvania, September 
15, 1851, in AS Alba Iulia, Protopopiatul G.C. Alba Iulia. 
Pachet 8, Acte oficioase. 1851/8. This procedure no longer 
obtained in the 1860s. 
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concluded in 1855. From the beginning the Concordat was 
controversial from the beginning. It became the bete noir 
of the Austrian liberals, undermining the support they might 
have extended the regime for its pragmatic economic and 
administrative reforms. In the words of Robert A. Kann, the 
Concordat embodied "the true [i.e. repressive] spirit of the 
regime." He emphasized the unprecedented degree of church 
supervision over education and the jurisdiction of Catholic 
ecclesiastical courts in matrimonial matters. Liberals and 
Protestants denounced the Concordat as the oppressive alli-
ance of an intolerant, ultramontane church with the absol-
65 
utist state. The encyclical Singulari Quidem 
addressed to the bishops of the empire after the the 
Concordat was openly exclusivist and conservative. To fight 
the evil of religious indifference, bishops should 
Saturate [the faithful] with the doctrine of 
Catholic truth more accurately each day ... there 
can be no greater crime ... than to divide the 
Church ... , than to forget evangelical love and to 
combat with the furor of hostile discord the har-
mony of the people of God. 
The encyclical denounced rationalism, and insisted that 
progress in the church consists solely of "the progress of 
66 
faith, which is not change." 
The negative view of the Concordat is accurate if one 
considers only school and matrimonial matters, although even 
65. Robert A. Kann, ~ History of the Habsburg Empire 
1526-1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 
321-2. His appraisal of the Concordat is exclusively nega-
tive. 
66. Singulari Quidem, March 17, 1856, in The Papal 
Encyclicals, 339-45. 
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here the polemicists exaggerated matters and failed to note 
the non-application of the Concordat in many respects. In 
other respects the Concordat was complementary to the econ-
omic policy of the period and fulfilled a popular Catholic 
demand in 1848, the emancipation of the church. The church 
regained the freedom to administer its internal affairs 
which it had lost under Josephinism, and later liberal 
67 
regimes never abridged this freedom. Prominent in this 
freedom was episcopal visitation of parishes and the holding 
of diocesan synods. Singulari Quidem strongly endorsed the 
68 
holding of synods. 
The imperial government conceded a lessening of its power 
over the church, but also hoped to strengthen the centralization 
of the empire with the help of the church. As the chief Austrian 
negotiator with the Vatican, the new Archbishop of Vienna, Joseph 
Othmar von Rauscher, stated: imperial unity requires unity within 
the church between Austria and Hungary, and "only the Holy See has 
the right and the authority to completely unite the Hungarian 
church with the Austrian church." Minister of the Interior 
Alexander Bach remarked, similarly, that it was hoped the 
Concordat would resolve the Italian and Hungarian questions by 
helping to overcome political and national prejudices. Austria 
conceded more to the church in the Concordat than it had 
originally intended, but considered this worthwhile in order 
67. My interpretation here follows that of Boyer, 20-1. 
68. These recommendations included the cautionary phrase 
"in conformity with the canonical prescriptions." The Papal 
Encyclicals, 342, 344. 
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69 
to further the ecclesiastical integration of Hungary. 
These intentions became known to the Hungarian episco-
pate in 1850, when it began to register its insistence on 
the previously existing regulations applying to the church 
in Hungary. Scitovszky traveled to Rome in October, 1854 
and sought to limit the application of the prospective 
Concordat in Hungary. He argued that in Hungary, unlike in 
Austria, formal canonic procedures for marriages were still 
in full force, the bishops already had complete supervision 
over Catholic schools, and the testamentary rights of the 
bishops were not restricted as in Austria: hence the 
Concordat was unnecessary there. The views of Vienna pre-
vailed, and Scitovszky's appeal was rejected. In a secret 
article appended to the Concordat, moreover, the state re-
served for itself the right to punish bishops and clergymen 
guilty of crimes against the state, and suspended the con-
siderable immunity (privilegium fori) the clergy had 
70 
enjoyed in Hungary. 
As with the later Protestant Patent and the adminis-
trative reforms of the 1860s, the state conceded more rights 
in Cisleithania than it had prior to 1848, but offered 
little improvement over the pre-1848 status in Hungary. The 
uniform application of the Concordat in Hungary meant a 
69. Leisching, 27-30; Rauscher is cited in Revesz, 15, 
and Bach in Adrianyi, Die Stellung der ungarischen Kirche, 
30. 
70. Adrianyi, Die Stellung der ungarischen Kirche, 88-
108; Celestin Wolfsgruber, Joseph Othmar Cardinal Rauscher, 
Flirsterzbischof von Wien. Sein Leben und sein Wirken (Wien: 
B. Herder, 1888), 157. 
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restriction of many rights claimed by the episcopate. 
The Hungarian episcopate publicly welcomed the Concordat 
after it was enacted, as in the given situation it undeni-
ably improved the position of the church via a vis the 
72 
state. In succeeding years the bishops enjoyed greater 
influence over church endowments, and the Concordat facili-
tated the convocation of provincial (for an archdiocese and 
its suffragans) synods in Esztergom in 1858 and Kalocsa in 
1863 and diocesan synods in 1860 and 1863; their decisions 
73 
were actually put into effect. The improvements still 
fell short of the bishops' desires. 
The chief grievance of the Hungarian episcopate and of 
Catholic opinion against Austrian church policy and the 
Concordat concerned the prerogatives of the Primate. The 
Prince-Primate of Esztergom had been the second civil offi-
cial of old-regime Hungary after the Palatine. As the head 
of the church, he presided over the national synod in 1822. 
The chief embodiment of his jurisdiction was his presidency 
71. Adrianyi argues the Concordat granted the Hungarian 
episcopate less rights than it had enjoyed previously. Yet 
by his own calculation, twenty-one articles of the Concordat 
represented no change, six articles increased the canonic 
freedom of the bishops, and five decreased it.-- Die 
Stellung der ungarischen Kirche, 119-21. 
72. Ibid., 123, 130. 
73. The synods, which enjoyed a higher canonical status 
than the less formal conferences in which the Hungarian 
bishops participated in Esztergom in 1850 and Vienna in 
1856, passed religious regulations for the respective 
dioceses. Konrad Szanto, ~ katolikus egyhaz tortenete, II 
(Budapest: Ecclesia, 1985), 407; Janos Karacsonyi, Magyaror-
szag eg¥haztortenete fobb vonasaiban 970-tol 1900-ig 
(Veszprem: Egyhazmegyei konyvnyomda, 1929), 268. (facsimile 
ed.: Budapest: Konyvertekesito vallalat, 1985). 
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of the highest ecclesiastical court of appeals in Hungary. 
The Primate actually exercized this judicial privilege in 
1846, when the condemnation by his court of the radical 
professors at the Romanian school in Blaj led to their 
75 
dismissal. 
74 
Nationality and confessional politics complemented each 
other in the policy toward the Primacy in the 1850s. Just 
as the Concordat served the antiliberal ideology of the 
ultramontane movement, hierarchical changes reflected the 
new activism with respect to the eastern rite. The Serbian 
and Romanian Orthodox bishops had proven effective champions 
of their respective nations~ cause in 1848-9. Calling at-
tention to the increased influence of Orthodoxy in 
Transylvania due to ~aguna, the Hungarian bishops~ conference 
of 1850 recommended the elevation of the Romanian see in 
Blaj to the rank of archbishopric or metropolitanate. The 
Croatian see of Zagreb was raised to an archbishopric in 
1852 with three suffragan bishops in Croatia and Slavonia, 
withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Kalocsa 
and subordinated directly to the Holy See. A year later, 
the Romanian see at Blaj was similarly separated from its 
subordination to the Primate, and two new Greek Catholic 
dioceses created. The will of the Holy See was evident, and 
Scitovszky voluntarily abdicated from his metropolitan 
76 
rights over the Blaj see. The recognition by the papal 
74. Adrianyi, op. cit., 113. 
75. Footnote in GBCS, III, 85. 
76. Lukacs, A Vatikan es Magyarorszag, 91, 96-7; DSSS, 
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bulls of hierarchical separation on ethnic lines was unpre-
77 
cedented in Catholicism, and disturbing to Hungarians. 
The direct subordination of the new Metropolitan of 
Blaj, Sulutiu, and his three suffragans to the Congregatio 
de Propaganda fidei meant that the new Vatican eastern 
policy would have a more direct impact on Romanian affairs. 
Singulari Quidem reemphasized Rome's respect for the eastern 
rite and called for regular reports by Greek Catholic bishops 
78 
to the congregation. The Pope hoped to bring about a 
special Concordat for the Greek Catholics of the monarchy 
and to send Cardinal Pitra to Blaj in 1858 as a first step 
toward this goal. Neither plan was realized, but the Nuncio 
took an active role in the delicate relations of Sulutiu, 
79 
Haynald and the authorities. 
Archbishop Rauscher considered the Primacy a mere tra-
dition, without canonical status. As he wrote in a memoran-
dum in 1857: there is no indication of a subordination to 
Esztergom in the papal bulls establishing the Archbishoprics 
61-72. After 1867 Hungarian and Romanian Catholics disa-
greed as to whether Scitovszky had also renounced his rights 
vis a vis Blaj as Primate, i.e. in public law; Elemer 
Gy~rf~s, "A rom~n g6r6g katholikusok autonomi~ja," 
Katholikus Szemle, 19 (1905), 350-65. 
77. The Holy See sought to console Scitovszky by naming 
him in 1852 apostolic visitor (inspector) for the monasteries 
of the provinces of Esztergom, Eger and Kalocsa for the 
period of three years, and elevating him to the dignity of 
Cardinal two years later.-- Luk~cs, ~ Vatikan es Magyaror-
szag, 97; J~nos T6r6k, Magyarorsz~g pr1masa, I, 260-1. 
The aspostolic visitorship reinforced Scitovszky's claim to 
the Primacy, but his visits to the province of Kalocsa 
prompted strong protests of interference by Jozsef Kunszt, 
the Archbishop of Kalocsa. 
78. The Papal Encyclicals, 344-5. 
79. DSSS, 137-8; see Chapter VIII. 
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of Kalocsa, Eger, Zagreb and Blaj. 
The foundation of a Primatial authority, as the 
Archbishop of Esztergom demands, would establish a 
Hungarian national church: something the Holy See 
can desire no more than the foundation of a German 
Patriarchate, which has also been demanded. (80 
The Hungarian demand, he assereted, was basically political 
in nature. Only the newly achieved close union with Austria 
preserved Catholicism in Hungary from the persecution and 
plunder of revolution. Hungarian claims to exclusivity, 
81 
unrestrained, were bound to provoke serious disorders. 
The view of the Holy See was nearly the same. The Nuncio 
informed Scitovszky that the Concordat was the best alterna-
tive available to the church in Hungary. The Vatican 
accepted the juridical subordination to the Primate only of 
Eger, of the four archbishoprics. Due to the importance 
that Hungarian patriots attached to the Primatial dignity, 
however, it decided to forego any statement on the question 
in order to protect the prestige of the church in 
82 
Hungary. 
The office of Hungarian Primate was not mentioned 1n 
80. On the initiatives for a German Primacy in 1806 and 
1848, see Heyer, 114, and Aubert, 75. 
81. "Gran's Ansprtiche auf eine Primatialgewalt ~ber 
Ungarn und dessen vormalige Nebenl~nder," ms. in Vienna, 
Erzdiozesanarchiv. Bishofsakten Rauscher; see also 
Wolfsgruber, 147-8. 
82. Adrianyi, op. cit., 112-13; Lukacs, A Vatikan es 
Magyarorszag, 107-8. Archbishop Kunszt denied his see-had 
ever been dependent on Esztergom (Lukacs, 108); one of his 
priests published a pamphlet in 1866 denying the Primate's 
claims, but making no reference to the Archbishop of Vienna 
or the Concordat: Jozsef Kovats, ~ primasi joghatosag es ~ 
kalocsai erseki szek. Elleneszrevetelek Dr. Frankl [Frakn6i] 
Vilmos urnak "Adalekok" stb. cz. ertekezesere (Pest: Elsa 
magy. egyesuleti konyvnyomda Fonda es Tarsai, 1866.) 
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the text of the Concordat. Yet in 1856 the imperial 
government denied Scitovszky the right to hold a national 
synod, and shortly thereafter abolished the Primatial ap-
83 
peals court as well. Rauscher did not raise a formal 
claim to the leadership of the episcopate in the entire 
empire, but his undeniable influence at Court and with the 
Vatican gave him de facto primacy among the bishops. Bishop 
Haynald informally recognized his primacy when he requested 
Rauscher's view on the application of two diocesan regula-
tions in the light of the Concordat. Rauscher took advan-
tage of the opportunity to reply to Haynald in a long letter 
84 
of February, 1857 which he also published. 
*** 
Hungarian Churchmen in the National Revival 
Rauscher's assessment of Scitovszky's goal of a 
"national church" was essentially accurate. Allied with 
Hungary's Old Conservatives, he aspired to a sort of 
national political leadership, to which the historic rights 
of the Primacy gave him a reasonable claim. In 1850 his 
name stood at the head of 131 signatories to a national 
petition to the Emperor, in 1857 he handed a similar peti-
tion to Franz Joseph, and his leadership of the pilgrimage 
83. Adrianyi, op. cit., 118-19. 
84. Haynald to Rauscher, in German, February 6, 1856 and 
printed reply by Rauscher, in Latin, February 21, 1857, in 
Vienna, Erzdiozesanarchiv. Bischofsakten Rauscher. The 
regulations in question were among those passed by the 
controversial diocesan synod of 1822. Janka Wohl asserts, 
in a generally reliable article, that Haynald had earlier 
spoken out against the Concordat.-- "Kardinal Haynald," 
Deutsche Revue, eine Monatschrift 17,1 (1892), 66. 
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to Mariazell in September, 1857 must be seen in the same 
85 
light. 
I have earlier discussed the role of Scitovszky in the 
constitutional restoration. Two other Hungarian priests who 
were prominent in this context were Archbishop Bela 
Bartakovics of Eger and Canon Janos Danielik of Eger. 
Bartakovics was an energetic and strongly patriotic pre-
86 
late. In 1856 he repulsed attempts by the authorities 
to interfere in the administration of schools in his arch-
87 
diocese. In 1859-60 he was prominent, like Scitovszky, 
in the Conservatives' patriotic manifestations, and was 
strongly criticized by the Nuncio for his public statements. 
At the fiftieth anniversary celebration of Scitovszky's 
ordination in November, 1859, Bartakovics declared that the 
absolutist regime in Hungary was illegal. Austrian 
displeasure was so strong that the Nuncio feared Bartakovics 
would be forced to resign from his see, and used his 
influence to prevent any speech by him at the festive 
85. Adrianyi, op. cit., 48, 132; see Chapter I. 
86. Although he was one of the most important 
Archbishops of Eger, there has been no major biography of 
Bartakovics. The most substantial treatments are the article 
by Janos Perger, "Kis-Apponyi Bartakovics Bela egri ersek," 
in Emlekkonyv kis-~onyi Bartakovics Bela ~ri ersek aranr 
misejenek unnepere CEger: Er8ekil-yceuw.I-·kny. ~--1865)~ and- .. 
Lajos Haynald, ~ml~!-.:.!?~sz~~ !!l~l.Y~! !5i.§..:~P!20ny_i Bartakovics 
~el~ .!1~.9Y!fl~ .. Lt2§~.9:i! ~§. .t§ti.§~!-~l~Ds19 ~g__!:"io er_seknek gyasz-
gnn.§p.§l.Y.§ ~J.J5-aJ!OAYal mondott ... (Eger: Lyceumi nyomda, 
1873), 30 p. The eulogy reveals no especially close rela-
tionship between the speaker and the deceased. Bartakovics 
sponsored the translation of many important Catholic works, 
including Bishop Ketteler's Die Arbeiterfrage und das 
Christentu~ (Mainz: F. Kirchheim, 1864)-- Adrianyi, Ung~~B 
und das ~ Vatikanu!f! (Koln: Bohlau, 1975), 83. 
87. Perger, 33. 
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88 
opening of the Erdelyi Muzeum-Egy]~~ in Kolozsvar. 
Like Scitovszky, Bartakovics was ex officio prefect of the 
county where he resided. 
Danielik was even more active, and more disturbing to 
89 
the Nuncio. He was a canon in Eger since 1849, and for 
many years a close friend of Zsigmond Kemeny, editor of the 
Deak-affiliated, moderate newspaper Pesti Napl6. Between 
1848 and 1855 Danielik edited the moderate but increasingly 
90 
political Catholic paper, Religio. In 1857 he also 
joined the editorial board of the Pesti Napl6. As Vice-
President of the Szent Istvan Tarsulat since 1854 and 
through his connections in the church he was able to rapidly 
increase the number of Catholic, aristocratic and clerical 
subscribers to the Pesti Napl6. The President of the 
society became a leading financial supporter of the Pesti 
91 
Napl6. The paper strongly opposed the Concordat, and 
88. Lukacs, ~ Vatik~~ §.§. Magyarorszag, 126. 
89. The most complete biography of Danielik is by 
Jozsef Szvorenyi, Emlekbeszed Da~ielik tiszteleti l~grol 
(Budapest: Franklin, 1891), 35 p. On his political career, 
see Laszlo Csorba, "6jabb adatok a kiegyezes el6keszitesenek 
tortenetehez," ~magyar polgari ~tal~~ulas kerdesei 
(Budapest: Az ELTE B6lcseszettudomanyi kara, 1984), 423-45 
and ibid., "Nemzetelet es hitelet kozos valaszutjan," 
Tanulmanyo~ ~ p.2l_g~ro_eodaE_ jell~_gg!"ol az .§IJ.Js§IJ.yuraJ_gm 
koraban (forthcoming). 
90. "A katholikus hirlapirodalom," in Janos Kiss and 
Janos Sziklay, ~ katholikus Magy~~Q~§za_g (Budapest: 
Stephaneum, 1902), I, 534-9. 
91. Geza Buzinkay, "A birodalomhu demokrata forradalmi-
sagt61 a nemzeti ellenallas forumaig: a Pesti Naplo," in A 
magyar sajto tortenete II ~48-1867 1 (Budapest: Akademiai, 
1985), 373-76. Szvorenyi notes this society was the only 
Hungarian one (aside from the Academy) which continued to 
operate throughout the 1850s; Deak, Eotvos and others regu-
larly participated in its assemblies. A study of the socie-
ty also emphasizes its special political role in this 
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Danielik himself organized secret assemblies of the 
Concordat's clerical opponents in his Pest apartment. Among 
92 
those in attendance were three bishops. The Nuncio 
claimed that Danielik was in contact with the emigration, 
and that he used the society and Religio to support the 
93 
political opposition. In a polemic with the Reformed 
journalist Marie Ballagi, Danielik insisted that Catholicism 
94 
was no less favorable to liberty than Protestantism. 
The celebration of St. Stephen's Day (August 20) in 
1860 provided an opportunity for a national religious demon-
stration reminiscent in some ways of the Mariazell expedi-
tion three years earlier, but more overtly political. The 
holiday had been celebrated in Vienna from the fifteenth 
century until 1849, but had then been banned. For 
Hungarians their first king symbolized not only the estab-
lishment of Catholicism in the kingdom, but the unity of the 
lands of the Crown of St. Stephen. The press prepared the 
celebration with pamphlets and articles emphasizing the 
saint's national significance. Scitovszky led the public 
procession through Pest streets bedecked with national 
flags. In a speech, he declared that "King Stephen's 800-
year-old land may be shaken temporarily, but not de-
stroyed ... " The celebration concluded with a banquet 
attended by the leading aristocrats and featuring a speech 
period: "A Szent Istvan Tarsulat," 1n op.cit. 
92. Revesz, 145-6. 
93. Lukacs, [:.. yatj,kag ~§ ~ilg~orszag, 127. 
94. ~esti Nap1o, September 1 and 7, 1860. 
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by Count Gyula Andrassy. The church continued to organize 
such celebrations in succeeding years, both in Hungary and, 
95 
from 1861, in Vienna as well. 
Scitovszky, Bartakovics and Danielik were the most 
prominent Catholic clergymen participating in the protests 
against the Protestant Patent in 1859-60. The court did not 
nominate the Primate as one of the Hungarian members of the 
Expanded Reichsrat of 1860, although it nominated Rauscher, 
Saguna and the Croatian Bishop Strossmayer. Scitovszky, 
other prelates and the clergy welcomed the October Patent in 
both speeches and pastoral letters. The emperor recognized 
the Primate's symbolic leadership of the Hungarian struggle 
for constitutional restoration. When he summoned him to 
Vienna at the time of the Diploma's promulgation, he greeted 
him with the words: "You are the winner." ("On a 
96 
gyoztes.) 
The Emperor well knew that Szecsen's negotiating skill 
was more important than the symbolic leadership of Scitovszky 
for the granting of the Diploma. The Primate was less 
concerned than Szecsen with constitutional principles, but 
strongly concerned about the revolutionary threat to the 
political order and to the prestige of the church. By his 
public pronouncements he sought to increase the authority of 
the church, not only to further religious goals but also to 
95. Gyula Gabor, A szent-Istvan-napi unnep tortenete 
(Budapest: Franklin-Tarsulat, [1927]), 27-36. 
96. Bari~iu, Parti alese, III, 39. 
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97 
outflank and disarm the radicals. 
The foundation of the first Hungarian Catholic politi-
cal daily newspaper at this time revealed the conservative 
strategy of the episcopate more clearly. Idok Tanuja began 
to appear in January, 1860. It proclaimed as its princi-
ples: God and country, religion and liberty. Prominent 
among its constitutional principles was the insistence on 
98 
the union of Hungary and Transylvania. Pesti Naplo 
attacked the new paper as an attempt to divide the nation. 
The President of the Szent Istvan Tarsulat forbade the 
greeting to the new paper planned by the Tarsulat~s weekly, 
Religi6; as a result the editor of Religio resigned. 
The new paper secured 1160 subscribers already at its incep-
tion, a high number but one-third that of Pesti Naplo; more 
than half of these were clergymen. The editorial policy of 
Idok Tanuja was cautiously patriotic but conservative. 
Bishops wrote many of the articles, and recommended the 
99 
paper to their clergy and believers. After the Vatican 
provided aid for the victims of a flood in Hungary in 1862, 
97. The Nuncio presented this view of Scitovszky~s strategy 
in his letter to the Vatican of May and December, 1860. 
Vatican State Secretary Cardinal Antonelli considered 
Scitovszky~s policy prudent, and rejected t~e Nuncio-urg~ng 
that he be reprimanded. Lukacs, A Vatikan es Magyarorszag, 
129-30, 134-5. 
98. Janos Sziklay, Negyven ev ~ katholicizmus tortene-
tebol. [i "Magyar Allam" negyveneves jubileuma. 1859-1899 
(Budapest: Nyomtatott a Hunyadi Matyas-intezetben, 1899), 4-
9, 13, 22. Magyar Allam was the paper~s successor. 
99. Buzinkay, "A katolikus restauraci6 programjanak 
megjelenese: az Idok Tanuja," in !i magyar sajto tortenete 
II/1, 402-4. Haynald recommended the paper to his clergy 
and schqolteachers; Imecs, Erdely pUsp6kmegye kronik~ja ~ 
XIX. szazadban, IV, 197. 
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the paper organized the first Peter's Pence collection in 
Hungarian history, which sent 13,000 fl. to Rome for the 
100 
support of the Holy See. 
Rumors circulated that Idok Tanuja received sub-
stantial subsidies from Michael Haas, the Bishop of 
101 
Szatmar. Haas shared Rauscher's dislike of the 
patriotic wing of the Hungarian episcopate. At the begin-
ning of 1860 he alleged that Danielik twice obstructed a 
motion of the Szent Istvan Tarsulat to express support for 
the Papal States. One letter to Rauscher cited several 
examples of purported agitation against pro-Austrian clergy-
men; Haas wrote that "they intend to intimidate all people 
loyal to the government, and spread discontent even by means 
102 
of the church and school." Haas also communicated his 
103 
pro-Austrian views to Archbishop Kunszt. 
The revival of political life after 1859 also stimu-
lated a renewed interest in Catholic Autonomy. The episco-
pate petitioned the authorities in 1850 and 1860 for the 
administration of Catholic foundations by a mixed commis-
sion. The Emperor actually promised the future fulfillment 
100. Sziklay, 23-5. 
101. Ibid., 402. 
102. Haas to Rauscher, January 17, 1860, in Vienna, 
Erzdiozesanarchiv. Bischofsakten Rauscher 1860. Despite his 
sharp tone, Haas was optimistic: "Die Opposition wird sich 
legen, sobald man aufh6ren wird auf Napoleon zu hoffen." To 
a degree he was correct. Haas' relationship with Danielik 
grew warmer in later years. 
103. Haas' many personal letters to Kunszt, and those of 
the even more conservative Archbishop Haulik of Zagreb, are 
in Kalocsa. Foegyhazmegyei Leveltar, Personalia. Kunszt 
Jozsef ersek privat-levelei. 
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of this request in April, 1860 but then took no further 
action. The public was barely aware of these unsuccessful 
efforts. In 1861 several county assemblies revived the call 
for Autonomy and the idea that it would increase popular 
concern for the welfare of the church. One assembly ap-
pealed to Bartakovics to support Autonomy, while others 
104 
called for its legislative enactment by the diet. 
The easing of censorship made possible a lively debate 
in the press about Catholic Autonomy. The editor of Idok 
Tanuja, Antal Lonkay, came out in favor of lay participation 
in church economic administration in December, 1861, as an 
105 
antidote to religious indifference. The most radical 
contribution to the debate was an anonymous pamphlet by a 
German of Hungary, Kirchliche Zeitfragen, in 1863. The 
author, possibly a minor clergyman, railed against the arbi-
trary power and inordinately high income of the bishops and 
many pastors, and demanded they be chosen by election and 
given a uniform income, and lay economic administration 
introduced. An anonymous rebuttal accepted the author's 
call for the holding of synods and election of bishops, but 
deplored his hostility to the higher clergy and impractical 
106 
call for economic levelling. Vilmos Fraknoi, who had 
104. Kalman Torok, "A kath. auton6mia mozgalmak tor-
t~nete 1848-tol napjainkig," Katholikus Szemle 7 (1893), 
364-5; Jeno Torok, so. 
105. Sziklay, 19. 
106. "Egyhazi korkerdesek" ("Kirchliche zeitfragen") c.imu 
ropirat. Taglalva ~ kath. lelkesz altal (Pest: Emich 
Gusztav, 1863), 137 p. I could not locate a copy of the 
German pamphlet. 
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earlier attacked the February Patent in Idok Tanuja, de-
nounced the ideas of "democratia" and social equality as 
"evil spirits of the age." Catholicism~s problems were the 
result of the struggle of good and evil, and the answer was 
a more effective Catholic press. L6nkay also modified his 
view in a conservative direction. Parish elections might be 
beneficial, he wrote in September, 1863. But the spirit of 
the age was the real source of the decline in religious 
faith, and the political rivalries characteristic of many 
Protestant congregations should be avoided. Yet for all his 
ecclesiastic conservatism, L6nkay was imprisoned for two 
weeks after attacking the decision of the Transylvanian 
107 
deputies to enter the Reichsrat in 1863. 
Under the Provisorium some Hungarian bishops continued 
the strategy of the previous decade of using their indepen-
dent position to mediate between the contending parties, 
moderate their conflict, and strengthen the position of the 
church. Two different applications of this strategy were 
the comportment of Jozsef Kunszt and Janos Danielik. 
In 1861 Danielik was appointed a councillor on the 
Hungarian Locumtenential Council with responsibility for 
108 
church affairs, a post which he held until 1864. His 
109 
leadership of the Szent Istvan and Szent Laszlo 
107. Sziklay, 15, 27-9; [Fraknoi and Kalman Rostahazy], 
sz6zat, hazank katholikusaihoz, kulonosen katholikus 
klerusahoz (Pest: Pfeifer Nandor, 1863, 48 p. The attribu-
tion of authorship is from Ferenc Rottler, ed., Egyhaz, 
muveltseg, tortenetiras (Budapest: Gondolat, 1981), 346. 
108. Szvorenyi, 14-16, 20. 
109. See Chapter IX. 
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societies made him one of the most prominent members of the 
patriotic wing of the Hungarian clergy. In the early months 
of 1862 he prepared the first detailed compromise plan of 
the Provisorium. Accepting the validity of both the Diploma 
and the Patent, he proposed a one-time constituent 
"Reichsrat ad hoc" of all the peoples of the empire. Its 
members would be partly elected by the provincial diets and 
partly appointed by the emperor, and its task would be to 
resolve the most pressing financial problems and establish a 
budgetary procedure for the future which local diets would 
then approve. The politicians he submitted it to in April 
did not see how it would be possible to replace the 
110 
Reichsrat already in existence. 
Archbishop Kunszt, the second-ranking prelate in the 
Hungarian hierarchy, submitted a less detailed compromise 
plan when Governor Palffy requested his political views. 
Kunszt blamed the recent failures of the government in 
Hungary in 1861 on the system of county government, which 
left the path open to demagogy and class privilege. Like 
Danielik, he did not insist on Hungary's constitutional 
independence, but proposed a modification of the Patent 
according to guidelines to be voted by a special conference 
110. "Politikai programmterv," Eger. Foegyhazmegyei 
konyvtar, Ms. 2046/17. A German draft accompanying the 
project submits it for the "hohe Meinung auf geeignetem 
Wege" of an unidentified "Excellenz," possibly in Vienna. 
Danielik expected that a Hungarian government would be 
formed, but recognized the prerogatives of the Minister of 
State with respect to the Reichsrat. He proposed that the 
Transylvanian question be reserved for solution by a future 
diet. 
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111 
of notables in Hungary. The conference would propose 
those modifications of the laws of 1848 dictated by the 
financial and military interests of the empire. He was 
pessimistic about the prospects of willing Hungarian parti-
cipation in the Reichsrat, but expressed confidence that the 
loyalty of the empire~s peoples would facilitate a solution, 
"no in equality, but in unity, not in unanimity, but in 
112 
harmony." There was no recorded follow-up to the plan, 
perhaps because the Old Conservatives were no longer willing 
to expose themselves to public outrage. Palffy rejoiced at 
having found one who shared his views, and on the eve of 
the provincial synod in Kalocsa in 1863 appealed to him to 
assure the moderation of the participating bishops in the 
113 
interest of "the great issue of the compromise." 
Cardinal Rauscher welcomed the February Patent as a 
measure in defense of central authority and German culture. 
Speaking in March, 1863 about the imperial unity which he 
believed the 1856 bishops~ conference had symbolized within 
the church, he expressed the hope that this assembly "would 
114 
soon find its counterpart in the political realm. In his 
attitude toward liberalism and constitutionalism, however, 
111. Copy of Kunszt to Palffy, January 9, 1862, in 
Kalocsa. Foegyhazmegyei leveltar. Personalia. Kunszt Joszef 
ersek privat-levelei. 
112. Copy of Kunszt to Palffy, January 31, in loc. cit. 
The letter indicates they had recently held an oral 
consultation at an unspecified location. 
113. Palffy to Kunszt, March 9, 1862 ("Ich bin glricklich, 
in Euer Excellenz einen politischen Gesinnungsgenossen 
gefunden zu haben ••• ") and September 1, 1863 ("a kiegyenli-
t8d~s nagy k~rd~se"), in loc. cit. 
114. Wolfsgruber, 168. 
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Rauscher shared some of Rechberg~s misgivings about 
115 
Schmerling~s policy. 
Schmerling and the Emperor were unwilling to abandon 
the Concordat, but showed some willingness to modify it in 
detail. A Protestant section in the Ministry of Culture was 
established for the first time in April, 1860, headed by the 
Saxon Joseph Andreas Zimmermann. The granting of an autono-
mous statute to the Austrian Protestants in April, 1861 
violated, in the view of the Holy See, the special position 
116 
of the church. Schmerling formally accepted the 
Reichsrat liberals~ demand for renegotiation of the 
Concordat in June, 1862, sending Bishop Joseph Fessler to 
the Vatican for this purpose in May, 1863. His negotiations 
117 
lasted nearly a year, but bore little fruit. The mild 
Josephinism of Schmerling~s ideologist, Hans von Perthaler, 
sought to weaken the political power of the church but at 
the same time increase its administrative and spiritual 
autonomy in the interest of the freer development of society 
as a whole. Perthaler was confident that in freely organized 
115. Ibid., 495-98. 
116. Correspondence of Pius IX and Franz Joseph, in 
Friedrich Engel-Janosi, ed., Die politische Korrespondenz 
der Papste mit den osterreichischen Kaisern, 1804-1918, 258-
9. The simultaneous statute of the Saxon Lutherans was very 
similar, and Zimmermann played an active role in both; see 
Teutsch, Geschichte der ev. Kirche in Siebenburgen, II, 
382-5. 
117. Wolfsgruber, Kirchengeschichte bsterreich-Ungarns 
(Wien: Heinrich Kirsch, 1909), 87. Fessler was commissioned 
by Rauscher to defend the Catholic position versus the 
liberals in the pamphlets Die Revision des Konkordats, Die 
Protestantenfrage in Osterreich, and Zur Orientierung uber 
die gemischten Ehen in bsterreich. 
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church assemblies neither "the abstract Romish spirit of a 
few fanatical and pietistic bishops" and "the servile 
deference of others toward a brutal ... government ... 
[will prevail] ... The deeper religion enters 
the soul, i.e. ceases to be [mere] tradition, and 
becomes a true inner necessity of life and experience, 
the stronger will be its special character, opposing 
118 
the antinational tendency. Increasing nationalism 
in the churches, of course, had mixed blessings for the 
Austrian state. This opening to liberal Catholicism on the 
theoretical level could justify the court's generosity 
toward the non-Catholic churches yet occasional reliance 
on the Catholic episcopate's conservative instincts. Neither 
119 
episcopate nor liberals found the compromise satisfactory. 
Serving in the Locumtenential Council, Danielik was 
alert to the beginning of Schmerling's decline and the rise 
of the Esterhazy "camarilla" in 1864. In June, 1864 he 
discussed the possibility of compromise negotiations with 
his friend Baron Antal Augusz, a former associate of 
120 
Archduke Albrecht. Danielik visited numerous Vienna 
officials in November, proposed Augusz as negotiating 
partner, and advised his friend that winning over "an 
118. Boyer, 2li Johann von von Perthaler, Auserlesene 
Schriften, ed. Ambros Mayr (Wien: w. Braumuller, 1883), II, 
204-12. 
119. On the conflict between the Austrian episcopate and 
the Reichsrat liberals under Schmerling, see Wolfsgruber, 
~irche~eschichte, 86-88. 
120. The discussion of the Danielik-Augusz 
negotiations is from Csorba, 423-45, based on their letters 
preserved in Eger and Szekszard. 
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archduke" would improve their chances. As the result of 
Augusz' meeting with Albrecht, the fateful Augusz-Deak nego-
tiations began in Pest on December 27, 1864. Thereafter 
Danielik's role was reduced to relaying information from 
Deak to Augusz while the latter was in Vienna. Danielik's 
role in the initiation of the compromise crowned the series 
of mediating efforts by Hungarian prelates. It is unim-
portant whether he took the first steps "alone.'' His 
countless connections with the Deak party and the Hungarian 
hierarchy made him an ideal intermediary on the Hungarian 
side, just like the church whose conservatism and dynastic 
121 
loyalty consistently favored the middle way. 
*** 
The years of constitutional conflict in Hungary 
coincided with the decisive confrontation between 
ultramontanism and liberalism within the international 
Catholic Church. Pope Pius IX (1846-78) became 
increasingly conservative with the passing of the years as a 
consequence of his suffering at the hands of Italian liberal 
nationalism. His view of liberalism and nationalism as the 
twin errors of the age achieved classic formulation in the 
§Yll9~u~ of Errors, under consideration from 1860 on and 
finally published in 1864. Ultramontanism represented not 
only political conservatism, however, but also a revival of 
121. Due to financial embarassments and health reasons 
Danielik withdrew from public life before the Compromise 
could be enacted, and devoted his remaining years to 
scholarship. 
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traditional Catholic piety. The Austrian state found it 
convenient to ally itself with the ultramontane movement 
through the Concordat of 1855. The church gained a repeal 
of many of the restrictions it had suffered since the 
eighteenth century, while the empire sought a Catholic 
Church that was an active agent of imperial unity. 
The Holy See moved tentatively toward a Concordat with 
Austria~s Greek Catholics, as well. Various Orthodox 
bishops had agreed to unions with Rome in the seventeenth 
century in order to secure the social advancement of their 
clergy. Rome and the empire were willing to facilitate this 
advancement for the sake of the universal church. However, 
the defense of the eastern rite brought Greek Catholics, 
especially Romanians, into conflict with the Holy See over 
questions of church discipine. 
The Hungarian lands were a major arena of the contest 
between ultramontanism and liberal nationalism. Nationalism 
found expression in the episcopate~s defense of the rights 
of the Primate vis a vis the Archbishop of Vienna and the 
resistance to Austrian absolutism in general as well as the 
political engagement of the Romanian bishops. Liberals saw 
the establishment of lay participation in administration in 
the so-called Catholic Autonomy as a response to the liberal 
spirit of the age and its perceived religious malaise. 
However, the dominant attitude of the Catholic episcopate 
was moderation and a quest for compromise rather than 
liberal reform. 
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